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ABSTRACT
The area of media assistance is not a widely known part of the Development Aid sector, even though
it has been in existence since after World War II and has grown significantly since then as part of the
development agenda. Media Assistance has been included in the strategies of Western and nonWestern donors as part of their overseas Aid programmes in many regions, supporting journalism
and media with the objectives of contributing to accountability, transparency, governance and
ultimately, democracy. This thesis examines the impact on the Media Assistance sector of the
arrival of digital technologies into the ‘information ecosystems’ in which it operates. Whereas
historically in Media Assistance, broadcast media and the press have been the preferred (or
available) media for achieving development objectives, digital technologies such as mobile phones
and social media are radically altering the landscape of Media Assistance. In Africa, where mobile
phones are heralded as a “gift to development”, donors have been exploring the potential of these
tools to achieve their development objective. As a consequence, the area of ICTs for Development
(ICT4D) has flourished. At a time when the narrative in the western media has been of an “Africa
Rising” and of techno-determinism, this research asks whether these digital technologies are indeed
being used to achieve Media Assistance objectives in practice. If they are being integrated into
media development programmes – or even replacing media development programmes - to what level
of success? To answer this question, the thesis focuses on two countries in East Africa – Kenya and
Tanzania – and interviews 40 stakeholders working in media assistance in these countries. The
research finds that in fact many projects continue to use traditional methods. This is due to issues
such as the digital divide, technical literacy, and continuing preference for traditional media by
wider populations in these countries. Furthermore, the study notes that the virtual public sphere
facilitated by the internet is not accessible to all, nor is it an ideal public sphere. Finally, citizens of
these countries, the research finds, do not necessarily use these technologies for participation or
accountability ends. Thus, despite widespread diffusion of technologies such as mobile phones in
both these countries, there is still an important role for traditional media development approaches to
achieve donor objectives in the new information ecosystem.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

It is no exaggeration to say that the world of media has changed dramatically in the
past two decades. Technology has changed how people consume and interact with
media. Innovations in communications technology have changed the way in which
information is produced and shared. Where once the audience passively listened or
watched news, today end users – the audience – now create media, comment,
participate, interact, discard. Academic debates talk of a communications revolution
that has changed human relationships, “between individuals, between government and
citizens and even between states” (Voltmer and Sorensen, 2016:19).
This thesis is an investigation into the field of media assistance in two Sub-Saharan
countries and the possible impact these changes in media technologies have had on
this sector. Media assistance, as will be explained in more detail below, focuses on
supporting media institutions and media systems, journalists and media organisation
so that they can better fulfil their democratic role as the fourth estate, as public sphere
and a watchdog on power.
The central question of this thesis asks:
RQ1: is media assistance still relevant given the digital transformation in the
media and communications environment?
How have digital technologies impacted on media assistance in practice? Has this
communications revolution rendered media assistance obsolete? And what is the
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potential for digital technology to achieve the goals and objectives of donors of media
assistance?

In order to answer these broad aims, this thesis puts forward the following research
sub-questions:
RQ1a. What is Media Assistance and how does it relate to the policy aims of its
donors?
RQ1b. What are media assistance donor goals and what are the methods by which the
sector addresses these objectives?
RQ1c. Is there evidence to show that media makes a positive contribution to donor
goals?
The Media Assistance sector is a little-known part of the international aid sector and is
founded on certain assumptions about media’s positive role in society and democracy.
Also known as ‘Media Development’, Kumar describes it as “assistance designed to
promote robust, independent media” and adds that “such assistance is based on an
underlying assumption that independent media contributes to the building of
democracy and economic development” (Kumar, 2006:1).
This thesis provides a critical introduction to these assumptions and gives a history of
the sector in order to contextualise the issues raised. Often, these goals have centred
on improving standards of journalism and building capacity in media systems with the
aim of strengthening democratic institutions. This is pertinent because if media
assistance projects have been successful to date, then it will be of further interest
whether digital technologies can do any better to achieve the same goals. Therefore,
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the thesis includes an historical evaluation of whether media development has been
successful in its goals. The research also looks at the methods the sector uses in
projects to address these objectives.
Related to media’s link to democracy are theories that explore media’s relationship to
development, and these will also be examined. The research contextualises media
assistance within the larger Aid/Development industry as it is situated in this industry
and funded by the international aid donors to achieve certain objectives. Who these
donors are and what their objectives are will be examined as they have been the main
driver for media development in the past decades.
There is considerable debate amongst international actors, and academia, on how ICTs
and digital media might contribute to democracy and development. For instance, there
are optimistic (some might say utopian) views of what ICTs can do for development
goals such as freedom of expression and participation. The thesis therefore
investigates the literature on whether ICTs and digital media impact positively on
democracy and whether they can replace the role of traditional media and journalism
in media development practice. Thus, their potential contribution for achieving donor
objectives will be assessed. So, the thesis also examines:
RQ1d. How do digital technologies (or ICTs) relate to development? Furthermore,
what is the relationship between ICT in Development and Media Development (or
Media Assistance)?
As the research is focused on the Sub-Saharan African countries of Kenya and
Tanzania, the thesis looks at the current state of journalism and media in these
countries and the political economy of the media systems there. To address whether
media assistance is still relevant in these two profile countries, the thesis queries:
3

RQ2. Have digital technologies impacted on the relevance of media assistance in
the chosen case study countries?
In order to answer this, this thesis puts forward the following research sub-questions:
RQ2a. What are the characteristics of the current media and information environment
in the selected case studies of Kenya and Tanzania?
This will give a picture of what the weaknesses of the media systems are and audience
needs in these countries. The research can then assess whether digital media can better
address the needs of Kenya and Tanzania’s media systems in media assistance
interventions. To do this it looks at:
RQ2b. What are the characteristics of current media development practice in a modern
East African context?
RQ2c. Have ICTs impacted on the practice of media assistance in the chosen case
studies?
This question reviews current projects undertaken in the region and through primary
research with those working directly in the practice of media development assesses the
potential of digital technologies to address both individual project and broader
development goals.
Through the primary research, the thesis examines the extent to which media
development organisations have adopted a digital agenda on the ground in Kenya and
Tanzania, the reasons underpinning such adoption and with what effect.
In so doing, the research examines:
4



The nature of media assistance projects taking place in Kenya and Tanzania



Whether digital technologies are being used to address project goals

This will help address the question of what the strengths and weaknesses of digital
technologies are compared to traditional media development approaches for achieving
donor goals. It will therefore address:
RQ2d. What is the rationale for a continuing emphasis on traditional media methods?

As noted, the arrival of new media or digital media has changed the dynamic of the
relationship between media and development, and subsequently the landscape for the
media development sector. It has been called transformative for consumers but it has
also altered the ways media businesses are run and even threatens their existence. The
internet has impacted on the traditional media economic model and many well-known
media outlets, especially newspapers, have closed. Many are struggling with finding
successful business models for the digital age, both in Africa and elsewhere.
As the old revenue model comes under pressure, journalism standards have suffered in
some places, with an emphasis on the bottom line and survival rather than support for
balanced coverage and good investigative journalism. The new economic model has
also meant a decline in the number of journalists employed. At the same time, citizen
journalism and user generated content (UGC) means readers can get different sides to
a story. Digital technologies have disrupted the news space and media has become
more fractured as a result of the explosion of choices available to media consumers.
This research examines whether these technological changes have affected the role of
media assistance, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. It asks whether new digital
5

technologies have the potential to achieve media assistance goals such as transparency
and accountability and good governance. If so, does it render traditional media
development approaches redundant?
The research adopts a practice-based perspective and therefore investigates whether
media development NGOs in Kenya and Tanzania are changing the structure and form
of the projects on the ground as a result of the growth in these technologies. The
thesis garners the views of those working directly on the ground as to the potential of
digital technologies for their project goals. If digital technologies can better address
the needs of the media systems and audiences, it will be reflected in these projects
which are trying to strengthen and bolster the media sector and media environment in
the respective target countries.
In answering the above questions, the research will critically examine the broader
field of media development and assistance, identify changes and tensions experienced
in the sector and the trends likely to affect it in the future. As such, it contributes new
knowledge to the study of transformations within the international media landscape
brought about by digitalisation and how this has impacted on the field of media
development.
First, however, the thesis offers a clarification of the meaning of media development
as deployed in this thesis.

What is Media Development?
The discipline of media assistance (also known as media development, and used
interchangeably) is a complex and not widely understood area of international aid and

6

the first priority is to clarify it here. ‘Media development’1 is a part of the
international aid sector that focuses on using media to improve the quality and
availability of information to audiences and citizens in developing and transitional
countries. The field of ‘media development’ aims to improve the quality of news and
content and news delivery to citizens, by supporting free and independent media, and
enhancing media systems.
The importance of a free media in supporting democratic development is often
acknowledged both in academic literature and in the policy statements of development
agencies (Norris and et al, 2010; DFID, 2008). There is wide-ranging consensus
around the idea that the evolution of a free and plural media is essential for holding
government to account and enabling an informed citizenry (Islam, 2006; Norris,
2006). This relationship between media and democracy will be examined further in
later chapters as it is the basis for much media development work.
For the purpose of this research, ‘Media Development’ is understood as a sub-division
of the international Aid industry which focuses on media and journalism as a catalyst
for development objectives.
According to the Centre for International Media Assistance (CIMA) website, the term
media development refers to “evolution and change in the fields of news media and
communications. Such change relates to a range of institutions, practices, and
behaviours including the rule of law, freedoms of expression and press, education
systems for journalists, business environments, capacities of journalists and managers,

1 Inverted commas are used to here to differentiate Media Development, as a division within the
overseas aid sector and an industry in itself, from media development which could be just understood as
development of media over time.
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as well as support for a diversity of views in society” (“What is Media
Development?,” n.d.).
So, in this research, media development is understood as the collective term given to
activities that are undertaken to strengthen journalism, media systems and enhance the
public sphere in developing and transitional societies. These activities are meant to be
catalysts for this change. And very often with the intention that it will contribute to a
strengthening of democracy.
As such, media development activities can include improving the capacity or skills of
media outlets, training of journalists, creating networks for the support of journalists,
revising or refreshing journalism education in third-level institutions, and providing
equipment for better quality reporting. Larger and more ambitious projects can
involve transforming previous state broadcasters to a public service model.
The organisations within this sector who implement these media development projects
on behalf of the funders or sponsors are called Media Non-Governmental
Organisations (NGOs) or are also referred to as Media Assistance Organisations
(MAOs) (Drefs and Thomas, 2015)
The major donors in international media assistance include both governmental
overseas aid departments and also the multi-lateral agencies such as the United
Nations. The largest funders are the United States government overseas aid
programme (USAID), Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), the
European Union, through agencies such as European Instrument for Democracy and
Human Rights (EIDHR) and the European Endowment for Democracy. The French
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and
Development, Global Affairs Canada, the Government of Norway (NORAD), Japan
8

International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Netherlands, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), and
the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) are also considerable
donors (Angaya Juma and Myers, 2018; Kalathil, 2017; Kalathil and CauhapeCazaux, 2015).
Multi-lateral organisations such as the World Bank, UNESCO, UNDP and UN
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) are also significant
contributors.
In addition to these governmental agencies, media assistance is also supported by a
large group of foundations and philanthropic organisations. These include the Konrad
Adenauer Foundation, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the John
S. & James L. Knight Foundation, the Mac Arthur Foundation, the Friedrich Naumann
Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Open Society Foundations.
More recent private donors include Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Jigsaw
(formerly Google Ideas), Knight Foundation, Omidyar Network (eBays Pierre
Omidyar) and the Skoll Foundation (eBays Jeff Skoll) who emanate from Silicon
Valley.
It has been suggested that philanthropists who come from the world of digital
technology have sought to create new models of philanthropy that emphasise the roles
and principles of digital media. Anne Nelson claims “vast new fortunes have been
made in the field over the past decade, and some of these are now creating new
models of philanthropy that display a keen interest in the role of digital media in the
world” (Nelson, 2012). This may impact on the tools being prioritised in development
projects and this is the subject of later discussion. As Nelson argues “the Gates
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Foundation may not have invented “media for development,” but in recent years it has
undoubtedly helped to set the agenda” (Nelson, 2012).
Different generations of donors also correspond to different eras of regional emphasis.
In the post-war period, the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation played a
central role in the creation of the Marshall Plan (1948-1952) to rebuild European
economies and institutions, including the news media. In the aftermath of the 1989
collapse of the Soviet Union, the Open Society Institute and other foundations
contributed substantial funds into an effort to help the former Soviet bloc countries
transition to a democratic free-market system (Nelson, 2012).
In terms of geography, the new generation of tech-based foundations devotes most of
its international attention to Africa and India. Interestingly, both regions are also
considered among the most dynamic markets for digital media, which makes them
“fertile ground for experimentation in media and development” (Nelson, 2012).
So, whereas historically media assistance efforts and interventions have focused on
traditional print and broadcast media, more recently digital technology has gained
more attention as tools in development projects.

Media development vs. Media for development
In addition to its low profile within the aid sector, media development is often
confused with ‘media for development’, otherwise known as ‘Communication for
development’ (C4D). The distinction is qualified here. As noted by Cauhaoe-Cazaux
and Kalathil (2015), ‘media for development’ is
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the employment of media and communication in order to promote or facilitate
development goals, for example, when media is used to organize health campaigns or
to promote human rights. In these cases, media is more an instrument than a target

But with Media development projects they stress: “The main purpose of these projects
or programs is to strengthen the quality, sustainability, and/or independence of the
news media. Media organizations are the main “direct” beneficiaries of these projects
and frequently the counterparts” (Kalathil and Cauhape-Cazaux, 2015: 7-8).
Scott (2014) refers to media development as “donor-led initiatives designed to
develop the media sector within a specific country or region. … these include efforts
aimed at promoting independence, plurality, professionalism, capacity, an enabling
environment, economic sustainability and media literacy” (Scott, 2014: 4). He argues
that the distinction between media development and M4D projects is that the focus in
media development is on developing the media, rather than using the media as “a
mechanism for achieving other development outcomes”. Or as Geertsema-Sligh notes
“in media development, the focus is on the development of the media themselves, and
not on the message communicated through the media” (Geertsema-Sligh, 2019: 2439).
Scott also explains that with media development activities, the media are understood
as “more an institution, acting upon and in concert with many institutions in
society…. Media are implicated, not necessary in individual behaviour change of
collective empowerment but in aspects of democracy, good governance and economic
growth” (Scott, 2014:6).
‘Media for Development’ or Communication for Development (C4D) is using media
as an outlet to broadcast, transmit and communicate information to individuals in the
11

developing world which will be of benefit in their lives or increase knowledge of their
rights. Very often this is done in the form of radio or TV programmes, often soap
operas and dramas, but can also take the form of direct educational shows or
humanitarian programming.
Of note is that many of the radio and TV programmes produced as content during
media development projects have become very popular, winning large audiences and
local media awards. The BBC Media Action hospital soap opera “Taste of Life” TV
programme in Cambodia was set in a nursing college and tried to change attitudes and
behaviour around HIV and AIDS. It was broadcast twice a week on the country's most
watched station, TV5 and the state broadcaster, TVK. Another TV soap opera,
“Jasoos Vijay” set at the same time in India, was also an award-winning thriller series
about an HIV-positive detective. The programme communicated key messages about
HIV and AIDS and in the last series, it reached more than 70 million people across
India.
With C4D or M4D approaches, the media are seen as instruments for changing
individual norms and behaviours. The defining features of M4D interventions are
that they use mass media, in particular radio, for information provision and are used
for cultivating attitudes. This approach has been characterised by a narrow definition
of development associated with behaviour change rather than “broader social change
involving tackling social structures and the root causes of poverty” (Manyozo, 2012:
110).
Interestingly, it is estimated that USAID spends four times more on C4D-related
projects than it does on media development (Cary and D’Amour, 2013).
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Origins of the Sector
Despite much focus in the literature relating to media aid being on the post-Cold War
period, the origins of international media assistance can be traced back earlier to
Europe during the post-World War II years. Media Development, as a concept, first
took shape during this period.
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the U.S. government joined forces with
European agencies in the reconstruction of Europe. Their reconstruction plan included
efforts to re-establish a viable news media following the defeat of Nazism (Glossner,
2010; Jakubowicz and Sükösd, 2008; Kaplan, 2012).
One of the immediate priorities for the Allies after 1945 was to break up the existing
Nazi structures. Radio was targeted in particular, because it had been used as a
propaganda tool during the Third Reich. The Allies were keen to re-establish radio as
independent from the state, to act as a critical voice and to try to prevent extremism
ever taking hold again.
Khabyuk and Kops (2010) noted how public service broadcasting was strongly
promoted in Germany by the Allies against “undemocratic political influences in the
media.. in the democratic Germany that they wanted to install”. The authors suggest
that Germans were lucky to be forced to accept a broadcasting concept that, in
retrospect has been a central factor in the stability of post-war Germany (Khabyuk and
Kops, 2011:128).
The Allies wanted the German public broadcaster to represent the whole of society
and reflect a range of views and political opinions. In West Germany, public service
broadcasting was based on French, British and American models, notably the BBC.
Local journalists were trained in Western news practices, “objective reporting .. its
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respect for the truth, and its high journalistic standard” (Nelson, 2012). Independence
from the state and political objectivity were of central importance and remain the
hallmark of public service broadcasting in Germany (Kaase, 2000).
The idea of political re-education after the period of totalitarian Nazi rule was a core
element in the Allied restructuring of Germany, and thus the mass media played a
large role in their plans. In his book, The History of U.S. Information Control in PostWar Germany, Warkentin (2016) described how the US occupation forces established
new media outlets “to attempt the mass re-education of an entire nation” (Warkentin,
2016:xii) .
According to Kaplan, this resulted in a more diverse media:
The machinery of fascist propaganda was dismantled, and new broadcast media were
instructed in independent news production. Newspapers were created with mixed
editorial boards, free of party control. These efforts were especially effective in
Germany, where a vibrant and politically diverse media culture flowered within a
decade of the Nazis’ defeat (Kaplan, 2012:12).

Post-war Germany is a notable case in the study of media development and provides a
template for future media development and its link to democratic reform. Nelson
noted that “within a decade, the West German news media was noted for both quantity
and quality, and the United States discovered media development as a tool for
democratization” (Nelson, 2012). Independent media was thus understood as integral
tool for the promotion of democracy.
Tellingly, media development work was later to be compared to a “Marshall Plan of
the Mind”. The European recovery plan funded by the Allies after World War II was
14

called ‘The Marshall Plan’ after General George Marshall. Whilst its primary aim
was to get the economies of Europe back on their feet again, its secondary aim was to
protect against the spread of communism (Cox and Kennedy-Pipe, 2005).
In 1992, the BBC World Service established a department to undertake training of
journalists in the former Soviet Union and called it 'BBC Marshall Plan of the Mind
Trust” (MPM) (later called BBC Media Action). In naming the BBC unit after the
Marshall plan, there was recognition that media could be another tool for
reconstruction toward democracy, the free market, and protection against other
regimes (Gerrish, 2014). And it is for this reason that international donors have been
funding media assistance activities for decades.

Funding for media development
And so, in the past half century, development donors and agencies and private
foundations have engaged in activities designed to influence the form, structure, and
practices of media in countries around the world for their development goals. What is
the scale of this investment?
Cauhapé-Cazaux and Kalathil (2015) found that Overseas Development Assistance
(ODA) from OECD countries devoted to media support (averaged over the period
from 2006 to 2012) show an annual disbursement of U.S. $377 million. In 2012, the
disbursements were close to U.S. $441 million, representing 0.40% of total sector
allocable ODA. These figures are for total media support; support for media
development (mainly independent media) represents a smaller percentage (Kalathil
and Cauhape-Cazaux, 2015).
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Source: OECD-DAC database: 2012 ODA disbursements in constant prices2.

Figure 1: ODA allocated to media support in USD million (2006–2012) and percentage of
total sector allocable ODA

Of note is that the biggest providers of development cooperation for media assistance
were the United States, Germany, Japan, Sweden, and the EU institutions. In 2015, for
instance, the US contributed $65million for media development activities (Kalathil,
2017).
While supporting media, not all the donors have the same priorities and do not follow
the same strategies. A detailed analysis of the type of project supported reveals a
difference among the donor priorities. Japan gives media infrastructure priority, while
Germany has invested strongly in public diplomacy. In the area of media

2 These results are based on the estimation that all ODA allocated under the CRS purpose codes “media
and free flow of information” (15153) and “Radio, television and print media” (22030) have to be
considered media support.
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development support, the United States provides the most aid by far (Kalathil and
Cauhape-Cazaux, 2015).
However, these are not the only donors and in some African countries for instance,
they are definitely not the dominant ones. The Scandinavian countries, Denmark, and
the Netherlands are very much involved in media development and have a different
approach to democracy and media assistance. These donors have different media
systems in their home countries, with European countries more aligned to the public
service broadcasting model than the US.
Myers notes that most of the Western European donors have “well-articulated, rightsbased justifications for supporting media development” (Myers, 2009:9).
Certainly though, with reference to dollars contributed, the USA is by far the biggest
donor historically and that is why much of the literature on media development and
assistance refers to its policies. Kaplan (2012) found that the United States was the
largest national source of funding for media development, at 46 percent of the total
(Kaplan, 2012) and the model it promotes in its media assistance programmes is the
liberal free market model of the press.

Rationale for Media Development
As noted, media development activities, as this thesis understands the term, first
appeared in the aftermath of World War II and were enlisted to help improve media
systems and standards of journalism as countries moved towards democracy, or away
from autocracy. As Kumar alluded to earlier, donors hoped that by fulfilling the role
of Fourth Estate and providing a forum for public discussion, independent media and
journalism would contribute to democracy.
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Media assistance efforts would create media that “when allowed financial and
editorial independence”, would hold state authorities accountable and nurture
democracy by encouraging an “open but respectful exchange of ideas and opinions”
(Kumar, 2006:1).
This is highlighted by the fact that most media development projects have historically
been funded under the democracy programmes of the international and bi-lateral
donors. Media development is expected to produce better journalists, better media
organisations, and better media systems. And these media systems are designed to
produce, or at least contribute to, the development of democracy.
Academic and policy research has recognised the role independent media plays in the
process of improving democratic governance. For example, after evaluating decades
of data on press freedom and political development, Karlekar and Becker (2014)
found that a healthy press sector is highly correlated with broader political freedoms.
Taking a closer look at countries that experienced sharp increases or decreases in
political freedom, the researchers found that press freedom is often a lead indicator for
the direction a country’s political system is headed; it usually indicates an acceptance
of other individual freedoms also (Karlekar and Becker, 2014).
Evidence as to the potential benefits of media development programmes is varied but
media freedom is often seen as central to transparent governing. For instance,
Amartya Sen, the Economics Nobel Laureate, said: "There has never been a famine in
any country that has been a democracy with a relatively free press. I know of no
exception" (Sen, 2011:343). He held that famines can only occur if nobody is allowed
to criticise policy decisions, government action, inaction or corrupt practices that lead
to crop failures and food shortages.
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Stromberg found that better informed citizens are more likely to vote, which in turn
encourages politicians to be responsive (Strömberg, 2004). And Besley and Burgess
found that having an informed and politically active electorate strengthens incentives
for government responsiveness ( Besley and Burgess, 2001).
In research by Internews, an American media NGO, it was found that countries with a
“free press”3 are less dependent on foreign aid, provide a better environment for
businesses and are more likely to be democratic and have much stronger democracies
overall, than countries without a free press. The research claims that broad-based
economic growth and political stability seem to be strongly connected to the presence
of a free and independent press (Susman-Peña, 2012).
Norris’s (2006) well-known study explored the role of the free press in strengthening
good governance, democracy and human development. She found that freedom of the
press contributes positively towards democratic governance. She argues that the news
media is most effective in strengthening the process of democratisation, good
governance, and human development where “journalists function as watch-dog over
the abuse of power (promoting accountability and transparency), as a civic forum for
political debate (facilitating informed electoral choices), and as an agenda-setter for
policymakers (strengthening government responsiveness to social problems)” (Norris,
2006:4).
Norris’ study focused in particular on how a free press and independent media can
strengthen the public sphere, by mediating between citizens and the state, facilitating

3 A measure on the Press Freedom Index produced annually by Freedom House, an US based NGO that
conducts research and advocacy into democracy, political freedoms and human rights.
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debate about the major issues of the day, and informing the public about political
issues and government actions.
UK academic James Curran (2002) agreed that independent media not only provides a
channel of communication between government and governed but that “above all the
media provide a forum for debate in which people can identify problems, propose
solutions, reach agreement and guide the public direction of society” (Curran,
2002:225).
According to the US Department of State, democracy depends upon a knowledgeable
citizenry whose access to information enables it to “participate as fully as possible in
the public life of society and to criticise unwise or oppressive government officials or
policies” (Cincotta, 2013:6).
Gunther and Mughan (2000) have called mass media the “connective tissue of
democracy” and Linz (1975) listed freedoms of association, information, and
communication as essential components of democracy (Gunther and Mughan, 2000;
Linz, 1975).
Studies such as these highlight how independent media might play an important role
in democracy, facilitating debate, improving governance and reducing corruption, in
turn increasing economic efficiency and stability.
Consequently, justifications for media development, or media assistance, as part of
their aid spending are usually expressed by donors in terms of promoting these goals accountability, good governance, citizen participation - in developing and transitional
countries.
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As former World Bank president James Wolfensohn claimed, “to reduce poverty, we
must liberate access to information and improve the quality of information. People
with more information are empowered to make better choices” (World Bank Institute
2002:14).
In supporting these projects, media assistance donors believe that media will play an
important monitoring role in a democracy that enables citizens to hold their
governments and elected officials accountable (Juma and Myers, 2018). Figure 2
outlines this Media development Theory of Change as deployed in this thesis.

Figure 2. Media Development Theory of Change
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The model suggests that media assistance methods and activities, such as those
outlined here, will contribute to a stronger media sector, a strengthened fourth estate
and an enhanced public sphere. These in turn contribute to more reliable information
being available for citizens, further educating them about issues relevant to them and
stimulating discussion which can empower citizens to hold those in power to account.
This process will in theory result in increased participation in public life, improved
accountability and thus better governance.
As noted by Von Kaltenborn-Stachau, “media can play a powerful role in shaping and
influencing public debate and opinion. By giving a voice to the otherwise voiceless,
media brings marginalized actors into the public sphere and allows them to influence
the public debate and to pressure policymakers to act” (Von Kaltenborn-Stachau,
2008:21).
Scavo and Snow argue “where citizens feel that they have the right, the opportunity
and the mechanisms to demand action or justification, they are empowered as active
participants in the decisions that affect their lives” (Scavo and Snow, 2016:47). A
functioning, independent media assists these goals in that is provides information,
stimulates discussion and enables people to interact directly with decision-makers.
On balance, there are those who question whether media development projects do in
fact result in better journalists and media systems (Coman, 2000; Gross, 2003;
Ognianova, 1995). And a number of scholars have criticised the hidden agendas of
Western media assistance funders. They argue that the activities of ‘democracy
promoting’ organisations are usually strongly tied to the interests of capitalism and/or
US geo-strategic ambitions (Gills, 2000; Saltman, 2006; Taylor, 2002 in Barker,
2008).
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Barker noted how democracy has become a ‘legitimising force’ for American foreign
policy “helping fuel the myth that America is a benign and democratic leader of
international affairs”. He argues that American or British foreign policy protects the
interests of powerful elites who want to protect the status quo at home and expand
their (profitable) interests overseas (Barker, 2008:1).
Furthermore, he contended that ‘countries of greater geostrategic value seemed to
need more “democratisation, for example, both Afghanistan and Iraq have roughly the
same population but ‘oil rich Iraq received 20 times more American media
development assistance per year than war-ravaged Afghanistan, one of the poorest
nations on earth” (Barker, 2008:15).
These concerns over media development in the context of democracy promotion will
be addressed later with regards to the evaluation of media development interventions
and their impact, in particular with regards to the media systems of the post-Soviet
States.

Evolution of Media Assistance
Although the template was set during the post-War period, it was the fall of the Berlin
Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Communist regimes of the Soviet Bloc in the
immediate aftermath that was the more significant moment in the history of the sector.
With the huge political changes following the collapse of communism, and the
disruption to the flow of financial support from USSR, there was a transformation of
media systems in many regions (Kumar, 2006). The trend for many countries was the
shift from government control to private ownership. Media change often happened
hand in hand with social and political change. In post-communist Eastern Europe, for
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example, media freedom was often “the first sign that the old communist system was
truly dead and a new, free system had begun” (May and Milton, 2005: 140)
It was in this context that media development gained traction, as western donors saw it
as a cornerstone to their liberalisation policies. Their objective was to promote
democracy and open up new markets.
Early media development projects tended to be solely training for journalists, for
example, in post-communist Europe and Russia. As the sector grew with more
funding from international donors, the projects became more multi-faceted and had
more elements in addition to training. They might then include the production of news
programmes or reviewing the local journalists’ code of practice or updating the
curricula of local university journalism faculties.
Working with the regulatory environment within programme countries also became a
large part of the media development projects when it became obvious that training
journalists would be futile if the media was not permitted to carry out its role properly.
So projects started working towards encouraging the right “enabling environment”
(Price and Krug, 2002) - that is, media-specific laws, policies and institutional
structures which support free and independent media.
As noted, media is frequently discussed in the context of its vital contribution to
public debate, the public sphere, and democracy. But the media does not and cannot
operate successfully without the other institutions of a democracy functioning
properly. In their 2002 study on the ‘enabling environment’, Price and Krug
questioned what the political and cultural conditions are that make laws effective and
useful in achieving a media structure that serves to bolster democratic institutions.
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They looked at considerations such as the separation of powers, independence of the
judiciary, and establishment of reliable regulatory bodies. They called these the
broader set of enabling factors for the media. Larger societal issues such as the state
of the economy, the extent of demand for information, and the extent of ethnic and
political pluralism are also contributing factors to whether an environment can support
media freedom.
Price and Krug concluded that although free and independent media may organically
arise in a mature democracy, artificial steps are necessary in many transition contexts.
They argued that shaping a functioning democratic society required many stages and
that the formation of media law and institutions is one of the most vital (Price and
Krug, 2002).
Price and Krug warned that whilst laws that support independent media are necessary
for the development of civil society, they alone do not guarantee how media will
function. For free and independent media to work, the community in question must
also value the role that the media play. They claimed:
Taking laws off the shelf of another society and plugging them into the processes of
transition will certainly, alone, be insufficient. The public acts of drafting and
debating media laws can be enacted as a drama, a teaching drama that educates the
citizenry in the role that the media can play. The process might encourage a rise in
consciousness about the value and functioning of free speech and its operation in the
society (Price and Krug, 2006: 97).
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The authors concluded: “Reform is most effective, or perhaps only effective, when it
includes efforts to develop a public culture that is supportive of the media sector”
(Price and Krug, 2006).
This is important here because media development projects often try to establish and
support independent media outlets but sometimes this is done in environment that may
not be conducive to its long-term survival. Programmes that focus on supporting an
independent media sector must take into account the economic and legal realities of
the media environment. Regardless of the number of journalistic support
programmes, a low functioning economy and a weak advertising market provide little
revenue for independent media operators. Thus, media development programmes have
increasingly focused on the business side of news media outlets including personnel
and financial management as well as marketing and audience research skills in order
to strengthen media outlets’ capacity to sustain themselves.
A regulatory structure that is supportive of freedom of speech and independence of
media is also desired. Thus, donors also support progammes that focus on the mediaenabling infrastructure such as revising existing laws, training lawyers, judges and
legislators in media law, assisting advocates for media freedom, and providing
training in international laws and standards.
So, although media development projects may have started out as relatively
straightforward journalism training programmes, very few projects in the current day
focus solely on training media professionals and setting up new media outlets; they
now aim to provide support for the wider media environment that includes media law
reform, strengthening supporting institutions such as independent media councils and
building a strong media infrastructure in a given country.
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Another area of support has been for journalism education and curriculum revision in
universities. Many journalism faculties in developing countries remain teaching the
theory of journalism exclusively, while others teach only ‘tradecraft’ without proper
foundation in ethics and other studies (Hume et al., 2007). Often programmes merge
the teaching of public relations with journalism, without the journalists’ mission as
independent watchdogs holding the powerful accountable. Media Assistance to
universities aims to improve educational curriculum, improve technical capacities and
enhance the expertise of the faculty.
Thus, as a result of increased donations and interest in the sector, media development
projects have now morphed into large scale training and communication plans with
budgets in the millions.
Furthermore, increasingly the lines are blurred between media development and media
for development (M4D) where projects have training and capacity building activities
combined with content development and production of programmes for development
ends.
Media development projects can take the form of journalism training plans which
include creating public broadcasting messages or news reports on important issues.
Sometimes they provide life-saving information in emergency situations; say in a
famine, or to improve various health issues, such as sexual and reproductive health,
child and maternal health and preventing infectious diseases. Many of these projects
contain training components, with journalists being trained in production and
journalistic values in addition to producing content, very often with development
messages.
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What this means is that some projects now unconsciously merge ‘media development
support’ and ‘media for development’ approaches. What has evolved in practice is
that projects now often contain both elements. Scott (2014) calls these “media
development hybrids”.
As Myers highlighted in a report for the Centre for International Media assistance:
With such a broad set of activities, it is almost impossible not to let the definition of
“media development” spill over into the use of “media for development” and thence
into the realm of communications for social or behavioral change—or using media for
“intended outcomes.”
Take, for instance, a grant for a women journalist’s group, who run their own
activities (such as annual general meetings, benevolent fund for members, internal
capacity building) and who produce radio programmes aimed at educating market
women about elections. This is a project that supports media as a sector in itself, and
that supports media as a tool for education and development. These are the sorts of
overlaps that make it difficult for donor organizations to categorize and quantify their
media efforts (Myers, 2009:8).

Thus, these ‘media development hybrids’ make it difficult to define projects as solely
M4D or media development. This is part of the change taking place within the sector
as the data from this research will also reveal.
Therefore, although initially this thesis’ specific objective was to critically explore
changes to media assistance due to digital technologies, it is more difficult to separate
the two – ‘media development’ and ‘media for development’ - particularly in the
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa where there has been more focus on M4D projects
for food security, education and health objectives.
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Warren Feek (2008) argues the distinction between the two areas is “false and
distracting” and should be abandoned altogether. He argues that this adds
unnecessary confusion and detracts from the status of the broader field of
communication and media for development.
On the other hand, Jo Weir (in Alcorn et al., 2011) has argued that the distinction
between the two terms is important and should be preserved stating that: “there is a
huge difference between media development and media for development and those
two terms are often confused…. It sometimes blurs the lines between journalism and
advocacy” (Alcorn et al., 2011:12).
Regardless of this distinction, the model which is being promoted is the based on the
western liberal model of journalism, and this itself is not without its own challenges or
controversy.

Pressures on the Media Development Model
Traditionally in media assistance, western donors were promoting a media system
based on their own media in their home country. For instance, during the 1990s US
donors were proposing a liberal, free-market model to the post-Soviet States.
Due to the largely western origins of funding and technical support, numerous media
development initiatives build on the western concepts of free press and democracy. As
a result, media development activities “emphasise the universalisation and
globalization of western experiences and approaches in deliberative democracy”
(Manyozo, 2016:3).
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This approach has been questioned by media scholar James Miller who noted
“unprecedented international efforts to codify and inculcate Western-style news
reporting and editing” in places quite different from American newsrooms and
classrooms, with “nothing like the journalistic or political-cultural history of North
America and Western Europe” (Miller, 2011:39).
Media scholars such as Hallin and Mancini (2004) and Curran and Park (2000) have
debated the problem of the universal application of the Western model of journalism
to other regions. And whether it is wise to try and transplant one model upon another
has been treated with scepticism (LaMay, 2008).
Another reason to question the exportation of this model is that the traditional
business model in newspapers and broadcasting in the West no longer seems to be
working. In recent years there has been a crisis in the western media model, due to
falling advertising revenues, a failing business model and competition from alternative
news sources. Many western countries’ news industries have suffered at the hands of
harsh economic conditions and technological disruption. Western news agencies that
only recently “set the global agenda are now struggling to survive under hostile
market conditions” (Nelson, 2013: 32).
U.S. networks have closed many of their foreign bureaus and global broadcasters such
as CNN and the BBC are cutting staff and international reporting. International
broadcasters, including the Voice of America, the BBC World Service, and Deutsche
Welle, are “under increased pressure to defend their services” (Nelson, 2013:32).
In this environment, other governments have been expanding their media outside their
borders. For instance, China is making increasingly large contributions to media in
Africa in recent years. Central China Television (CCTV) opened its third international
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bureau in 2012 in Nairobi, with programming in English, Chinese, and Swahili and
oversees dozen bureaus across the region. The Xinhua news agency has 28 bureaus on
the African continent as of 2018 and in 2012 launched a China African news service
(McKenize, 2012).
Admittedly, both China and the USSR were involved in media development since
before the fall of the Berlin Wall. For instance, China has been engaged with media
support in some African nations since the 1950s (Wu, 2012) and the USSR gave
massive amounts of aid for several decades during the Cold War (some $26 billion in
1986 alone).
But Russia and China’s activities in the international media sector are now growing
again and this presents a challenge to the traditional media development model. As
noted by Satter:
The push by Russia to influence the media among its near neighbors ….. poses a
major challenge to the international media development community, which over the
past two decades has spent hundreds of millions of dollars trying to help build
sustainable and independent media institutions in the former Soviet space (Satter,
2014:5).

The narrative is changing from the dominance of the west, and Western donors
insistence on linking development aid with democratic developments (Street et al.,
2012).
To give some further context to media development in the current day, it should be
noted that there is also a decline in support for western liberal democracy itself.
Having been heralded as “the triumph of the West, of the Western idea… evident first
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of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism”
(Fukuyama, 1989:1) there has been a democratic recession in recent years.
According to the American political scientist Francis Fukuyama, the fall of the Berlin
wall signalled the ‘End of History’, as his famous work was titled. He claimed,
somewhat optimistically, that western liberal democracy was the end point of
humanity's sociocultural evolution and the final form of human government
(Fukuyama, 1992).
Fukuyama wasn’t saying that history itself was finished but was referring to the
growth of a kind of universal consensus on the justness or the rightness of the
principles of liberal democracy. He noted also that liberal principles in economics –
the “free market” – seemed to have spread and produced unprecedented levels of
material prosperity (Fukuyama, 1992).
Samuel Huntington disagreed with this in his 1993 book The Third Wave of
Democratisation, which noted the global trend that had seen more than 60 countries
throughout Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa undergo some form of
democratic transitions since Portugal's "Carnation Revolution" in 1974. He countered
that the widespread Western belief in the universality of the West's values and
political systems was naïve and that continued insistence on democratisation and such
‘universal’ norms would only antagonise other civilisations.
Huntington warned about the potentially disastrous effects of an arrogant democratic
imperialism and insisted that promoting democracy and modernisation abroad ‘means
more war, not less’ (Kurtz, 2002).
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In reality, despite Fukayama’s optimism for liberal democracy, since the fall of the
Soviet Union the process of global democratisation has slowed down. Since then, the
state of freedom has been situated somewhere between stagnation and decline. In
2019, Freedom in the World, an index of global freedoms, declined for the thirteenth
consecutive year (Freedom House, 2019).
As Micheal Abramowitz, President of Freedom House wrote in his essay, Democracy
in Crisis, ‘political rights and civil liberties around the world deteriorated to their
lowest point in more than a decade in 2017, extending a period characterized by
emboldened autocrats, beleaguered democracies, and the United States’ withdrawal
from its leadership role in the global struggle for human freedom’ (Abramowitz,
2018:1).
He added that even in the developed West, “the world’s most powerful democracies
are mired in seemingly intractable problems at home, including social and economic
disparities, partisan fragmentation, terrorist attacks, and an influx of refugees that has
strained alliances and increased fears of the “other” (ibid).
So, in the years since media assistance first emerged as a tool for democracy,
democracy promotion has experienced a crisis of purpose. This is noted in the
pushback from a number of non-democratic governments that are actively resisting
democracy assistance and also in a “growing questioning by people in many parts of
the world of the value and legitimacy of the concept of democracy promotion itself”
(Carothers, 2008:133).
The efforts by the United States and its partners to impose a democratic
transformation of Iraq and Afghanistan created questions over the legitimacy of
Western democracy promotion. The status of the United States as a symbol of
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democracy and human rights has been further damaged by the election of President
Donald Trump.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace argues that under President Trump,
U.S. democracy has reached “its lowest ebb of at least the past forty years”. It
laments that if the United States continues its present course, “it will end up stranded
on the side-lines, or even on the wrong side, of the global democratic struggle,
precisely at a time when that struggle is more acute than at any time in modern
history” (Carothers and Brown, 2018)
Thus, democracy no longer enjoys an unchallenged place on the international scene as
the only political system viewed as successful and credible. Larry Diamond calls it
the “democratic recession” (Diamond, 2015:1).
So, although liberal theorists argue that media liberalisation usually results in
democratisation, since the fall of the Soviet Union the process of global
democratisation has seemingly slowed down, or in some cases has been reversed.
Freedom House4 noted, in its latest available data, that global press freedom fell to its
lowest level in over 14 years in 2017 and only 13 percent of the world’s population
enjoys a Free press—that is, 'a media environment where coverage of political news is
robust, the safety of journalists is guaranteed, state intrusion in media affairs is
minimal, and the press is not subject to onerous legal or economic pressures'
(Freedom House, 2017:25).

4 Freedom House may be wedded to a specific notion of press freedom. For example Noam Chomsky
and Edward S. Herman have criticized the organization for excessively criticizing states opposed to US
interests while being unduly sympathetic to regimes supportive of US interests (Chomsky and Herman,
1994).
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Paradoxically, this decline in press freedom has occurred against a backdrop of
increasingly diverse news sources and platforms. Even though there has been
exponential growth in mobile phones and internet connectivity across the world, “the
creation of high quality, independent media is still a distant dream for most
developing countries” (Nelson, 2014).
So, despite the optimism of the Western donors about what societal changes that their
model of media liberalisation might bring for democracy and development, ‘thing
haven’t come out as they should’ (Coman, 2000:50).
For instance, in Africa, media liberalisation often resulted in media ownership by a
few powerful individuals, most often with political allegiances.
In this environment of increased pressure on the traditional journalism business model
and from online news sources, there has been a collapse in trust in journalism itself.
The Edelman Trust Barometer in 2017 found that trust in media has fallen
‘precipitously’ and is at an all-time low in 17 countries. The study found also that
“trust has been so corroded that we now trust leaked information much more than
traditional news sources; and algorithms over human editors” (Edelman, 2017:5). A
report on the news business from the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism,
based on data in 40 countries across six continents, found an increasing number of
people saying they actively avoided the news – no less than 32% (Hölig and
Hasebrink, 2018).

Foley noted, “what is now more apparent is that when we talk of democratic
journalism, Western standards or the Anglo-Saxon model it is increasingly the case
that no one knows what they mean anymore… The ideal, pushed mainly, but not
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exclusively by US agencies, is in trouble itself because it hardly exists” (Foley, 2006:
9).

The trend of increasing “fake news” competing for audience attention should be noted
also. Wardle and Derakhshan call this “information disorder” and argue that
“contemporary social technology means that we are witnessing something new:
information pollution at a global scale” (Wardle and Derakhshan, 2017: 4). As
McNair notes in his book Fake News: Falsehood, Fabrication and Fantasy in
Journalism:

The capacity of the digitised, networked information space – what I refer to as the
globalised public sphere – to disseminate news and information of all kinds… has
coincided with a particular political moment where journalistic objectivity and
professionalism are under challenge from state and non-state actors as never before
(McNair, 2017: i).

These are some of the challenges that the media development sector has met in recent
years in a fast-changing environment. As noted, sceptics question the media
assistance model, or whether there is a model at all, and what the legacy of media
assistance is (Fog, 2004; LaMay, 2008; Rhodes and Lange, 2007). The question
arises again whether promoting this model in the developing world is the right way
forward? This thesis questions whether it is still relevant in the current political and
technological landscape.
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New Technologies and Media Development
The introduction of new technologies to the media production cycle has also impacted
the media development sector. Kaufman reports that the traditional focus on
journalism training is at least partly being replaced by an increasing focus on ICT
provision. Support for ICT grew from virtually 0 per cent to 17 per cent of media
development assistance between 2002 and 2008 (Kaufman, 2012). And so, the sector
now increasingly overlaps with Information Communication for Development
(ICT4D).
Mottaz (2010) reported that “nearly every U.S. media development grant encourages –
and often requires – the incorporation of digital components” (Mottaz, 2010: 10). By
incorporating digital technology, such projects also implicitly take on digital
communication methods such as interactivity and social media communication.
Digital technologies such as mobile phones and social media have been heralded for
creating new spaces for public discussion across societies, new platforms for news and
journalism, new direct avenues for communication with those in power and new
opportunities to hold those in power accountable.
Proponents of using ICTs in development talk of the positive contribution that
technology can make to engagement and participation and thus accountability and
governance (Heeks 2009; Castells, 2008). Technology has indeed increased citizen
participation in crowd-sourcing and government service delivery reporting in some
countries with services such as YouGov in the UK and Ushaihidi in Kenya. ICTs
have also contributed positively in humanitarian assistance projects and health
development projects for increasing effectiveness and speed of communication
processes and programmes.
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There is evidence certainly that the technology is being used, to varying degrees, by
citizens to contribute to news-making and information exchange in influential ways
(Mabweazara 2011; Moyo, L. 2011), as the data will reveal later. This research
project investigates whether digital technologies can likewise assist in addressing
donor goals such as accountability, transparency, participation and good governance
that have traditionally been addressed by media development methods.
If this is the case, as the techno-optimism would suggest, it would question whether
established media development methods - such as supporting journalism training,
bolstering traditional media outlets for a stronger public sphere and strengthening
institutional capacity of media organisations - are outdated. As Puddephatt and
Oesterlund note:
What donors did twenty years ago, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and
dictatorships throughout the world, is unlikely to be appropriate today. Many of the
issues, of course, remain the same – such as how to ensure balanced content from a
variety of independent sources - but there are new stakeholders, new technologies,
new patterns of access, and new patterns of control.... It follows that the modalities for
support to media development and freedom of expression need to be changed and
modified (Puddephatt and Oesterlund, 2012: 5).

This thesis will thus critically evaluate the overlap of the field of ICT4D as applied to
media development activity. It will investigate the potential of digital technologies for
achieving media development goals in the focus countries. Theoretical debates on the
contribution that ICTs can arguably make to development and governance will be
examined further in the Chapter 3.
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This section has given a picture of the tensions and pressures the media assistance
sector has experienced in the recent past. It has outlined the global political and
technological context in which media assistance now takes place. Much has changed
since it first emerged as a tool for democracy promotion. As such, it is a most
interesting time in which to investigate the role and relevance of media assistance.
The next section will briefly introduce the research site from where the data is
collected and recent trends on the African continent in relation to new digital
technologies.

Recent developments in Africa
In recent years the narrative of Africa has changed. According to some ‘Africa is on
the rise’, with GDP and social indicators telling a story of improvement in people’s
standard of living (Severino and Ray, 2007). In the Western media, articles discuss
growing populations, new businesses and Africans taking charge of their
development. While the world’s economy was recovering from the global financial
crisis, many African countries have been enjoying a boom.
One factor that has been suggested as contributing has been the take-up of information
and communications technologies (ICTs) and, in particular, the growth of mobile
phone communications. In 2011, Time Magazine wrote how “mobile phones are
transforming Africa” calling Kenya “Silicon Savannah” 5.
What is widely acknowledged is the huge growth in mobile phone adoption and
penetration rates that equal the West. The growth has been remarkable: in 2000, there

5 Alex Perry, Time Magazine, Silicon Savannah: Mobile Phones Transform Africa, June 30 2011
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were about five million mobile phone subscriptions in Africa. In 2019, there are
nearer 950 million (ITU, 2019).
Some authors (Alzouma, 2005; Steinmueller, 2001) suggest African countries are
‘leapfrogging’ economic growth stages through the adoption of cellular and internet
technologies, and without the need for landlines and related infrastructure.
Mobile technology has been able to bypass the infrastructural constraints that have
hindered the old land-line technology in Africa, thereby leapfrogging theoretical
stages of development or modernisation (Akpan-Obong et al., 2010).
Jeffrey Sachs, the leading American development economist based at Columbia
University, New York, called mobile phones ‘a gift for development’ and heralded an
‘end to poverty’ (Sachs, 2006) .
The high penetration rates of mobile phones in many African countries means that it is
bringing information to those who previously lived in ‘media dark’ 6 areas. Kenyans
and Tanzanians, the case study countries for this research, are embracing mobile
media enthusiastically and this is illustrated by anecdotes of African consumers
literally breaking down doors to lay their hands on a coveted device (Southwood,
2009).
For example, in Kenya, mobile penetration rates are now over 100 per cent (CCK,
2018); and 99 per cent of new internet connections in Kenya are on mobile phones, as
opposed to computers. The penetration rate reflects the fact that some individuals
now possess more than one phone.

6 This is a term used by Media Development agencies to describe areas and communities that have no
or very limited access to any media at all such as radio, TV and newspapers..
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There are several reasons for the exponential growth rate of the cell phone. The
comparatively lower cost of acquisition of the cell phone and stand-alone technology
make it more affordable by resource-poor people predominant in Sub-Saharan Africa
(Akpan-Obong et al., 2010). In Africa, mobile phones are “almost always the
cheapest and quickest way to communicate” (Etzo and Collender, 2010: 659).
Interview participants whom this researcher met in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam
predicted that in the next few years in Kenya, almost everyone in the country will
have a mobile phone and many of these with an internet connection. That would
make universal mobile access, which would change the lives of locals on a huge scale.
Ten years ago, outside the urban areas most Kenyans had little means of
communicating with each other across large distances. With this widespread change
in access to even a phone call people can now get information which was only
recently inaccessible.
South African academic Herman Wasserman notes that “although Africa might not
yet be as media-saturated as the Global North, one can increasingly say that Africans
do not live WITH media, but IN media” (Wasserman, 2011: 11).
The internet is growing as an important, and alternative, platform for political debate
and mobilisation around issues in East Africa. There has been sharp growth in
blogging and engaging in forums in this new virtual public space. For example, in
Tanzania, Jamiiforums7 has been described as an “amazing cathartic tool where even
disgruntled politicians in East Africa go and upload sensitive documents” (Rhodes,
2015, in interview).

7 Jammiforums is a popular political forum in Tanzania
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But the continued existence of the digital divide must be noted. Etzo and Collender
believe that instead of being a force only for social good, that “mobile phones are not
socially neutral tools, but can entrench or exacerbate unequal gendered or classed
power relations” (Etzo and Collender, 2010: 660).
In Africa, there exists a strong correlation between gender and ICT use, partly the
result of females’ low access to education in developing countries. In Sub – Saharan
Africa, a woman is 23 percent less likely to own a mobile phone than a man – this
divide is lower than in the Middle East and South Asia (Murthy, 2011a).
Alzouma warns that technology can “contribute to widening the gap between those
who possess everything and those who do not. They can become a tool for excluding
poor and illiterate people” (Alzouma, 2005: 352). Meinrath and Zimmerman argue
mobile connectivity does not ‘lift all boats’ (Meinrath and Zimmerman, 2012).
The recent data shows that the wider African continent is embracing mobile phones;
Africans are connecting in increasing numbers with the internet, and with each other.
However, this research discovered that they are not necessarily subscribing to The
New York Times online nor engaging actively with the political system. The digital
divide continues to be an issue even in the so-called utopian world of mobile
technology.
Ogan et al. caution that “the introduction of ICTs into the discourse of development
has caused some scholars to forget that technology cannot provide a magic multiplier
effect to the poorest of the poor” (Ogan et al., 2009: 656).
This research focuses in particular on two neighbouring countries in East Africa –
Kenya and Tanzania – and they will be examined in more detail in Chapter 5. What is
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of relevance here is the positive narratives in respect of the African continent in the
past decade and how many of them are linked to ICT use and the proliferation of
digital technologies.

This Research: Media Assistance and Digital Technologies
The potential of technology to address development problems in Africa, and
elsewhere, has become a focus for international donors and it has spawned a new area
of the Development sector – Information Communication Technology for
Development (ICT4D). New technologies are being merged into traditional
development work and new niches are appearing on the back of the growth in mobile
phones and internet to achieve objectives around health, poverty reduction, food
security. Many development programmes now start with ‘M’ or ‘E’: M-Health, MEducation, E-Government and E-learning.
This sector overlaps with this research thesis also as the fields of Media Development,
Media for Development and ICT4D become increasingly merged due to technology.
Whereas media development started out with individuals accessing information in
print and broadcast, now increasingly target groups for projects are also using ICTs.
Media assistance organisations are exploring whether to use these new technologies to
improve on what their traditional media projects used to do for freedom of expression,
accountability and governance.
Whereas historically media assistance efforts were directed towards supporting media
institutions, journalists and organisations to provide new and plural sources of news,
the internet, mobile phones and social media can arguably provide these platforms
now.
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Donors have for years been supporting projects under democracy promotion
programmes that support accountability, good governance, and participation. For
them technology looks very appealing – a method that can potentially engage citizens,
especially through their mobile phones, in reporting abuses of power in their own
locales, or possibly participate more in election processes.
Indeed, studies have found low participation in between elections as a challenge for
African democracies. In fact, respondents complain of a wide gap between citizens
and their political representatives (Afrobarometer, 2002). The same organisation
found that political and civic engagement by African youth is declining and is
particularly weak among young women (Lekalake and Gyimah-Boadi, 2016).
As a result, many new technology initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa are springing up,
financed by international funders such as the United Nations, the UK Department for
International Department, the Swedish International Development Cooperation, or
other private foundations such as Omidyar Network, and are increasingly focused on
citizen engagement and reporting. As corruption and mismanagement of government
funds is a key issue for those involved in African development, these organisations
hope to use technology to address these societal problems.
Figure 3 outlines these assumed links and compares respective theories of change
between media development and ICTs and donor goals.
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Figure 3. Theories of change Media development, ICTs and donor goals.

It is difficult to ignore the widespread claims that new technologies have the capacity
to transform international development. There is much activity in the African region
to get more people online and connected. Initiatives such as internet.Org by
Facebook – which aims to bring the internet to everyone in Africa – and Google’s
Project Loon, which wants to beam the internet to the African continent from a
network of balloons travelling on the edge of space, create excitement around the
ICT4D sector. Internet.Org says “the more we connect, the better it gets”.
There are enthusiastic debates within media studies on the benefits of digitisation and
social media on people’s lives, and on democracy. This thesis critically explores such
utopian claims of the enormous benefit of digital technology for development. The
research will reveal whether more traditional media assistance still remains relevant in
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the context of this digitalisation and the noted geo-political changes in the media
development landscape.

Outline of the Thesis
The current Chapter 1, Introduction, has surveyed the background to the media
development sector and its relationship to democracy and democracy promotion. It
has contextualised the research subject historically and portrayed the current
environment for media assistance support. It has outlined the stimulus for the research
question – the Africa Rising narrative and cyber-optimism in relation to African
development.
In Chapter Two, the research examines in more depth the academic literature on
media development. The chapter provides readers with an introduction to the
ideological foundations of the media development industry which is drawn from
different strands: theories of media and democracy and the role of media in society;
the liberal theory of the press and modernist theories of the media and development.
Habermas’ concept of the public sphere is explored and critiqued, as it significant in
media development work.
Theories of the role of media in development have progressed with time, as
demonstrated by Sieberts (1963)’ and MacBrides’(1980) theories of media and
modernisation. Opposing theories of media imperialism are examined. In Chapter
Two, these interrelated theories are discussed and assessed with relation to media
development and the model with which most of this work is undertaken. This chapter
then looks at historical evaluations of whether media assistance has been successful
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with interventions in transitional countries of the post-Soviet Bloc countries and in
Africa.
Chapter Three: As noted, Media Development overlaps with Communications for
Development and now ICT for Development and the confluence of these is explored
further in this chapter. The concept of ‘development’ and theories of development are
critically reviewed and evidence as to whether aid efforts in development actually
work. This chapter critically evaluates theories and debates in relation to new
technology in development and assesses cyber-utopian claims to its effectiveness.
The potential of the new virtual space as public sphere will be assessed and the
contribution of ICTs to recent development in Africa will be assessed.
In Chapter Four the methods used to address the research question are outlined. The
central question of this thesis is whether digital technologies can achieve media
development goals in Sub-Saharan Africa. Have ICTs rendered traditional media
development interventions obsolete? In order to address this, the thesis outlines a
series of sub-questions relating to media development practice. The views of
practitioners within the industry were garnered as to whether these ICTs are effective
at addressing their project goals.
To address the question of the potential of digital technologies in current media
development practice in East Africa, the primary research and data collection is
organised in two main parts: firstly, in-depth profiles of the two case study countries,
Tanzania and Kenya setting out the context for the research sites, and secondly,
primary qualitative research in the form of face-to-face interviews which were
conducted in the field with stakeholders in the media development sector.
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The case studies provide an opportunity to assess the media, political, social and
technological environments in which media development currently takes place and
examines how citizens of Kenya and Tanzania are using media and digital technology
today. Interview data examines the extent to which digital technologies are employed
by international media assistance programmes in Kenya and Tanzania to achieve
donor objectives. Stakeholders also contribute insights as to their potential for their
work.
These methods will thus address the question of what type of media development
activity is being carried out in the region and whether digital technologies are being
put to use by practitioners as part of their programmes.
In Chapter Five, the study presents the first part of the data and introduces the
country case studies (Kenya and Tanzania). The chapter starts with a brief look at the
history of development and journalism on the African continent. Primary and
secondary data sources are used to draw a more detailed profile of these two countries
in Sub-Saharan Africa. The historical and social context for media development and
also the current media landscape in both these countries is outlined. Then a more
detailed picture of the current media systems in both countries is presented.
This chapter assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the media systems in Kenya and
Tanzania, including the enabling environment, and the changes that have occurred due
to the growth of digital technologies in Kenya and Tanzania including present-day
journalism practice. The chapter gives context to the research site, the kind of issues
addressed by media development interventions and additionally the information needs
of citizens and audiences in these countries.
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In Chapter Six, the findings from the primary research data collection are presented.
The face to face interviews that took place in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam in 2014 and
2015 are analysed and synthesised according to important themes that will reveal the
findings and address the research question. The data tackles issues of media
development donors and their activities in the region, current media development
projects being implemented and the extent to which they are employing digital
technologies.
Examples of development projects are presented and analysed, which bring to life
current media development activity in Kenya and Tanzania and illustrates the extent to
which digital technologies are being utilised in projects. This chapter analyses the
success or failures of this adoption of digital technologies with regard to attainment of
media development objectives.
Chapter Seven synthesises and expands on the themes developed in the findings
chapter and further addresses the question of whether digital technologies have
impacted on the practice of media assistance in the region.
Successes in the incorporation of ICTs in media development projects are presented
and discussed with a detailed analysis of where they have enhanced or positively
contributed to projects goals.
The Africa Rising trope is critiqued as is why ICTs are proposed as solutions to media
development needs. The thesis also considers the source of this techno-determinism.
Issues which limit the potential of digital technologies are also discussed in particular
with reference to engaging citizens and participation using ICTs. The continued
popularity of radio is revealed and also the limitations of the new virtual public sphere

49

are discussed within an East African context and whether the ideal of participation for
all through technology is a reality.
One issue that arises from the data is the persistence of the digital divide in the region
despite increasing access to newer forms of communication and information. This is
due to cost, access, and technical literacy amongst other factors and impacts on the
extent of their use in media development projects.
In the concluding Chapter Eight, the research questions are reiterated and the
evidence is summarised. It is argued that media assistance is not redundant and
traditional media development approaches are still needed. The theoretical framework
is revisited and tested.
In this final chapter the thesis presents conclusions to the research. The limitations of
the research are discussed. The pace of technology growth presents an obvious
limitation to the current work. As mobile information and communication
technologies become ever more prevalent and connectivity is enhanced, the potential
benefits for media development goals need to be continually assessed. The wider
implications of unregulated online content in particular for democratic processes is
also subject to regulatory change and this is a further factor that needs to be taken into
account.
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Figure 4. Research Map

Finally, the research discusses the role media development can play in the future.
Media development focuses on getting reliable information to people - many of them
in Africa and living in media dark areas – and connecting with those who cannot
normally get news and information without the assistance of donors. Working at
strengthening media institutions is and is likely to continue to be an important part of
this process.
But media development is not solely about reaching these individuals with
developmental messages, or to better inform them of their rights for example, but also
about engaging citizens, fostering better civic and political engagement, bringing
people into the public sphere, to participate in public debate and bring people from
differing sides of the political and economic spectrum together. It is helping them to
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‘join the conversation’, representing views of the whole of society, reflecting a range
of views and political opinions and as such contribute to a healthier democratic
sphere.
Even with the traditional journalism training projects, this was ultimately what the
objectives were – yes improved content for better accountability, governance and
democracy, but you cannot really achieve democracy unless you are connecting with
people across all levels of society, and bringing them into the national debate, the
public sphere.
Have digital technologies changed this? The central question this research thesis asks
is whether digital technologies can achieve donor goals in the same way as traditional
media assistance methods, and whether media assistance is still relevant.
This thesis argues that it is not just relevant but possibly more important than ever and
there is a continuing need for media assistance as traditionally defined. This is because
the internet and digitisation have not necessarily resolved issues such as governance
and accountability, nor the information needs of citizens of the countries under
review.
As a recent report by the BBC finds, “the internet is not keeping everyone informed,
nor will it: it is, in fact, magnifying problems of information inequality,
misinformation, polarisation and disengagement” (Parkinson, 2015: 3).
In a post-truth global environment in which it is difficult to differentiate factual news
from ‘fake news’ or disinformation, media assistance can contribute to supporting
reliable, factual and independent news media.
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By examining media development practice in East Africa, it is revealed that
established media assistance approaches are indeed still relevant. Furthermore, the
thesis underlines the central role that media development can serve in the current geopolitical and technological landscape.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review Part 1

A history and overview of media development
The central question this thesis addresses is whether media assistance is obsolete. It
investigates the extent to which digital technologies are in use in media development
programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa and whether they have the same potential to
achieve donor goals as ‘traditional’ media development approaches. In answering
this, the thesis will also uncover whether media development has fundamentally
changed in its mission and whether its founding principles are still valid.
This chapter critically reviews these founding principles. The Media Development
sector is founded on certain assumptions about media’s positive role in society and
democracy and the donors contribute to projects based on this relationship. As ‘media
development’ is often funded under democracy promotion programmes, the chapter
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provides an overview of the literature concerned with media’s role in democracy and
the ideology motivating this area of international aid.
The literature is drawn from different strands: theories of media and democracy and
the role of media in society; public sphere theories; modernist theories of the media
and societal development. These theories are discussed and critically assessed with
regard to media development and the model with which most of this work is
undertaken. The aim of this literature review chapter therefore is to contextualise the
practice of ‘media development’ within an appropriate academic and theoretical
context.
This chapter additionally reviews historical evaluations of media development work to
better understand whether media development has been successful in its goals. An
evaluation is important because if media development projects have been successful to
date then it will be of further significance whether digital technologies can do any
better to achieve the same goals.
This review chapter, and the next, also examine the body of literature concerning the
relationship between media and development and societal transformations (for it is a
transformation of some sort that the projects in question are attempting). It will
explore the concept of development, particularly in Africa and address what is the
potential of new media or Information Communication Technology (ICT) in
development.
The body of literature examines what Powers and Arsenault have called the media’s
“potential use as a tool with which to achieve and facilitate broader economic, social,
and political development aims and objectives” (Powers and Arsenault, 2010:6).
These theories will frame the investigation of whether media assistance is still
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relevant, and whether newer digital technologies have the same positive relationship
as media for democracy and development.

Historical Context
‘Media Development’ emerged as a tool for democracy promotion in the period after
World War 2 and continued during the post-war reconstruction phase in Europe and
throughout the Cold War. Miller (2009) noted that media development during the
Cold War was “unavoidably influenced by the political self-interests of North
America and Western Europe, which were then engaged in a ‘war of ideas’ with the
USSR” (Miller, 2009:12).
At that point in time democracy may have seemed like the ideal end-game to the
citizens of the former Soviet Union. After years of government propaganda and
limited freedoms, they had an appetite for freedom of expression and a more open
public sphere.
With the fall of the Iron Curtain, a key priority in the region for the international
community was end state ownership of media and to transform it into an independent
media. The “media development” sector mobilised to transform the former state
broadcasting outlets and roll out more independent sources of news in the post-Soviet
states (Harvey, 2006; Kumar, 2006; Hume, 2004).
In response to the end of Soviet rule, Western countries (particularly the United States
in its endeavour to establish liberal democracy in the region) launched media
initiatives to upgrade journalistic, technical, and management skills and to foster an
environment supportive of a free press (Kumar, 2006).

56

Journalists in these countries were trained by Western journalists in standards of
journalism such as fairness and impartiality, balanced news reporting, accuracy and
ethics. The rationale was that an independent and free press would hold new leaders
to account, promote transparency and accountability and cement the transition to
democracy.
Hume devised the term “media missionaries” for the journalists and media workers who
then flocked to the Post-Soviet states. She recounted how:
When the Communist barricades collapsed in 1989, hundreds of Americans rushed to
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics to spread the gospel of democracy.
Among them were some of America’s most altruistic journalists, who hoped to midwife
a newly independent press (Hume, 2004:9).

This group of journalists later earned the unappealing moniker ‘parachute professors’,
due to the short-term training they delivered without any local knowledge or context
(Ognianova, 1995). As soberly described in her paper:
In general, the schedule of the "parachute professor" has consisted of landing at the
capital's airport, giving a talk (in some cases advice not at all relevant to the country's
media system) and generous promises soon to be broken, then leaving with no intent
to return. This scenario has left bitterness and has undermined the credibility of North
American journalism educators among East-Central European journalists (Ognianova,
1995:3).

Nevertheless, numerous aid agencies located to Eastern Europe contributing
significant amounts of money to help develop independent media and encourage full
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democratic transitions. This was when “media development” started to gain traction,
as more funding was made available from international donors such as the USA and
UK, hoping to democratise the post-Soviet states. Opportunities were also seen to
create a liberal free market for the press and its products.
And so, although the template for media development work can be discerned in the
post WWII years, it is really during this period of huge political change, between 1989
and 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, that it
became a more well-funded and recognised feature of international development
assistance (Harvey, 2006; Hume, 2004).
Kumar noted that “the former Soviet Union and its satellites served as laboratories
wherein the international community and its local partners refined different media
development strategies and programmes” (Kumar, 2006).
Hume has estimated that at least $600 million was spent by the US Government in the
post-Soviet States in the decade after 1989 (Hume, 2004).

Theoretical Assumptions
The support that international donors gave to the Media Development sector was
based on their belief that the media could contribute to their policy objectives. Often,
media development projects were undertaken to establish or support democracy in
countries in transition, or to encourage an open, uncensored and egalitarian public
sphere.
It was understood, and still is, that media can contribute in its ‘watchdog role’(Curran
and Seaton, 2003; Norris and et al, 2010); demanding accountability of leaders,
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combating corruption, increasing transparency, as a platform for freedom of
expression or opening up the public debate and participation. This section will look at
studies and evidence that explore these attributes and the underlying rationale for
‘Media Development’.
The research thesis is focused on the media development sector, and much of the
support and funding (but not all) for the sector comes from donors’ democracy
promotion and governance objectives. The research question addresses whether digital
technologies can achieve these same objectives, asking those who work in media
development practice whether they could replace traditional and legacy media in
development programmes. Reviewing what the literature says of the relationship
between media, democracy and governance will help clarify whether that is a realistic
prospect.

Theories of the role of media in society
With all the hype about ICTs – connectivity, citizen journalism, participation and
other much lauded characteristics – it is pertinent to ask what has been the role of
traditional media in society? This will facilitate understanding of whether ICTs can or
should replace ‘old’ media in these development projects. Examining elements of
media theory in this section will illustrate the extent to which the role of media in
society has been theorised in academic literature.
Prior to the mid-20th century, there had been little scholarly interest in the mass
media. Hardt observed
It was not until the 20th century that journalism and the mass media became subjects
of scholarship in the US in any significant way….. It was in general agreement
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however that if the conditions of freedom were maintained then the consequences of
mass communication were relatively automatic - an invisible hand leading the will of
individuals to the maximization of social good (Hardt, 1979:11)

The role of the press in a democracy was subject of a debate in the 1920s between
Walter Lippman and John Dewey after a massive public relations campaign was used
by the government to build support for the United States' participation in the First
World War (Dewey, 1927; Lippmann, 1923). Both Lippman and Dewey recognised
that the press had a crucial role in democracy, with Lippman seeing the press as a
group that should evaluate the policies of government and present well-informed
conclusions about these key debates to the public, and Dewey viewing the press as a
necessary instrument of democracy that should engage citizens in understanding for
themselves the central questions of our times. Its role was both to inform and engage.
Another study, the report of the Hutchins Commission, was formed in the midst of
World War II to inquire into the proper function of the media in modern democracies.
Written by the Head of the Chicago University, Robert Maynard Hutchins, “A Free
and Responsible Press” claimed that “the mass media were the single, most powerful
influence in modern society” (Hutchins, 1947:vii). The report argued that the media
should serve the public, and in order to do so, should remain free of government
interference (ibid). Hutchins stressed the independence of media from government
control to fulfil its role.
A later work that built on the Hutchins Theory of Social Responsibility was Siebert et
al’s Four Theories of the Press (1963). An important study and the first well-known
attempt to formally clarify the link between mass media and the societal development,
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Siebert’s Four Theories divided the world into three camps: the free world of liberal
democracy, the Soviet totalitarian sphere and authoritarian societies. They suggested
that media systems reflect the prevailing political philosophy of the society in which
they operate (Siebert et al., 1963).
According to Siebert, Peterson and Schramm the authoritarian state system requires
direct governmental control of the mass media. This system is especially easy to
recognise in pre-democratic societies, where the government consists of a very limited
and small ruling-class. The media in an authoritarian system are not allowed to print
or broadcast anything which could undermine the established authority.
Siebert also explains the libertarian theory, which is also called the free press theory.
In contrast to the authoritarian theory, the libertarian view proposes that the individual
should be free to publish whatever he or she likes. Its history traces back to the 17th
century, deriving from the work of thinkers such as Milton, Locke, Mill, and Jefferson
who asserted that human beings inevitably choose the best ideas and values. In the
libertarian system, attacks on the government's policies are fully accepted and even
encouraged. Journalists and media professionals ought to have full autonomy within
the media organisation.
The third model, the Soviet theory is closely tied to a specific ideology; that of the
communist system Siebert traces the roots of this theory back to the 1917 Russian
Revolution. The media organisations in this system were not intended to be privately
owned and were to serve the interests of the working class.
The final theory was the social responsibility theory. In this model, the media had
certain obligations to society. These obligations were expressed in the words
"informativeness, truth, accuracy, objectivity, and balance". Siebert claimed that the
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goal of the social responsibility system is that media as a whole is pluralised,
reflecting the diversity of society as well as access to various points of view (Skjerdal,
1993).
At the time, Siebert et al.’s four theories were hailed by many mass media researchers
as the most appropriate categories to describe how different media systems operate in
the world and Their analysis was viewed as a landmark study for the next forty years.
Journalists Ralph Lowenstein and John Merrill wrote: "Almost every article and book
dealing with philosophical bases for journalism has alluded to this book commented
on it, or quoted from it. It has definitely made an impact" (Lowenstein and Merrill,
1990:163).
However, later, scholars criticised the four theories, calling them biased because they
omitted the mass media of the so-called Third World (McQuail, 1987). Many nations
in the third or developing world do not fit into any of Siebert’s four camps. Curran
noticed that Siebert had little exposure to media systems in the Third World but this
“lack of knowledge about other countries need not get in the way of confident global
generalisation” (Curran, 2002:167). Skerdjal argues that Siebert’s model was
outdated and too simplistic to be useful in contemporary media research (Skjerdal,
1993).
To counter this shortcoming, a model of mass media systems in developing countries
appeared in 1980. The ‘MacBride report’: Many Voices, One World, was named after
its chair, the Irish jurist, Sean McBride. Supported by UNESCO, its aim was to
analyse communication problems in modern societies, and to suggest a kind of
communication order to diminish these problems and to address the media imbalance
between north and south. Among the problems the report identified were
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concentration of the media, commercialisation of the media, and unequal access to
information and communication in first and developing world countries. Although the
MacBride report was written almost four decades ago, these are themes that will
reappear in this current research as the data is analysed.
The ‘MacBride Report’ called for the creation of a New World Information and
Communication Order (NWICO) to improve access to media, development, and
technical assistance for poorer countries, with the aim of fulfilling human rights (the
right of all people to participate in communication and the duty of the media to expose
violations of human rights) (Hamelink, 1997).
While the report had strong international support, it was condemned by the United
States and the United Kingdom as an attack on the freedom of the press - by putting
an organisation run by governments at the head of controlling global media - and both
countries withdrew from UNESCO in protest.
Sean MacBride had anticipated this reaction, acknowledging: “protests against the
dominant flow of news from the industrialised countries were often construed as
attacks on the free flow of information’ (MacBride, 1980: xxi). But for the first time a
study had addressed media systems in developing countries.

Modernisation and Media Imperialism
Other research on how media contributes to society and development included the socalled modernisation theories of 1960s. This approach was based on the idea that that
the introduction of modern media and communications systems and practices were
essential prerequisites of modernity (e.g. development towards an American or
European model) (Curran and Park, 2000).
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Implicit in this thinking was the presumption that the goal of development should be
to propel traditional or indigenous cultures towards modernity and that traditional
practices and institutions that were not modern stood in the way of development.
The theory assumes that, with assistance, "traditional" countries can be brought to a
stage of development in the same manner more developed countries have attained.
According to Törnquist, modernisation was the application to developing countries of
the Industrial Revolution that took place in Europe from the mid-18th to the mid-19th
Century (Törnquist, 1999).
Early modernisation theories assumed a simple relationship between the spread of
access to modern forms of mass communications, economic development, and the
process of democratisation. The basic idea of this theory was that “underdeveloped”
societies should aim to replicate the political, economic, social and cultural
characteristics of modern, developed, Western societies. And that also included their
media and communications systems.
For example, in the 1960s, Daniel Lerner proposed how a modern communication
system supposedly contributes to the transition from ‘tradition’ to modernity. He
argued that exposure to modern media extends people’s horizons and encourages them
to want more out of life. Consequently the ‘connection between mass media and
political democracy is especially close” (Lerner, 1963:342).
Modernisation theory talked of ‘the construction of western-style political and social
institutions as indicators of progress… Local media were expected to emulate Western
patterns of behaviour and contribute to the construction of democracy’ (Miller,
2009:10).
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Thus, modernisation theory called for expansion of mass media to poorer countries in
order to promote western lifestyles and the market economy. In this book,
Communications and Political Development, Pye claimed that: ‘the basic processes of
political modernization and national development can be advantageously conceived as
problems in communication’ (Pye et al., 1963:8).
Critics of modernisation argue however that it promotes a system in which poorer
countries are exploited by richer countries as long as they continue to follow “closer
integration into the world market” (Scott, 2014:30). They claim also that the
expansion of western media and business corporations promoted capitalist and
consumerist values and eroded local cultures.
For example, critics of modernisation theory, Paul Baran and Andre Gunder Frank,
argued that underdevelopment was in fact a consequence of the expansion of
capitalism (in Park, 1998).
Herbert Schiller similarly claimed that far from promoting self-sufficiency, the
‘modernisation’ of a third world country” encouraged their dependency within an
“exploitative system of global economic relations” (Schiller, 1998:17). Furthermore,
according to Schiller, American aid programmes to developing countries, and the ‘free
flow of information’ policies promoted by the American state, assisted the American
media industry in its drive to achieve international dominion (Schiller, 1969).
Mattelart and Friere further argued that the Western media companies were the real
beneficiaries of media modernisation programmes; their dominance grew while poorer
countries often faced intensified inequality and dependency (Mosco, 1996).
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Despite criticism of the modernisation paradigm and although it is now considered an
outdated way of thinking about media and development, Powers and Arsenault claim
that “the roots of this paradigm are still evident in much current thinking about media
development” (Powers and Arsenault, 2010:2).
For instance, in a detailed analysis of media development literature between 1960 and
1989, Fair (1989) found that the modernisation paradigm continued to dominate
contemporary discussion on media’s contribution to development and media’s ability
to influence audiences in target countries (Fair, 1989).
Interestingly, Manyozo (2012) describes media development practice as an
“instrument of modernisation” (Manyozo, 2012:149). He argues that the action of
consolidating market-friendly models of media systems in the global South
“contributes to an overdependence on external aid, reinforces minority power
structures within the country and ultimately services transnational/corporate interests”
(Manyozo, 2012:149).
The ideas of the modernisation theorists remained dominant throughout the 1960s, but
theories of media imperialism then emerged in opposition to the prevailing
modernisation agenda of the time.
The media imperialism approach evolved in an attempt to deal with those questions
which earlier models had ignored. Boyd-Barrett (1977) described media imperialism
as “the process whereby the ownership, structure, distribution or content of the media
are…subject to substantial external pressures from the media interests of any other
country or countries, without proportionate reciprocation of influence by the country
so affected” (Boyd-Barrett, 1977:117). The media imperialism model views the
media as an obstacle to meaningful and well-balanced socio-economic progress.
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For instance, Robert McChesney suggested that US and Western corporate control
over international media and communications systems were central aspects of neocolonialism that kept much of the third world “incapable of genuine selfdetermination” (Foster et al., 1997:11).
McChesney was a leading proponent in the political economy study of media which
focuses on the role media play in democratic and capitalist societies where the
primary goal is profit, not the public interest. His focus was whether media systems
promote or undermine democratic institutions and practices.
McChesney found that the processes of global media mergers had concentrated
control in the hands of a few multinational corporations, which were unaccountable to
the public, and reducing the diversity of news media outlets (McChesney, 2008).
These mergers and the resulting concentration of media ownership has meant a
globalisation of media ownership, with a very small number of giant global
corporations owning and controlling media in all parts of the world. McChesney
argues that these anti-democratic trends are “eroding the public sphere both at national
and global levels” (McChesney, 1999).
While this globalisation has led to foreign investment in developing nations, this
investment does not always translate into greater diversity of content and often has the
effect of reducing domestic programming in favour of imported programming (Price
and Krug, 2002). Thussu argues these massive media conglomerates have taken an
active role in promoting privatisation and free market policies that they see as
beneficial to their operations (Thussu, 2000).
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Mano (2009) argues “neo-liberal media globalisation is like a second more subtle
form of colonialism which affects individuals, communities and nations with a more
powerful force” (Mano, 2009:294)
Furthermore, Norris and Zinnbauer (2002) found that the globalisation of media
sources has not increased the strength of democracies, and Minderhoud found that, in
the case of Africa, “the opening up of the radio market to private parties can and has
shown to produce undemocratic outcomes in Africa” (Minderhoud, 2009:2).
What this review highlights is the research showing that that the widening of public
access to newspapers, radio and television as a result of globalisation, liberalisation
and free market policies may be insufficient in itself to result in democracy and
development. As Ogan et al (2009) argue in their global review of literature on
communication and development “because of the appeal of the modernization
paradigm, there is a tendency to forget that it cannot work” (Ogan et al, 2009:14)
These theories of modernisation, globalisation of media and imperialism relate to this
research question not only in relation to the impact on developing countries of
traditional media, but also with regards to new technologies such as mobile phones
and social media platforms.
In the next section, further attributes of the role of media in society shall be examined
in terms of their potential link to development.

The Public Sphere
Definitions of media development and media assistance very often include reference
to freedom of expression and freedom of the press. One of the most important
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determinants in whether a media can establish and maintain its independence is the
level of freedom of the press.
Liberal theorists from John Milton to John Stuart Mill have argued centuries ago the
existence of a unfettered and independent press is essential in the process of
democratisation, by contributing towards the right of freedom of expression, thought
and conscience, strengthening the responsiveness and accountability of governments
to citizens, and providing a public platform and channel of political expression.
UK academic James Curran argues that ‘the first condition of a decent society is some
kind of common discussion, in public, of the realities of that society’ (Curran and
Seaton, 2003:386).
The importance of freedom of expression is reflected by its wide recognition in
international law at the global and regional level. The right to freedom of expression
is protected in all significant international and regional human rights treaties,
including Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
Jurgen Habermas famously described this space where freedom of expression
manifests itself in the public domain as the ‘Public Sphere’ - a space for
communicating information and sharing points of view. He described it as “a
discursive arena that is home to citizen debate, deliberation, agreement and action”
(Villa 1992:712).
Habermas’ concept of the public sphere is significant as the media is frequently
discussed in the context of its contribution to public debate and democracy and as a
result it is central to media development. Its particular relevance for this research
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stems from the fact that media development projects frequently try to establish or
strengthen democratic spaces that are independent or free of the state.

Habermas
Habermas’ concept of the public sphere had its origins in the new civic society that
emerged in eighteenth century Europe. Driven by a need for open arenas where issues
of common concern could be exchanged and discussed - accompanied by growing
rates of literacy and access to literature - a separate domain from ruling authorities
started to evolve across Europe.
Habermas depicted a space that emerged to a public who previously had no public
arena for free discussion of civil life. The public sphere consisted of organs of
information and political debate such as newspapers and journals, as well as
institutions of political discussion such as political clubs, literary salons, pubs and
coffee houses, meeting halls, and other public spaces where socio-political discussion
took place (Kellner, 2000). Habermas noted
In its clash with the arcane and bureaucratic practices of the absolutist state, the
emergent bourgeoisie gradually replaced a public sphere in which the ruler’s power
was merely represented before the people with a sphere in which state authority was
publicly monitored through informed and critical discourse by the people (Habermas,
1962:11)

His ‘public sphere’ presupposed freedoms of speech and assembly, a free press, and
the right to freely participate in political debate. The key feature of his public sphere
was its separation from the power of both the church and the government.
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Habermas’s study of the public sphere centred on the idea of political participation as
the core of democratic society, a feature reflected in media development projects that
attempt to draw wider society into national conversation and discussion, including
minority groups and different social classes, to represent the view of whole of society
and give them a voice in the public sphere.
It should be noted how Habermas’ public sphere evolved as a result of economic
developments and increased literacy of the population at the time. Economic
developments were vital in the evolution of a public forum for free expression of
political thought.
Scholars have noted that probably only a few Western bourgeois societies have
developed any public sphere at all in Habermas's sense, and “while it is salutary to
construct models of a good society that could help to realise agreed upon democratic
and egalitarian values, it is a mistake to overly idealize and universalize any specific
public sphere as in Habermas's account” (Kellner, 2000:267).
Habermas's critics (Calhoun, 1992; Fraser, 1990; Schudson, 1994) have challenged
his concept of the public sphere and argue that he idealised the earlier bourgeois
public sphere by presenting it as a forum of rational discussion and debate when in
fact certain groups were excluded and participation was thus limited. For instance,
Mary Ryan notes that Habermas neglects women's public spheres (in Calhoun,1992).
This is repeated in the public spaces today where often groups such as women and
minorities have no voice.
Nevertheless, Habermas' key work “The Structural Transformation of the Public
Sphere” (1962) has been very influential and has provoked discussions of liberal
democracy, civil society, public life, and social changes in the twentieth century.
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According to Kellner, few books of the second half of the twentieth century have
been so seriously discussed in “so many different fields and continues, almost
forty years after its initial publication, to generate such productive controversy
and insight” (Kellner, 2000:259).
This popularity is explored by Lunt and Livingstone in their 2013 article ‘Media
studies fascination with the concept of the Public Sphere’. They talk about the
“rise and rise of the concept of public sphere” within media studies and they claim
that it is “with ambivalence that media scholars have continued to work with the
concept of the public sphere” (Lunt and Livingstone, 2013:1,5). Nonetheless,
many adopt the pragmatic view that Habermas’ concept of the public sphere
establishes a “good starting point, a framework against which to test one’s ideas
and assumptions” (Lunt and Livingstone, 2013:5).
Despite Habermas’ public sphere being labelled an idealised space, it is one which
many media development projects attempt to replicate. The public sphere perspective
is important in media development therefore because media is supposed to fulfil this
idealised role.
Kalathil observed that “the overarching theme, at least as far as the mediadevelopment world is concerned is the rise of a pluralized, diverse and multimediated public sphere, with individuals, groups, corporations, governments and
other entities freely comingling to influence public opinion” (Kalathil, 2008:12).
However, the public sphere can be corrupted due to its environment. Kellner (2000)
notes that Habermas's account of the structural transformation of the public sphere,
despite its limitations, illustrates the increasingly important functions of the media in
politics and everyday life and the ways that corporate and other interests have
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“colonised this sphere, using the media and culture to promote their own interests”
(Kellner, 2000:268).
Habermas’ work is an important analysis of what can happen to the media when
exposed to the realities of a free market and the difficulties of maintaining
independence from corporate or government pressure.
In a similar way, media development works towards objectives of establishing
independent media organisations and strengthening the media sector in developing
countries, to provide platforms for national discussion and debate. This is usually in
the context of a free market for media products. As will be explored more in later
chapters, these markets can often be dominated by political, corporate or elite interests
and this has implications for journalism and the health of the public sphere.
There are other elements of the potential role media can serve in society which
underpin media development work, such as its watchdog role and as a check on
government and those in power.

The Fourth Estate
In addition to its role as public sphere for discussion, the media is often referred to as
the ‘Fourth Estate’, where the press serves as a complement and balance to the three
branches of power: legislative, executive and judicial. The first use of the term was
by Edmund Burke in 1787 during a debate in parliament, when he articulated how the
media is regarded as one of the classic checks and balances on government and those
in power (Schultz, 1998).
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The reason it is felt to be central to a functioning democracy is for its potential to hold
government to account. In its ‘watchdog’ role, the news media is understood to
promote government transparency, accountability, and public scrutiny of decisionmakers in power.
Curran confirmed that “the principal democratic role of the media, according to
traditional liberal theory, is to act as a check on the state” (Curran, 2002:217).
Brunetti and Weder (2003) found that there is less corruption in nations with a free
press. The reason, they argue, is that journalists’ roles as watchdogs promote the
transparency of government decision-making process, and thereby expose and hinder
misuse of public office, and financial scandals (Brunetti and Weder, 2003).
Independent journalists can act as an important channel for decision-makers, helping
to make governments more responsive to the needs of the people. Besley and Burgess
(2001) showed that regions with higher levels of newspaper circulation proved more
active during an emergency in responding to food shortages. The reason, they offer, is
that political leaders learn about local problems more accurately and in a timely
fashion when journalists function as an intermediary by reporting living conditions at
the grassroots (Besley and Burgess, 2001).
Amartya Sen argued that the accountability mechanisms in democracies are
particularly important in averting disasters; in their absence, for example he said
major ecological damages can go unchecked. For instance, between 1959-61 China
had the world’s worst famine of the 20th century which killed many millions of people
and went unreported. “During that terrible calamity the government faced no
pressure from newspapers, which were controlled and none from opposition parties,
which were absent” (Sen, 1999:143).
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In his book Development as Freedom (1999) Sen claimed that post-Independence
India, with a much lower average availability of food for the poor than China, largely
avoided such disasters because Indian democracy, with its free press and vigorous
opposition parties, has been politically quicker in averting threats of famines and
starvation deaths. He explained:
The working of democracy and other political rights can even help to prevent
famines and other economic disasters. Democratic governments have to win
elections and face public criticism and have strong incentives to undertake
measures to avert famines and other catastrophes. Authoritarian rulers, who are
themselves rarely affected by famines tend to lack the incentive to take timely
preventative measures (Sen, 1999:16).

These studies show therefore how a free press may be linked to transparency,
accountability and furthermore, good governance. Media can help raise public
awareness about corruption, its causes and possible remedies.
Guseva et al., (2008) tried to understand the connections between “indicators of
environments conducive to media freedom and independence” and indicators of
human development, poverty reduction and good governance. They found that press
freedom was found to be positively correlated with governance (Guseva et al.,
2008:3).
This emphasises how these elements are often interlinked: governance, press freedom
and democracy. Zambian academic Francis Kasoma (1995) maintained that it was no
accident that the three countries in Africa that have upheld democratic governance namely Botswana, Senegal and Mauritius - are also the countries that have
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consistently maintained a free and independent press (Kasoma, 1995). He noted also
that democracy has been slower in coming in countries where a free press has been
completely inactive.
It is as a result of this type of evidence that many donor agencies and governments
now see efforts to promote freedom of expression and with that assisting governance
as a fundamental part of their international development work, along with more
established efforts to provide emergency food or material aid 8.
But media does not operate in isolation. In her 2002 study, Harvard academic Pippa
Norris analysed 135 countries to evaluate under what conditions the media positively
influenced democratic governance. She found two elements that are required for
media systems to positively impact democratic governance: “both independence and
access are required” (Norris and Zinnbauer, 2002:3). If citizens cannot access the
press (as a result of say, cost or literacy issues) or journalists are not free to write what
they wish, then the power of the media is restricted.
Norris further maintained that “policies which eradicate limits on the freedom
information and communication, whether due to state censorship, intimidation and
harassment of journalists, or due to private media oligopolies, have important
consequences for those seeking to strengthen transitions from autocracy” (Norris,
2006:75).

8 . Details of a sample of these projects can be found here
NORAD: https://norad.no/en/front/funding/norhed/projects/building-capacity-for-a-changing-mediaenvironment-in-uganda/
UNESCO: https://en.unesco.org/programme/ipdc/
UK DFID: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/open-aid-open-societies-a-vision-for-atransparent-world
German BMZ: :
http://www.bmz.de/en/issues/freedom_of_opinion_press/deutsches_engagement/index.html
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This suggests that the media does not and cannot operate successfully without the
other institutions of a democracy functioning properly. The so-called fourth estate
cannot fulfil its role without the complementary support of the other pillars of society,
what Price and Krug call the “enabling environment”.
This is important in media development work because no matter how successful a
project is in concept, if the environment cannot support independent journalism or
media organisations, they will struggle to live up to their potential democratic role.
This was found to be the case in media development during democratic transitions in
1990s and continues to be a challenge for media development today.

Evaluating Media Assistance
At this point, having discussed the link between media and democracy and
development, and the ideological underpinning of the sector, it is of value to look at
whether past media development projects have achieved their stated goals and
objectives. Of particular interest will be the outcomes of those projects that were
implemented in the aftermath of the Cold War, when media development came to
prominence. This will provide a guide as to whether established media development
can live up to its promise so to speak. This will further guide assessment of whether
digital technologies can fulfil the same role in trying to achieve development goals
such as accountability, transparency and strengthening of democracy.
To date, a large proportion of the evaluation of media development has been done
through studies of transitional countries, in particular the post-communist countries of
Eastern Europe. Kumar claims that “the former Soviet Union and its satellites served
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as laboratories wherein the international community and its local partners refined
different media development strategies and programmes” (Kumar, 2006:5).
There are interesting findings that are worth reviewing here to see what have been the
strengths and weaknesses of media development interventions in the past, what have
been the outcomes and whether ICTs will be able to perform the role any better.

Democratic transitions in Eastern Europe
As noted, with the collapse of one-party states in the former Soviet Union in 1990s
and the wave of democratic elections that followed, new governments and political
parties emerged ostensibly committed to more democratic and open government and
explicitly to more open media.
There was pressure from donors to liberalise media both as a concerted attempt to
invest in good governance and democracy and as part of a trend to open markets.
In many of these media assistance interventions working to transform or strengthen
the media sector, the aim was to distance the press from the governing party’s (or the
elites) influence and establish a more independent and plural media environment for
democratic ends.
Studies emphasise the vital role of the mass media in transitions from autocracy, for
instance in Germany, and later in Georgia’s ‘Rose’ revolution (Mitchell, 2009).
McFaul (2005) argues that in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine the presence of the
independent media was one of the key components of successful transitions from postcommunist states (McFaul, 2005).
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The positive relationship between the growth of the free press and the process of
democratisation is also thought to be reciprocal. Kulikova (2008) found that greater
freedom of press and more independent press systems are indicative of greater overall
democratisation. On the other hand, more democratic transitional countries have
higher degrees of press freedom and media independence (Kulikova, 2008).
Yet, studies of transitional countries and in particular the post-communist countries of
Eastern Europe in the 1990s have shown interesting elements about the nature of
media change in these countries. Coman notes how “the feeling that ‘things haven’t
come out as they should’ emanates from many studies or essays dedicated to postcommunism” (Coman, 2000:50).
De Smaele gives a perspective on events at the time:
When the communist world collapsed, the corresponding media model was declared
history as well. At first sight, it was fully replaced by the western model in the same
way as the society was reorganized according to western principles. On a closer look,
however, western influence seems to be restricted primarily to the market area. The
reshaping of the media system into a pluralist and independent Fourth Estate, the
transformation of the journalistic community into an autonomous professional group
dedicated to a public service ideal and the redefinition of the audience into a group of
citizens all failed to occur (De Smaele, 1999:1).

Although there was large investment in media development at that time, Sparks and
Reading argue that only politicians benefited from the new post-Communist media
(Sparks and Reading, 1994). They claim that, “in terms both of structure and
personnel, the media show singularly little transformation and what there has been is
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best understood as a mechanism for ensuring social continuity in the face of political
change” (Sparks and Reading, 1998:106).
Despite the investment and best intentions of media donors, political elites tried their
best to bring the press, radio and television under their control, recognising the
potential power of media. Jowitt (1993) claims that “in Eastern Europe one sees a
novel evolutionary phenomenon: survival of the first, not simply the fittest. Former
party cadres are exceptionally well placed to successfully adapt themselves – and their
families – to changes in the economic and administrative order” (Jowitt, 1993: 296).
Following liberalisation of the media market, the press became the battlefield of
financial groups, linked to different political and governmental clans (De Smaele,
1999). Through the media outlets they owned, controlled or influenced, they helped
create a highly partisan and politicised media and journalism in the first decade of
post-Communism (ibid).
Colin Sparks observed that while media trainers attempted to create newspapers like
the New York Times and broadcasters like the BBC in Eastern Europe, what emerged
mostly were newspapers that were highly partisan and broadcasters remained more
aligned with the state than the people. There was significant continuity in personnel
between the old regime and the new, and the shift to a market economy was a “highly
political process” (Sparks and Reading,1998:174). He refers to it as “elite continuity”
(Sparks, 2018).
Furthermore, financial obstacles were a hurdle for the development of an independent
media sector. In Central and Eastern Europe, independent news media were unable to
make capital investments or pay adequate salaries without the support of donors.
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They were often burdened by fines or taxes, and could not afford to invest in staff
training or development.
Thus, media outlets that had survived in the worst of political and social conditions in
Soviet states then had to succeed financially against competition from a variety of
other outlets. Craig LaMay called it “the tyranny of the market" (LaMay, 2001:15).
In his book “Exporting Press Freedom”, LaMay claims that “the central dilemma is
economic, between the need to find adequate and diverse sources of revenue while
also providing a high-quality editorial product” (LaMay, 2008:5). Very often in
developing countries maintaining a diverse source of revenue for media outlets is a
challenge.
What became apparent in post-Soviet States therefore, was that the free market
business model may not be the holy grail of journalism. In fact, Zaller (1999) found
"for every set of cases in which I am able to make plausible comparisons, higher
levels of market competition are associated with lower levels of news quality" (Zaller,
1999:1).
Fog (2004) argues that free market forces exclude broad social interests from
participating in the main media and it leads to concentration of media ownership.
While moderate competition may increase diversity, it has been found that ‘excessive
competition may lead to decreased diversity’ (Fog, 2004).
Hence, after the early enthusiasm following liberalisation of media in the region, what
occurred instead was the “erosion of the public sphere and the transformation of what
were a series of government monopolies into a series of private oligopolies” (Deane,
2005:182).
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Democratic transitions in Africa
The collapse of communism also had implications for media systems much further
away than just the neighbouring Soviet satellites. For instance, in Africa, there was
extensive liberalisation of media during the decade following the fall of the Berlin
wall. Countries which had been tied in with the Soviet Bloc “made steps towards
multi-party democracy” and a free market (Myers, 2014:6).
The press played an important role in forcing autocratic African regimes to press for
democracy (Shaw, 2009).

Calls for governance reforms from citizens of these

countries, and international donors, brought in a new era of competition for political
leadership. Between 1989 and 1994, as a consequence of external and internal demand
for democratic change, 41 out of 47 countries in sub-Saharan Africa underwent
significant political reform, and, in many cases, the first competitive elections in a
generation (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994).
Many autocratic leaders began to loosen their own grip on their countries’ media.
These countries introduced legislation, giving local media “the freedom it lacked in
previous decades….after years of muffled expression” (Myers, 2014:4).
For instance, in Benin, military role was overturned in 1991 and the broadcasting
sector was subsequently opened up. Similar patterns of media liberalisation emerged
in Uganda and Mali in 1991, Nigeria and Cote D’Ivoire in 1992 and in Tanzania
following the introduction of multi-party democracy in 1992. The period has been
called Africa’s “democratic rebirth” (Kasoma, 1995:1) and the “springtime of media
proliferation in Africa” (Myers, 2014:1).
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Myers maintains that “almost every country in sub-Saharan Africa has seen an
enormous rise in the numbers and diversity of private and independent newspapers
and TV and radio channels” (Myers, 2014).
However, studies suggest that the process has not been smooth. Indeed, Minderhoud
(2009) found that
introducing media liberalisation whilst simultaneously introducing multi-party
politics, in a country context where identity politics play an all-determining role in
defining the social contract between state and society, where poverty, deprivation and
international marginalisation persists, and where formal democratic institutions are
weak or not yet institutionalised ….. has shown to produce undemocratic outcomes in
Africa” (Minderhoud, 2009:2).

According to Linz and Stepan, few African political systems have so far developed
into institutionalised, consolidated democracies – where democratic institutions and
rules have become ‘the only game in town’ (Linz and Stepan, 1996:2).
On the contrary, Ocitti (1999) asserts that the “appearance and formalisms of
procedural democracy” have also masked a more profound pattern of declining press
freedom on the continent, as African governments, under the pretext of constitutional
rule, “have resorted to the enactment of suppressive laws against an increasingly
critical media” (Ocitti, 1999). He found that many of the impediments that the
African media faced in the 1960s and 1970s are still alive today and “marks a reversal
of the little that has been achieved politically since the beginning of the nineties”
(Ocitti, 1999:30).
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With regards to media development interventions during this period, the African
Media Development Initiative (AMDI) – a research program that assessed key media
changes and foreign support to the media in seventeen African countries – found
“substantial evidence [for]: non-sustainable and short-term approaches to projects;
disconnected programs; unnecessary competition amongst donors; and, consequently
wasted investment of donor funds” (AMDI, 2006:15).
In the same way that the “media missionaries” plan to export the western model of
journalism to the post-Soviet states was not an unmitigated success, it has been
suggested for example that problems within African media exist because of the
western media model, i.e., free speech and private market forces. Authors such as
Berger (2002), Nyamnjoh (2005) and Shaw (2009), believe that a reason for many of
the problems with African Media are due to the fact that they are expected to act
according to a neo-liberal paradigm which is not suited to the continent.
Nyamnjoh (2005) argues that western media programmes, instead of acknowledging
local conditions, decreed that ‘aspiring journalists in Africa must, like containers, be
dewatered of the mud and dirt of culture as tradition and custom, and filled afresh with
the tested sparkles of culture as modernity and civilization’ (Nyamnjoh, 2005:3). He
described this model further as:
A journalism of mimicry, bandwagonism and self-debasement, where African
creativity and originality are crushed by the giant compressors of the One-Best-Way,
as the Euro-centric assumptions and indicators of humanity, creativity and reality are
universalised with the insensitive arrogance of ignorance and power (Nyamnjoh,
2005:3).
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Thus, while the western liberal model of journalism, which media assistance
programmes promote, exports values of objectivity and neutrality, some scholars feel
that the African audience is not as keen on these values. Shaw claimed “the middle
ground position, or objectivity, that is unique to the Western liberal democracy model,
was, and still remains, an unpopular option” (Shaw, 2009:20).
He further argues that “the African model of journalism lays emphasis on the
community (civil society), or communities (civil societies), the Western Liberal model
emphasises the individual” (Shaw, 2009:20).
Kasoma lamented ‘the tragedy facing African journalism is that the continent’s
journalists have closely imitated the professional norms of the North’ (Kasoma,
1996:95).
Thus, many scholars have expressed discontent with Western influence in African
journalism. They argue that Western media practices applied in the African context
arguably reinforce neo-colonialism (Banda, 2008), suppress people participation
(Shaw, 2009) and are generally seen to be at odds with African philosophy (Blake,
2009; Jimada, 1992; Okigbo, 1987 quoted in Skjerdal, 2012:637).
Hence, it’s suitability to Africa is ‘questionable’ (Berger, 2002). Minderhoud argues
that
The reality of ‘substantial democratic reversals’ (Puddington 2009:101), both in Africa
and elsewhere in the world, frequently challenges media’s assumed positive democratic
contribution…….Media’s democratic role – such as expressed by leading development
actors – overlook the many, oft interdependent, challenges countries face in processes
of democratisation and development (Minderhoud, 2009:7).

85

The fact that this western model is the one promoted by media assistance training
projects, for better or worse, prompts a closer examination of the model.

The Media Development Model
Despite the evidence reviewed in this chapter pointing to the positive contribution that
media can make to democracy and development, in the implementation of these media
development projects, the process can be complex.
In the evaluation literature, authors frequently touch on an important issue with
Western media development projects: the model of journalism. A large part of
media development work has focused on providing support to train journalists in
the developing world in western standards of journalism and create privately
owned, independent media. “Media developers often tried to sell a U.S. “liberal”
model of journalism - based on impartiality and facts” (Hume, 2011:22).
Mihai Coman argues, with regards to transitions in post-Soviet states, “that the
source of crisis resides in the liberal media system, with its market battles, political
struggles, ethical challenges and professional pressures” (Coman, 2000:54).
The rationale of donor organisations has been that having many different private
media companies operating in any one country is the best way to build democracy
and to provide access and voice to citizens.
But critics argue that these projects are misguided in trying to replicate an AngloSaxon model of journalism and Western media systems in their programmes.
Miller contends that
Journalism training in countries donors judge to be in transition to democracy–postcommunist, post-colonial, post-autocratic, post-conflict, less developed–is very much
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a Western project. Sometimes couched in the language of universal human rights,
such as freedom of expression, the export of Western press practices, idealized social
roles, and ethical claims raises fundamental questions that donors seem rarely to
address (Miller, 2009:13).

Media scholars such as Hallin and Mancini (2004) and Curran and Park (2000) have
similarly addressed the problem of the universal application of the Western model of
journalism to other regions. In ‘Comparing Media Systems’, Hallin and Mancini
(2004) argue that ‘the literature on the media is highly ethnocentric, in the sense that it
refers only to the experience of a single country, yet is written in general terms, as
though the model that prevailed in that country were universal’ (Hallin and Mancini,
2004:2).
They noted that ‘the liberal model has become the dominant model throughout the
world: it serves as normative model for practitioners everywhere” (Shaw, 2009:507).
In this model, journalists are expected to give neutral, impartial and objective reports
and fulfil their social responsibility to the people (Hallin and Mancini, 2005). This
liberal model is most aligned to the template being promoted in media development
programmes and the authors call for a re-thinking of journalism theory and practice to
reflect local conditions from one society to another.
Estonian journalism professor Epp Lauk (2005) argues that the belief that
transitioning countries would follow the Anglo-American journalism paradigm has
not happened for many reasons. These countries are ‘in permanent flux,
simultaneously fighting legacies of the past and searching for successful ways of
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building up the states based on the rule of law, as well as civil societies’ (Lauk,
2005:208).
In the United States, the laws relating to freedom of the press, developed over 200
years, have for the most part been respected by power elites and the public,
notwithstanding the attacks on the media by President Trump and his followers.
Development in newly democratic nations has lasted only a few decades at most, and
the Western “liberal” model of fact-based, impartial journalism competes with other
styles of journalism–both old and new–for the public’s attention (Hume, 2011).
Some suggest that a western-like ideology could not be transplanted to Eastern Europe
and other developing countries because of huge cultural and ideological differences
(De Smaele, 1999; LaMay, 2001). The idea that Africa needs a journalism standard
which differs from that of the rest of the world – and particularly from the West – has
gained popularity among media scholars, although some question the viability of a
journalism model unique to Africa (Strelitz, 2005; Tomaselli, 2011; in Skjerdal,
2012).
For instance, Kasoma (1996) has argued that African journalists should turn to the
continent’s own values instead of imitating the norms of the North, which in his view
had only led to media-driven selfishness and divisionism (Kasoma, 1996). Kasoma
(1996) proposed ‘Afriethics’ as a basis for African journalism practice, but was
criticised by colleagues from all over the continent who claimed that his ideology was
based on a ‘romantic reconstruction of the pre-colonial’ (Nyamnjoh, 2005:91).
Merrill (2002) argued the idea that the media elsewhere conform to Western media
structures is ‘not only an arrogant and ethnocentric one but also betrays a stultified,
intellectual view of reality. Cultures are different; the values that shore up such
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cultures are different. Stages of national development are different, Citizens
expectations are different’ (Merrill, 2002:18).
Furthermore, according to the media development model, to propose that the media in
Africa could follow the same change model as the media in post-communist Europe
would be simplifying the process of media assistance and reform. ‘The maxim “one
size does not fit all”’ is ideal here (Kumar, 2009:1). Media Assistance takes place in
dynamic environments, with different histories, cultures and politics, to suggest the
interventions can have the same democratic outcomes would be naive.
At its root, media assistance after the Cold War took place in contrasting political
environments and economic contexts. In post-communist Europe there was a ready
consumer group, hungry for media products, and a populace that might be able to
afford the abundance of media products that the free market brought. In Africa there
was also widespread liberalisation, but media assistance took place in an environment
where, despite a dynamic media sector, the majority of the consumer populace have
extremely limited means to purchase media products and thus support the long term
financial viability of media organisations.
Media development projects, when at their best, take place after rigorous country
context and needs analysis, and a review of the political economy of the programme
countries. Baseline audience research is conducted so that the appropriate media is
used to achieve project objectives. In this way, each media development project
differs from another, and it would be challenging to transplant one model from
country to country.
Marguerite Sullivan from the Centre for International Media assistance (CIMA),
which is funded by the US National Endowment for Democracy, agrees that
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Establishing independent media in a country where they do not exist, or strengthening
them in a country where they are weak, is no simple task. Required is an intricate
structure with many interdependent parts… Picture a stool with strong supporting
legs—professional journalists, a supportive legal environment, economically
sustainable media, and news literate citizens and public officials. Take away a
supporting leg, and the stool becomes unstable and is in danger of collapsing
(Sullivan, 2008:3).

The literature reviewed here suggests one cannot copy media systems from one
country to another and there is no ideal media development model. La May
questioned whether ‘exporting press freedom’ was in fact possible at all to differing
media ecosystems (1997).
This echoes James Miller’s observation that “the large-scale exportation of
mainstream Western journalistic ethics and practices today brings to mind Marshall
McLuhan's famous admonition against driving into the future while looking in the
rear-view mirror” (Miller, 2011:3). In addition to weakness in the model, journalistic
values in the North are also under attack via social media and accusations of creating
‘fake news’.
Lauk (2008) suggested that in the future, altruistic journalism developers might have
to take “very different directions” to accommodate the different cultures of the
countries they are trying to help. She suggests “digitisation may provide the unifying
influence for journalists that the Anglo-American model failed to be….. not because
of global standards about journalism and technology, but because of the internet’s
ubiquity and speed” (Lauk, 2008:209).
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There have been successful media development interventions of course but the
literature highlights that media development projects are incredibly complex and
layered and these complexities may not be anticipated at the conceptual stage.
Evaluation of long-term impact is also difficult.
Stremlau (2019) argues for greater focus and greater sensitivity to local contexts, and
urges media assistance organisations to avoid a “blank slate” approach (Stremlau,
2019).
The evidence presented in this section illustrates the argument for using media in
development and to achieve donor development goals. It shall be seen whether using
ICTs for the same media development objectives is any less complicated, or whether
as Lauk suggested, digitisation will be the solution for global journalism.

Conclusion
This chapter reviewed the academic literature relating to the media assistance sector
and its potential benefits for democracy and development. The literature suggests that
the relationship is not simple. This stems from the debate about the ideal role of
media in society and the diversity of countries, societies, and cultures that bring
different experiences and outcomes to the process of establishing independent or new
media systems.
Historical theories of media and modernisation and theories around the concept of the
public sphere were examined. It was noted that media development projects have
often worked towards the creation of new or improved spaces for debate and dialogue
in society.
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As shall be discussed further in the following chapter, the term ‘Public Sphere’ has
gained renewed importance with the spread of new communication technologies. The
internet in particular is considered by some to provide unprecedented opportunities for
exchanging information among a large number of people and across borders (Castells,
2008).
The thesis investigates whether digital technologies have the potential to achieve goals
such as those discussed in this chapter – accountability, transparency, good
governance and democracy. If yes, does this leave media assistance outmoded and
irrelevant?
The literature surveyed in this chapter examined the evidence showing traditional
media’s usefulness in achieving donor development goals such as those above. The
next chapter will look at digital technologies’ potential to address the same issues.
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Chapter 3

Literature Review: Part 2

ICTs and Development on the African continent
In chapter 2, the literature on democracy, development and media was reviewed to
historically contextualise media assistance. Media Development, the focus for this
research, operates within a wider sector of overseas development assistance, so this
chapter will examine further the concept of ‘development’ in the broader context of
overseas aid.
The emergence of the internet and the huge growth of mobile technologies in the past
decade, especially in Africa, has influenced discussions about foreign aid and
development. Encouraged by the fast growth in ICTs, and especially mobile phones,
grant-making foundations and multilateral agencies have formed task forces and
departments devoted to ICTs for international development. Policymakers, academics
and development practitioners have hailed the technologies as the vehicle for Africa’s
renaissance (Tedre et al., 2009; Yusuf et al., 2009).
The potential of ICTs for dissemination of news and access to information has thus
changed the environment in which media development NGOs now implement their
projects. This chapter will therefore investigate the growth of ICTs and in particular
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mobile phones on the African continent and what this means for development. This
chapter will address the following issues which arise in the literature


What does the concept of “development” mean? And what are the current
arguments for and against foreign development aid?



What is the current landscape for development, and media development, in Africa,
in particular with regard to the growth of its most popular ICT – the mobile
phone?



What is the evidence that ICTs can contribute to the objectives of foreign aid and
democracy promotion such as accountability, participation and good governance?

Addressing the above questions will contextualise the research question in its African
setting and give a deeper picture of where the research is situated. It will advance the
investigation into digital technologies, development assistance and media support in
Sub-Saharan Africa in the present day.
The chapter will therefore examine the case for using digital technologies for
development and media assistance in an increasingly technological environment in
Sub-Saharan Africa. Claims relating to ICTs positive contribution to development
will be evaluated and the concepts of techno-determinism and cyber-optimism
critically investigated. This will help address whether ICTs have potential to
contribute to the same objectives as media assistance, thereby assessing its ongoing
relevance.
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Defining Development
As this research thesis explores the potential of digital technologies to achieve media
development objectives in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is pertinent to look further at what
the concept of ‘development’ actually means, especially in an African context. For
instance, does ‘development’ equate to GDP growth rates or does it involve a visible
change in the lives of the population of a country? The reality is that there could still
be widespread poverty in grassroots populations even when a country is perceived to
have attained good levels of economic growth
The literature acknowledges that what is understood by the term ‘development’ is
complex and subjective (Leftwich, 2005). Thomas argues that “alternative meanings
of ‘development’ are ‘hotly contested” (Allen et al., 1992:1).
For donors supporting the projects under discussion, their funds are being used for
stated objectives, as outlined in their project strategy documents, and their
understanding of what constitutes development presents one perspective. The concept
of development as used in this thesis is informed by diverse academic fields
– anthropology, sociology, economics and politics – each with emphasis on particular
features of development. This contributes to the challenge of getting a conclusive
definition of ‘development’.
Furthermore, the concept of international development is a relatively recent one.
Thomas wrote that “poverty is an age-old concern but ‘development’ has only become
an important concept…. since the end of the Second World War” (Thomas, 2000:1).
As noted, following World War II there was a need for reconstruction in Europe and
elsewhere and the launch of the Marshall Plan was a first step in creating a plan for
international development. This plan combined humanitarian goals with political and
economic goals.
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Economic historian, Walt W Rostow, was one of the most influential scholars in
development writing around that time and his book in 1960, The Stages of Economic
Growth focused on the economic system, showing the factors needed for a country to
reach the path to modernisation. Rostow outlined “five stages of growth” which
involve a traditional society going through a period of industrialisation which would
lead to a ‘take-off’ in mass-consumption, followed by profit generation and finally
sustained growth (Rostow, 1960).
As noted with regard to modernisation, the idea that the underdeveloped could be
‘developed’ through the transfer of particular technologies was advanced by Lerner in
1958 and later supported by writings of Schramm (1964) and Rogers (1962). In his
book, The Passing of Traditional Society, Lerner attempted to correlate development
with other variables such as literacy, urbanisation and media consumption and
political development. Rogers proposed that media could be a ‘magic multiplier’ for
development by fostering transmission of messages between the developers and
‘developees’ (Berger, 2005:3-4).
In his book Development as Freedom, Sen (1999) argued that development should be
judged by its impact on people, not only by changes in their income but more
generally in terms of their choices, capabilities and freedoms. He said that
development should be concerned about the distribution of these improvements, not
just the simple average for a society (Sen, 1999). Prior to this, many economists had
focused on income as the main measure of well-being. Sens’ ‘capabilities approach’
focused on an individuals’ capability of achieving the kind of life they have ‘reason to
value’ (Sen, 1999).
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Thus, development can mean different things in different contexts; it can mean
modernisation (as previously noted), economic growth (Rostow, 1960) or expansion
of personal freedoms (as with Amartya Sen, 1999).
In more recent decades, the idea of good governance has gained momentum in
development debates (Abrahamsen, 2000). According to the 1989 World Bank
report, Sub-Saharan Africa: From crisis to sustainable growth, good governance starts
with rejecting past development models (World Bank, 1989) and it seeks to have a
greater awareness of the social and cultural values of civil society (ibid).
Owen Barder, Director of the Centre for Global Development in UK, proposes that
“development also carries a connotation of lasting change…. development consists of
more than improvements in the well-being of citizens, even broadly defined: it also
conveys something about the capacity of economic, political and social systems to
provide the circumstances for that well-being on a sustainable, long-term basis”
(Barder, 2012).
More recently, ‘participation’ has become an important emphasis in the development
sector (Leal, 2007). Leal notes that “somewhere in the mid-1980s, participation
ascended to the pantheon of development buzzwords, catchphrases and euphemisms”
(Leal, 2007:89). Past failures could be explained by its “previous top-down, blueprint
mechanics, which were to be replaced by more people-friendly, bottom-up
approaches” (Leal, 2007:91).
However, despite a shift in development thinking from a purely economic perspective
to a more socially and politically inclusive one, a Western perspective still dominates
the field. Ayers (2006) argues that the neo-liberal ideology of the 1990s which is
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characterised by economic and trade liberalisation continues to prevail in development
discourse (Ayers, 2006).
These theories are significant for the research question because the meta-objective of
media assistance is ‘development’. A media project could be centred on strengthening
of the media sector or increased citizen participation in any given country, yes, but
usually it is in the context of a larger goal or vision of development from the funders.
For western donors then this vision has very often been the promotion of democracy
and the free market.
Kumar (2004) admitted that USAID’s media assistance was unashamedly a tool of forei
gn policy: “Independent media building has served U.S. national interests. In many
countries, support to independent media created political space that enabled the US to
pursue specific foreign policy goals” (Kumar, 2004: xiii).
Craig LaMay (2008) concurs that much of the emphasis in democracy projects is to
open up free markets for western corporations: “US Government understand foreign
assistance as a way to create markets economies and open markets abroad” (LaMay,
2008:41).
However, when media development projects are undertaken and funded by various
international donors, with varying foreign policy goals, it can often be articulated in
different ways as to the outcome actually expected.
For instance, China has become a recent donor of note in the African region. Myers
(2009) claims that “China has a very different motive for funding a radio station in
Africa from, say, The Netherlands. The former is for influence, commercial self-
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interest and possibly propaganda. The latter is for the sake of more liberal – some
would say “enlightened” –goals” (Myers, 2009:9).
For Myers to refer to China as a “media development donor” is somewhat
complicated however, as the media development field traditionally emphasises
concepts that are contrary to the Chinese media model system: freedom of the press,
journalist and media outlet independence, and the importance of the media in holding
governments to account.
However, ranked 10th among contributors to direct media assistance, providing
roughly $18 million in 2008 (Myers, 2009) it is certainly a presence of interest in
African media development.
And although USA and United Kingdom have been two of the larger contributors to
media assistance overall, in some African countries they are not the dominant ones.
According to O’ Malley, France, Germany and the European Union were the largest
supporters of Media development in Africa in 2016 (O' Malley, 2018) and have a
different approach to democracy and media assistance.
Regardless of motivation or ideology, it is worthwhile to examine whether efforts in
overseas development have been successful and a worthwhile use of donor funds. It is
important to examine whether development efforts have been successful historically
as this will determine whether a new approach has more potential, for instance
possibly using technological solutions for achieving donor objectives.
Having considered historical evaluations of media assistance in Chapter 2, the next
section reviews literature evaluating the effectiveness of foreign aid.
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Evaluating Foreign aid
The efficacy of development aid and whether it should be undertaken in the first place
continues to be a matter of debate for scholars and policy makers. Economists such as
Peter Bauer and Milton Friedman argued in the 1960s that aid is ineffective and Bauer
called it ”an excellent method for transferring money from poor people in rich
countries to rich people in poor countries” (Muehlenberg, 2009).
Development interventions have been accused of actively worsening poverty and
inequality. Dr Paul Schaffer (2012) states that “process of modernity, in particular
industrialisation, urbanisation, and the weakening of communal ties, have led to a
massive increase in new forms of poverty that have been worsened by schemes of
development such as poverty reduction strategies” (Shaffer, 2012:1772).
Dambisa Moyo (2010) argues that “the problem is that aid is not benign – its
malignant. No longer part of the potential solution, its part of the problem – in fact aid
is the problem” (Moyo, 2010: 47).
Dr Simon Reid-Henry, a senior fellow at the Peace Research Institute in Oslo, argues
that the overall effect of modernisation for some societies was “the replacement of
traditional poverty by a more modern form of misery” (Reid-Henry, 2012). Andrews
(2009) concluded that although billions in official aid still flows from donor
governments to recipient governments, foreign aid has failed to erase poverty
(Andrews, 2009).
In the past decade, the opposing sides in this debate have come to be embodied by the
clash of the two personalities of William Easterly, a well-known America economist
specialising in development, and Jeffrey Sachs, economist and director of The Earth
Institute at Columbia University. Their debate began in the pages of the New York
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Review of Books in 2005, when Easterly asked “Can we in the West end poverty
elsewhere?”
Sachs, author of The End of Poverty (2005) believed the answer is yes, and that the
solution is international Aid. He claimed that extreme poverty in rural Africa (and
elsewhere) is not attributable to corruption or other aspects of flawed governance, but
to a lack of sufficient funds. "The focus on corruption and governance is
exaggerated," he wrote in The End of Poverty, "Africa's governance is poor because
Africa is poor”(Sachs, 2005:312, 198).
Easterly took the opposite view. He claimed that nations cannot be “airlifted into
prosperity” by outsiders, “even if their surname is Clinton”, and foreign aid often does
more harm than good (Barker, 2013). Easterly argued
To Professor Sachs, African poverty is just a technical problem that “the world’s
leading practitioners” can solve if only these experts are given enough money for their
“proven strategies.” This reveals a remarkable naiveté about the roots of poverty.
Poverty in Africa is the outcome of much deeper factors such as political elites who
seek mainly to protect their own position, dysfunctional institutions like corruption
and lack of property rights, and a long history of exploitation and meddling from
abroad ….It takes breath-taking hubris to assert that this mess can be fixed for the tidy
sum of $75 billion (Easterly, 2007).

Recently, Bill Gates has directly addressed this debate. Gates has emerged as a
considerable donor in media development in Africa in recent years through the Bill &
Melinda Gates Foundation (although much of this is for Communication for
Development projects).
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In his annual letter in 2014, entitled: “3 Myths that block progress to the poor”, Gates
targeted the so-called myth that foreign aid does not work: “What we see over time is
people living longer, getting healthier, and escaping poverty, partly because of
services that aid helped develop and deliver. I worry about the myth that aid doesn’t
work. It gives political leaders an excuse to try to cut back on it—and that would
mean fewer lives are saved, and more time before countries can become selfsufficient” (Gates, 2014).
These arguments are pertinent to the media development sector because there are
those who also question government funds, and tax dollars, being spent on supporting
media projects and systems in faraway countries and whether doing so is a worthwhile
target for aid funds.
Current day media development takes place in a setting where the justifications for
undertaking aid are frequently challenged. Western donors want to know their money
is being well spent and implementers want to learn from past mistakes.
Yet, the media development industry itself struggles to produce real evidence of the
impact of its projects. Mosher claims that “the media development field lacks a clear
evidence base that illustrates the impact and significance of its activities, training
programs, and advocacy work” (Mosher, 2009:7).
Projects that involve Media for Development (M4D) and Communication for
Development (or C4D) have more success in producing results and evaluations of
their impact because they can measure audience, reach and behaviour change.
But, with ‘media development’ projects - meaning media sector reform, media
industry trainings, regulatory change or projects aiming to enhance participation or the
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public sphere - it is much more problematic to prove impact and success. Democracy,
Governance or improvements in journalism quality - these are long-term variables
which are also effected by other changes in the socio-political environment, so often it
is challenging to show whether improvements in a measure are due to the media
assistance intervention (Noske-Turner, 2017).
Mosher argues “that media matter is not such a hard case to support, but exactly how
it matters and what it actually does, in the context of development, whether by
contributing to the health of the economy, polity, or society, has been the focus of
considerable debate” (Mosher, 2009:7).
Thus, definite conclusions on the impact of media development programmes have
been difficult.

The growth of mobile technologies on the African continent
The central tenet of this research thesis asks whether digital technologies can
contribute to the same objectives as traditional media in media assistance projects in
Sub-Saharan Africa. As noted, the upsurge of mobile phone use in Africa has sparked
a rise in interest in these ICTs and how these might be applied to development. The
mobile phone has been celebrated for bringing information and news to people of all
levels of income at a much faster rate than other developing nations before it
(Poushter and Oates, 2015). According to some, no technology has transformed
Africa in recent years as much, and as rapidly, as the cellular phone (Alozie, 2007;
Bailard, 2009).
This section will therefore examine the impact of the growth in ICTs and in particular
mobile phones on Africa, and what potential they offer for development.
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The growth in penetration and use of the mobile phone has been described as
‘revolutionary’ and ‘transformational’ for the African continent. According to the
International Telecommunication Union, no technology has ever seen such a rapid rate
of adoption as mobile phones, and the developing world is leading the way (Tyler,
2010).
Indeed, as at 2003 there was one main telephone line per 100 inhabitants and 2.8
mobile subscriptions per 100 inhabitants in the region, a penetration rate of 2.8%. By
the end of 2018, there was a penetration rate of 44% (GSMA Intelligence, 2018).
Penetration rates are much higher for some individual countries such as Kenya and
Tanzania. For instance in Kenya, there is now a mobile phone penetration rate of over
100 percent (CCK, 2018).
What is unique about the mobile phone and its suitability for the African environment
is the combination of the affordability of hardware, the affordability of service, its
portability due to its small size and light weight, and its power efficiency. AkpanObong found that the comparatively lower cost of acquisition of the cell phone and its
stand-alone technology make it more affordable for resource-poor people predominant
in Sub-Saharan Africa (Akpan-Obong et al., 2010). De Bruijn claims mobile phones
have become part and parcel of the communication landscape in urban and rural areas
of Africa (De Bruijn, 2009).
The availability of pre-paid subscriptions (prevalent in Sub-Saharan Africa) and
services such as M-Pesa9 make the mobile phone a particularly attractive ICT for
Africans. While prepaid tariffs tend to be more expensive (per minute) than billed

9 M-Pesa, the mobile phone–based money transfer service launched by Kenya’s mobile network
operator Safaricom, is perhaps the most successful and profitable digital innovation in Africa so far.
The system processed around 6 billion transactions in 2016 (Monks, 2017).
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tariffs they are frequently chosen “because they are often the only payment method
available to low-income users who might not have a regular income and will thus not
qualify for a postpaid” plan. Indeed, about 95% of cell phone users in Africa use prepaid services (in Akpan-Obong et al, 2010:5).
Payment services via mobile phones such as M-Pesa have positioned countries such as
Kenya at the forefront of mobile financial services. CNN claimed “in some ways,
they're really leaping ahead of us” (Voight, 2011).
This concept of leapfrogging has been used again and again to describe how Africa is
not following the usual path of development as conceived by traditional modernisation
theories (Akpan-Obong et al., 2010; Fong, 2009; Nkwae, 2003). One of the reasons is
that Africa has been able to leap a stage of development by avoiding the costly
infrastructure of telephone landlines and going straight to mobile communications.
Southwood (2009) describes how mobile technology has been able to bypass severe
infrastructural constraints that have hindered the old land-line technology on the
continent. As Southwood noted “Africa was considered a difficult place to do
business and an even harder place to make money” (Southwood, 2009: xv). He
observed that before mobile phones:
Fixed line phones were provided by a monopoly provider and were not well resourced
or energetic about connecting customers. Waiting lists for new subscribers could be
ten years. The absence of instant communications provided many excuses for things
undone and little incentive for action (Southwood, 2009:xv).
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Southwood (2009) refers to this reshaping of life in Africa as ‘less walk and more
talk’. In his book of the same name he describes the changes in daily life that the
phone has been a catalyst for:
A son wants to talk to his mother in a neighbouring village – it’s a two day walk each
way.
A plumber makes house calls all morning only to return to his shop to pick up
messages for the afternoon.
A rural farmer wants to know what crop prices are in the market to see when best to
sell his crops – he has to take a day out to visit the market only to find out that the
prices are too low midweek.
This was Africa before mobile phones arrived: a lot of walking and not much talking.
(Southwood, 2009: xiv).

So, it appears the mobile phone has become the ICT of choice for Africans. Mobile
service is now relatively cheap to acquire and the technology on basic feature phones
is user-friendly enough that one does not require any particular level of sophistication
to use it. This is especially relevant for sub-Sahara’s largely illiterate populations 10.
Thus, mobile phones are said to becoming essentials for many Africans. “People
might not have shoes, but they have a cellphone” wrote Peskin (Peskin, 2011:20).
Indeed, Africans in the region are making real sacrifices to finance their cell phone. A
study by Crandall et al., found that at least 20 per cent of respondents, who were

10 UNESCO statistics show that the literacy rate for sub-Saharan Africa was 65 % in 2017. In other
words, one third of the people aged 15 and above were unable to read and write
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living on less than US$2.50 per day, felt it was necessary to make real sacrifices to
recharge their mobile credit. In the majority of cases, that meant buying less food, at
least once a week. New clothes, bus fares, utility bills and even soap were sometimes
sacrificed to sustain their mobile phone (Crandall et al., 2012). Other research has
found that some users are willing to spend up to a quarter of their household income
on mobile phone charges (De Carvalho et al., 2011) and to go without food in order to
stay informed and entertained (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007).
The reason they are willing to do this is because a mobile phone helps them to
improve their lives in the long term through “better access to information and
resources….. Access to information has become as vital as water and electricity”
(Powell III, 2012:11).
The New America think-tank argues that “mobile phones provide those living in
poverty with an opportunity to be their own problem solvers, business entrepreneurs
and aid workers. Connectivity and creativity have transformed mobile phones from a
technology device into a tool of economic empowerment” (Tyler, 2010).
Jeffrey Sachs enthusiastically claimed that mobile phones had been a gift for
development. In an article for The Guardian newspaper he argued “extreme poverty is
almost synonymous with extreme isolation, especially rural isolation. But mobile
phones and wireless internet end isolation, and will therefore prove to be the most
transformative technology of economic development of our time” (Sachs, 2008).
There are many testimonies of the beneficial day to day uses of mobile technology in
Africa. Most people will have by now seen the ubiquitous image of the Masai farmer
in traditional costume as he appears to be transacting day to day business on this
mobile phone.
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For example, in Senegal, information available through mobile phones enabled
farmers to double the prices of their crops and herders in Angola to locate their cattle
through GPS (global positioning system) technology (in Fong, 2009). Providing
market price information in the fisheries or agricultural sectors creates better
functioning markets and gets rid of intermediaries (Kuriyan et al., 2008).
Thus, there is great optimism about the potential of mobile connectivity for the
African continent as it is seen as having the potential to increase economic
productivity. Yonazi claims “the value of a mobile phone is higher in Africa than
elsewhere” (Yonazi et al., 2012:13). ICTs directly contribute around 7 per cent of
Africa’s GDP, which, is higher than the global average. That’s because, in Africa,
mobile phones are also “substitutes for many other types of service, such as financial
credit, newspapers, games and entertainment” (Yonazi et al., 2012:28).
The economic impact of mobile telephony in Kenya was assessed by the Global
Mobile Tax Review11 who claimed the industry contributed about $3.6 billion to the
country’s gross domestic product. It has also made a significant contribution to
employment, with an estimated 250,000 people employed by the industry in 2011
(Deloitte LLP, 2011). This is arguably through improved information flows, reducing
travel time and costs, and improved business efficiency.
This section has noted the enthusiasm for the mobile phone, which has resulted in
development agencies, funders and NGOs looking at these technologies to assist
development and aid programmes. The next section will review the evidence, if any,
that these new technologies can have a positive effect on development in Africa.

11 An annual report produced by the GSM Association which analyses consumption profiles, prices
and taxes
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ICT for Development in Africa
In recent years, the fields of ICT for Development (ICT4D) and Mobile For
development (M4D) have thus moved centre stage in the development field.
Banda maintained that the introduction of new media technology in Africa in the
1990s “sparked celebratory, almost utopian bliss in its proponents. It was
accompanied by the hype about the continent’s possibility of “leapfrogging” some
stages of development, as though the whole process of development had been
rendered less problematic” (Banda et al., 2009:1).
In their research into the area of ICTs in development, Ogan et al (2009) found that
there has been an upsurge in the use of the ICT paradigm within development
discussions and its use as a ‘holy grail’. They found more than half of all journal
articles addressing the topic of communication and development between 2004 and
2007 focused primarily on ICTs (Ogan et al, 2009).
Heeks (2009) noted that “the digital technologies of the 1990s were new tools in
search of a purpose. Development goals were new targets in search of a delivery
mechanism. That these two should find each other and fall in love was not
unexpected. They had a baby called "ICT4D", born in a flurry of publications,
bodies, events, programmes and project funding” (Heeks, 2009:3).
Many authors (Castells, 2000; Mansell, 1994; Mansell & When, 1998; Negroponte,
1996) have compared the development of ICTs to changes brought about by the
printing machines or the invention of writing. Bedi (1999) noted ‘proponents attribute
a wide and almost impossible array of positive effects to ICTs’ (Bedi, 1999:3). These
include economic growth, agricultural and industrial productivity, efficiency of public
administration, and participation in democracy.
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These studies show the discussions that are taking place in more recent years with
regards to development in Africa. The idea behind the techno-optimism is that more
and better information and communication helps development.
As noted, in recent years, technology companies have also entered the media
assistance space supporting media development projects through their foundations
(such as the Gates Foundation and Omidyar Foundation). Their media projects focus
on technology solutions for development problems and they increasingly contribute to
the discourse on aid.
However, the distinction should be made between the apparent economic benefits that
mobile technologies can bring for African nations and the political ones. Whilst this
chapter attests to the positive impact that these ICTs are having on the lives of citizens
of some countries in Africa, this does not mean that they are having the same impact
on the political arena, on participation and on the public sphere.

This difference is important because this research asks whether new digital forms of
media can add to or replace older traditional and legacy forms of media in media
development projects. And if the goal of these projects is better governance,
accountability, transparency and democracy, it is still debatable whether ICTs have
the same impact on these objectives.
For instance, Groshek (2009) found that internet diffusion had a positive impact on
democratisation across 152 countries, whilst Nisbet et al (2012) examining the
relationship between internet penetration, individual internet use, and citizen demand
for democracy across 28 countries, found no correlation (Groshek, 2009; Nisbet et al.,
2012).
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The next section will examine these claims of the potential for ICTs to contribute to
governance and democracy on the African continent

Digital technology and Political Change
With the growth of digital technologies in Africa, claims are now being made about
the democratising power of new media. ICTs, it is thought, might facilitate direct
participation of people in political decision-making, making possible the rise and
visibility of public opinion as a way of influencing the political process and thus
making leaders more concerned and responsive to public opinion.
Sika et al (2014) note that “ICTs are now widely accepted to be powerful tools with
which to combat many of the challenges that African countries face, including
governance” (Sika et al., 2014:9).
The use of mobile phones and the internet, for example through Twitter or Facebook,
might allow people to follow decision-making processes and discuss issues of
common concern (Castells, 2007; Mäkinen and Kuira, 2008).
ICTs are viewed by some as a way to promote democratic governance, and cultural
and political resistance against dictatorships. From this perspective, access to ICTs is
seen as aiding the democratic process in Africa (Grossman, 1995).
Referring to digital technologies and social media platforms as “liberation
technology”, Diamond (2008) has argued that “through expanding economic
freedom, civic mobilization, and the development of ‘liberation technology,’ even
seemingly entrenched regimes…could well become democracies within a generation”
(Diamond, 2008).
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Much of the excitement around new technologies extols the potential contribution of
digital technologies and social media platforms to the development of civil society and
practices of citizenship.
Howard has argued that new communication technologies have become the
“infrastructure for sharing and learning about diverse views and for new approaches to
political representation and participation” (Howard, 2011:40). Braskov and Obregon
(2012) claim that new media provide greater opportunities for engagement and
participation of individuals and communities (Braskov and Obregon, 2012).
This cyber-optimism is of relevance because many media development projects have
objectives to improve governance, participation and accountability and ICTs are now
being proposed as a solution to these goals in Africa, and elsewhere. There are a
proliferation of ICT for Accountability initiatives taking place in the region and this is
based on a paradigm which assumes increased citizen engagement through ICTs,
which could furthermore result in increased accountability (Fung et al., 2010; Sika and
Sambuli, 2014; Tettey, 2002)
But, the effectiveness of new media technologies to bring about social change is
contested. When it comes to Africa, the contribution of ICTs, of which mobile phones
form a part, to development and democracy has been questioned in a number of
sources (Hahn and Kibora, 2008). Tetteys’ research into ICT use in Africa found that
even though “a lot more people are getting a lot more information… this does not
translate into a significant expansion in the numbers and categories of those who
engage in, and hence influence, the direction of politics on the continent” (Tettey,
2001:133). Alozie et al (2011), maintain that in Africa “the effect of ICTs on political
development can neither be certified as revolutionary, nor can they be codified as
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panacea” and that “ICTs may not be the ‘magic bullet’ for political development in
sub-Saharan Africa” (Alozie et al., 2011:1,19).

Christensen (2011) is similarly

sceptical about the liberating powers of digital technology and has explicitly criticised
Diamond’s term ‘liberation technology’ as “excessively techno-utopian.” He is critical
of aid donors in the global North and how they have been “quick to declare social
media key tools in the battles over freedom of speech rights and democratic change in
developing nations … despite the lack of evidence” (Christensen, 2011:234).
For instance, during the Arab risings in North Africa, leaders of social movements
were seen to use ICTs to mobilise public opinion, organise mass protests and publicise
concerns and demands locally and globally. This led to it being named Revolution 2.0.
However, years after the so-called Arab Spring, authoritarian control has resurfaced.
So, the role of ICTs (often in the form of social media) and their promise to create
revolution and regime change is questionable. Buccianti and el-Richani (2015) note
that “in the years since the uprisings, it has become clear that the democratising
potential of social media for the region may have been overstated” (Buccianti and elRichani, 2015:5).
Indeed, even where communication technologies contribute to mass protest and the
strengthening of social movements, of course there is no guarantee that such protests
and movements will necessarily be successful and result in regime change.
Evgeny Morozov noted that in Iran “as the Green Movement lost much of its
momentum in the months following the election, it became clear that the Twitter
Revolution so many in the West were quick to inaugurate was nothing more than a
wild fantasy” (Morozov, 2011:5).
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In his book, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom (2011) Morozov
expresses scepticism about the power of the technology to bring about democratic
change. He argues against the notion that the internet is essentially liberating, dubbing
this notion “cyber-utopianism”. On the contrary, Morozov refers to the internet’s
alternative potential to be used by authoritarian regimes for surveillance, repression,
propaganda, and control of the digital media space, claiming that belief in a new
public sphere that would undermine oppressive governments was a “delusion”
(Morozov, 2011:i).
Many regimes have often responded to the threat of online activism by cracking down
on the use of social media. In many cases, those in power or elites own and/or control
the infrastructure for such technologies and can disrupt internet and mobile phone
services, as occurred in Iran and in Egypt. So, although social media can initially help
protest movements, they can also help the regime to crack down on the movement
(Aday et al., 2010; Papic and Noonan, 2011).

Malcolm Gladwell has noted that instead of being defined by their causes, activists are
now being defined by their tools. The protest in Moldova in 2009 against the
Communist government was dubbed the ‘Twitter Revolution’, because of the means
through which demonstrators were brought together (Gladwell, 2010a). Coverage of
the revolts in Egypt and Tunisia were also labelled the ‘Wiki Revolution and ‘Twitter
Revolution’.
But Gladwell insists “the revolution will not be tweeted”. He argues that the
platforms of social media are “built around weak ties” and suggests “whereas strong
ties are required for high risk (off-line) activism that explicitly confronts socially
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entrenched norms and practices, the weak ties sustained by social media produce little
more than “clicktivism” (Gladwell, 2010b).
The focus on the role of social media has been critiqued for taking away attention
from the actual causes of protests and movements and the role of human agency.
These labels attribute to a technology what is in fact the reaction to economic, social
and political grievances (Ottaway and Hamzawy, 2011).
These discussions illustrate some of the current debates about the role digital
technology can play in political change. These debates are pertinent as many media
assistance donors are encouraging the use of ICTs in their programmes without any
systematic evidence that they will achieve positive results. According to Aday, “most
accounts are based on anecdotes rather than rigorously designed research” (Aday et
al., 2010:3).
Along with the growth in these ICTs in Africa and claims of the democratising power
of digital platforms, claims are also made about the knock-on effect on the public
sphere. Odugbemi maintains “whether these governments like it or not, these
technologies are transforming their communication environments, their national
public spheres in irreversible ways” (Odugbemi, 2014).
It is asserted that this new space provides citizens with numerous opportunities to
engage in political process as well as to take a more active role in the governance
process (Benkler, 2006).
This is important in the context of this research because, as noted, legacy media has
traditionally been seen as fulfilling this role (see Habermas, 1962; Norris and Tettey,
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2010) and media assistance projects often work to strengthen and support the public
sphere. Can the internet and digital platforms do this more successfully?

ICTs and the new Public Sphere
The internet and digital media are seen to provide new opportunities for dialogue and
participation and this is why they are often referred to as the New Public Sphere or
‘virtual public sphere’. In modern day high-tech societies, there is a redefinition of
the public sphere which goes beyond Habermas to include new ‘cyberspaces‘
(Kellner, 2000:284). A number of different formulations of this position exist.
Castells, for one, maintains an optimistic view of the internet as a new space of
inclusive public sphere, saying that ‘the internet was expected to be an ideal
instrument to further democracy – and still is’ (Castells, 2001:155).
Benkler (2006) further asserts that the World Wide Web encourages a more open,
participatory approach because it enables users to potentially communicate
directly with many other users in a way that is outside the control of the media
owners. He claims that it “holds great practical promise; as a dimension of
individual freedom; as a platform for better democratic participation” (Benkler,
2006: 2).
Digital platforms have brought down barriers to group action, which has allowed for
new ways of gathering together and getting things done. In “The Political Power of
Social Media” (2011) technology evangelist, Clay Shirky offers a view of social
media as a long-term tool for strengthening civil society and the public sphere. He
argues that by democratising media production, now with a handheld device, it
“allows people to privately and publicly articulate and debate a welter of conflicting
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views” (Shirky, 2011:5). In other words, the internet provides not just great access to
information, but greater “access to conversation”.
Digital technologies and social media are seen to expand the realm for democratic
participation and debate and create new public spaces for political discussion.
Morrissett (2003) argued that ICTs can be used to provide a modern-day equivalent of
the barbershop, connecting citizens across the nation and with their leaders (Morrisett,
2003).
This is especially relevant in countries where radio, television, and the other electronic
media of communication are closed to critical voices, both in systems controlled by
the state or by private corporations. In these countries, if access is permitted, the
internet certainly provides a new public sphere where traditional media cannot,
because it is censored by the state or by its ties to big business and advertising.
This is of particular relevance in countries such as those we look at in Sub-Saharan
Africa, as there are new spaces being created by digital technologies, and arguably
these spaces for information, debate, and participation can invigorate democracy.
For instance, Frère and Kiyindou (2009) claim that in francophone Africa the
internet has enhanced citizen engagement in the public sphere through public
debates, more access to official information and more interaction with civil
society, thereby giving African citizens more capacity to participate in local and
worldwide public spheres (Frère and Kiyindou, 2009:73).
As will be seen in the country Case Studies, the internet in Kenya and Tanzania
has enabled the growth of blogs, forums and social media which provides
alternative virtual spaces to the mainstream media, which is the main has been coopted by politicians or business interests.
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However, the idea of the internet as an ideal public sphere has its complications. In
The virtual sphere: The internet as a public sphere, Papacharissi (2002) maintained
that although the internet may hold the promise of reviving the public sphere, features
of the technology simultaneously curtail its potential: information access inequalities
and new media literacy issues. She claimed:
A new public space is not synonymous with a new public sphere. As public space, the
internet provides yet another forum for political deliberation. As public sphere, the
internet could facilitate discussion that promotes a democratic exchange of ideas and
opinions. A virtual space enhances discussion; a virtual sphere enhances democracy
(Papacharissi, 2002:11).

Papacharissi also noted that internet-based technologies, while enabling discussion
between people on far sides of the globe, also frequently fragments political discourse.
So while these technologies have the potential of bringing people together, they also
risk “spinning them in different directions” (Papacharissi, 2002:16).
Comparing new and old media, a study by German scholars Jürgen Gerhards and
Mike Schäfer in 2009 tried to establish whether the internet offers a better and broader
communication environment compared to newspapers. They investigated whether the
online space proved to be a more democratic public sphere, with a wider range of
sources and views, but found "only minimal evidence to support the idea that the
internet is a better communication space as compared to print media" (Gerhards and
Schäfer, 2010:13).
Furthermore, Gerhards & Schäfer found that the internet is not an alternative public
sphere because less prominent voices end up being silenced by the search engines'
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algorithms. "Search engines might actually silence societal debate by giving more
space to established actors and institutions" (Gerhards and Schäfer, 2010:14).
This is noteworthy here because there is often a utopian rhetoric that surrounds
discussion on new media technologies and promises of citizen engagement.
Proponents of cyberspace claim that online discourse will increase political
participation and pave the way for democracy.
However, Fackson Banda (2009) questions whether new media technologies do
“indeed improve and qualitatively change the African continent’s political structures,
systems, and process or only create a quantitative increase in access to information
and interaction stemming from the ease and relative cheapness of new ICTs” (Banda
et al., 2009:14).
The tech-evangelists believe that the virtual sphere holds promise as a political
medium as it encourages political discussion and serves as a forum for it. However,
the virtual public sphere is dominated by those with access to computers or mobile
internet, much like the bourgeois of Habermas’ public sphere, still available to only a
portion of the population. Furthermore, as will be investigated later in the thesis,
technologies are not universally accessible and can result in fragmented discussions.
Polat (2005) suggests that although the internet may provide an additional space for
political deliberation, its role in extending the public sphere is limited because “of its
fragmented nature, inequalities in access and formation of groups around single
issues” (Polat, 2005:452).
Research by Davis (2007) on the internet’s role in representative politics found that
new media accelerated the decline of the traditional mass-mediated public spheres and
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contributed to “exclusionary political ‘elite discourse networks’ despite assumptions
to the contrary” (Davis, 2007:55).
Indeed, Foster and McChesney state that ‘the enormous potential of the internet has
vaporized in a couple of decades’ (Foster and McChesney, 2011:21). The era of Echo
Chambers12 and Fake News13 has also shown the virtual public sphere to be anything
but ideal.
Curran, Freedman and Fenton (2012) have challenged the cyber-optimism relating to
the internet and its proposed transformational power over society. Fenton describes
how social media “reinforces political fragmentation and inhibits solidarity among the
disenfranchised”, whilst “providing an illusion of direct control through selfexpression” (Curran et al., 2012:170).
Indeed, after examining the ownership structures of new media, Curran et al. find that
the internet era is market by the increasing power of existing large corporations. And
whereas democracy is intended to give a voice to everyone, the internet broadly fails
to achieve this due to educational, language and economic barriers (Curran et al.,
2016).
So, mobile phones may have transformed the “ecology of political
communication” and also “facilitated democratic engagement”, but Tettey (2017)
notes that despite this positive relationship there was still “no significant alteration

12 In media, an echo chamber is a situation in which information, ideas, or beliefs are amplified or
reinforced by transmission and repetition inside an "enclosed" system. “The idea that online
conversations about politics are typically divided into a variety of sub-groups, and that this division
takes place along ideological lines with people only talking to others with which they are already in
agreement (Bright, 2017: 1).
13 A reference to fabricated and untrue stories, but used by current US President as a tool to discredit
journalism and the press.
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in fundamental structures of political power” (Tettey, 2017:1).
In fact, Tettey (2001) argued that “while technologies have expanded the amount and
sources of information that are potentially available to citizens, they have not resulted
in any significant transformations in the way government is run or how politics are
conducted on the [African] continent” (Tettey, 2001:1).
So, while the literature suggests that the internet has the potential to extend the public
sphere, at least in terms of the information that is available to citizens, more
information does not necessarily lead to greater political activity.
Akpan-Obong (2010) confirms “that ICTs may well have revolutionized the social
space of sub-Saharans is not contested. Yet, one must grapple with the reality that
level of mobile phone penetration has far outpaced political development in the subSahara” (Akpan-Obong et al., 2010:18).
These issues make it a most interesting point in time to investigate support for media
assistance and independent journalism and the impact of digital technologies on this
sector.
The potential of digital technologies with respect to social change will be explored
more in later chapters in relation to the two case study countries. The stakeholders
provide valuable insights into the true potential of ICTs to influence change on the
continent.
The cyber-optimism that is apparent in the literature would suggest that these new
technologies will dramatically alter media development work - providing a new open
space for political discussion, for participation, for education, for cross-society
reconciliation even. What need for traditional media and traditional ‘media
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development’ then? Is it still relevant in the new information ecosystem in Africa?
These are the central questions which the research addresses in subsequent chapters.

Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to examine the debate on development aid, media
development and ICTs in an African setting.
It was noted that the concept of development itself is unclear and donors have
different priorities and ways of expressing what it means to them in their aid policies.
There is little evidence in the literature showing foreign aid as a resounding success,
and there are arguments both for and against overseas development interventions. The
same argument can be made for media assistance, or ‘media interference’ as it has
been referred (Berger, 2002).
Jones and Waisbord maintain “we still know very little about the link between aid
interventions and media transformations” (Jones and Waisbord, 2010:1). NoskeTurner noted that “few media assistance evaluations manage to provide sound
evidence of impacts on governance and social change” (Noske-Turner, 2014:1).
The fast growth of ICTs and the mobile phone on the African continent has been
accompanied by enthusiastic claims about what they can do for the regions’ social,
economic and political problems.
This chapter examined the potential for ICTs and digital technology for development
goals. No doubt they have impacted on the social and economic sphere in this region
of Africa, but the political impact of ICTs may have been exaggerated. This is
particularly relevant for media development projects, where ICTs are being viewed
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through rose-coloured lenses by donors as a solution to governance, accountability
and participation issues. However, the effectiveness of new digital technologies to
bring about political change is contested.
Both Chapters 2 and 3 have critically assessed the strengths and weaknesses as
outlined in the literature of both traditional media and ICTs with regard to
development goals. The primary research aims to ascertain from those working
directly in the practice of media development whether these technologies can
positively contribute to their programmes to address media development goals. Thus,
the research will build on the academic literature reviewed here to address the
question of whether media assistance is still relevant in the current political and
technological environment.
Chapters 5 and 6 present findings on the current landscape and ‘information
ecosystem’ for media development practice in Kenya and Tanzania and subsequently,
whether these digital technologies are being utilised to address donor goals. Prior to
that, Chapter four will outline the methodology adopted.
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Chapter 4
Methodology

This chapter outlines the methods and the research design employed to address the
central research question of whether media assistance is obsolete, and more
specifically the potential for digital technologies to achieve media development donor
goals in Sub-Saharan Africa. Motivated by ongoing changes in the media and
journalism spheres brought about by digital technology, the thesis asks how these
changes are impacting in practice on the media development sector. 14
The approach adopted in the research design was a mixed method one using a variety
of research methods to address the hypothesis. This entailed using secondary data
sources to construct case studies of the two focus countries followed by a period of
qualitative research comprising face to face interviews to collect primary data. The
rationale for using these methods will be discussed in more detail in this chapter.
In answering whether digital technologies can contribute to donor goals in media
development practice, the research elicits the views of those working on the ground
implementing projects as to whether they are integrating these technologies into their

14 The distinction is made again between Media Development as in strengthening the media sector and
media for development, which uses media as a medium for development messages. These are both
covered by the umbrella term ‘media development sector’. The research found that in the case study
countries, these two disciplines tended to overlap.
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programmes, and if they are being used to what success. If they are not being used, the
research investigates why not.
The underlying rationale is that if digital technologies are being used in media
development activities to address media development objectives, will this render
established methods of media assistance redundant? Thus, the thesis looks at what
form current media development practice takes in East Africa, specifically in Kenya
and Tanzania. In this chapter then, the methods used to address the central research
question will be discussed.

Methods for this research
The choice of which research method to employ depends on the nature of the research
question. Morgan and Smircich (1980) argue that the actual suitability of a research
method “derives from the nature of the phenomenon to be observed” (Morgan and
Smircich, 1980:491).
The first step was to review the literature on media development, democracy
promotion and ICTs in development to provide a theoretical underpinning for the
research question. To provide deeper insight into the subject matter, the literature
review in Chapters 2 and 3 gave a background to the field of media development and
the media assistance sector, of the ideology that drives it, including the context for
media development activity on the African continent today. The literature provides a
framework on which to understand the role and function of media assistance in SubSaharan Africa in its current setting.
As such, appropriate methods are required in order to:
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a) Compile recent data via desk review of available sources of information on Kenya
and Tanzania. This will give a picture of the context and landscape (or the
‘information ecosystem’15) in which ‘media development’ projects are currently
being carried out in these countries
b) Garner from a range of key informants working within the media development
sector in Kenya and Tanzania the degree to which digital technologies and social
media are being utilised in their current programmes. This provides the “view
from practice” of the thesis title. It was thought especially important to provide a
perspective from those working directly in the field of media development, a
practical view which could illuminate whether digital technologies can live up to
their promise in the context of media assistance. The key stakeholders can also
provide a view as to whether the work is still relevant in the current information
eco-system.

With regards to (a) above, the research presents an overview of the media landscapes
in Kenya and Tanzania and how they may have changed as a result of recent changes
in digital media technologies. Any changes in the media environment might influence
the medium used or media addressed by media development NGOs in their projects or
the format of capacity building programmes. A survey of the media environment
might also help identify what media interventions are needed in the region.
For instance, media development projects, if they are going to be effective, need to
employ the media that their target groups are using. As example, if a donor is funding

15 An “information ecosystem” refers to the producers and consumers of various types of media, as
well as the social and community structures through which information is accessed, consumed,
influenced, trusted, and shared (Bourgault, 2016).
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a project with the objective of encouraging urban youth to engage more and
participate in political processes, the project might use TV (a more urban based media
in many African countries) or youth journals/ magazines to connect with this group.
Alternatively, if a project is trying to encourage rural women to use more modern
practices in their agricultural work, the project would most likely use radio (which is
widely used in rural Africa, both my males and females, literate and non-literate).
With regards to media sector reform projects, if there are training initiatives taking
place, to what extent do journalists need capacity building in digital technologies or
are they already skilled in these areas? And with media restructuring endeavours, have
these projects changed to incorporate the newer technologies? Are ICTs a central part
of media sector transformation programmes, if any are being undertaken?
Providing a snapshot of the focus countries’ media systems will enable a deeper
understanding of the needs of the media sector in the region, what the industry term
‘needs analysis’.
Thus, the country case studies give a background context for the media development
projects that are taking place, and furthermore, can identify what media assistance
interventions are needed, if any. This will help with assessing whether digital
technologies have the potential to contribute to these interventions.
The research approach is also informed by Robson and McCartan (2016) who suggest
the following guidelines for selecting research methods:
To find out what people do in public: use observation
To find out what they do in private, use interviews or questionnaires
To find out what they think, feel and/or believe, use interviews, questionnaires or
attitude scales (Robson and McCartan, 2016:242)

127

As noted by Woods, “large amounts of relevant information about the experiences of
others may be collected by directly questioning or talking to people” (Woods, 2011:2).
Therefore, in this instance, it was deemed most appropriate to use qualitative
interview methods to learn directly from those organisations implementing the
projects, what the shape and form of those projects were, to what extent they use ICTs
to enhance their projects and whether these technologies have the same potential to
achieve donor goals.
Analysis of the primary interview data will also give a picture of what activities the
‘media development’ sector is currently implementing in their projects in Kenya and
Tanzania. The interview data thus gives perspective on whether media assistance is
still relevant and also contributes an insight into the future role, if any, for the media
development sector.
The justification for these qualitative methods will be now be outlined.

Methodology
As noted, in this research the methodology was two-pronged. Firstly, case studies of
the two countries under review, Kenya and Tanzania, were developed. Then, face-toface interviews were conducted with stakeholders in the media development sector in
these two countries. This section will illustrate the advantages and disadvantages of
the different methods considered and the rationale for adopting a qualitative approach
for capturing primary data in this instance.
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Buckley and Chiang (1976) describe research methodology as a strategy or
‘architectural design’ by which the researcher maps out an approach to problemsolving (Buckley et al., 1976). According to Crotty (1998), research methodology is a
comprehensive strategy ‘that silhouettes our choice and use of specific methods
relating them to the anticipated outcomes’ ( in Jamshed, 2014:1). The choice of
research methodology is based upon the type and features of the research problem
(Noor, 2008).
Silverman discusses the relative merits of quantitative and qualitative methods in this
book Doing Qualitative Research and says that “outside the social science community
there is little doubt that quantitative data rules the roost” (Silverman, 2006:35).
However, the methods used by qualitative researchers show a belief that they can
provide a “deeper understanding” of social phenomena than would have been
garnered from purely quantitative data (Silverman, 2006:56).
Dabbs (1982) claims that “quantitative and qualitative are not distinct” (in Berg et al.,
2004:2). Yet in many social sciences the quantitative orientations are often given more
respect. This may reflect the tendency of the general public to regard science as
relating to numbers and implying precision.
Berg (2004) confirms that “certainly, qualitative methodologies have not
predominated in the social sciences. After all, qualitative research takes much longer,
requires greater clarity of goals during design stages, and cannot be analysed by
computer programmes. Qualitative research methods and analytic strategies are not
associated with high-tech society in the ways quantitative techniques may be”.
Nonetheless, Berg adds that “qualitative research has left its mark conceptually and
theoretically on the social sciences. The lasting contributions to social understanding
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from qualitative research, as well as the sheer number of contributing social thinkers,
are significant” (Berg et al., 2004:2).
Creswell suggest that qualitative research methodology is suitable when the researcher
or the investigator either investigates new field of study or intends to ascertain and
theorise prominent issues (Creswell, 2007). Creswell adds that “researchers bring their
own worldviews, paradigms, or sets of beliefs to the research project, and these inform
the conduct and writing of the qualitative study” (ibid).
In this instance, direction was taken from Berg who asserts “Qualitative research
refers to concepts, definitions, characteristics, metaphors, symbols, and descriptions of
things. In contrast, quantitative research refers to counts and measures of things”
(Berg et al., 2004:3). What was desired in this research was further insight and fuller
description of media development projects taking place in-country than had been
retrieved from project documentation and thus qualitative interview methods were
considered most appropriate for gathering this data.

Research Design
The research process consisted of four main phases with each stage of the research
used as input for the following part, as illustrated in the figure below:
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Figure. 5 Research Design.

The first part involved the literature review (reported in Chapters Two and Three),
which surveyed the most relevant research themes from the literature and identified
the following as particularly significant: the origin and growth of the media
development sector; media assistance methods; theories of the press including media’s
relationships to accountability, transparency, governance and democracy; the public
sphere and the new public sphere; Development and Aid; ICTs and development.
To understand the core tenets of the research question, those chapters review the
academic literature on the following questions: how is media related to democracy?
What is its relationship to the donors objective of democracy promotion? How is
media linked to governance and accountability? What is the public sphere?
The literature under consideration is drawn from a wide range of sources. In addition
to relevant academic literature on the social and political theory relating to the role of
journalism and media in society and scholarly literature of development studies, this
131

research also draws on the substantial body of ‘grey literature’. This includes policy
sources such as reports, working papers, and evaluations from government and
institutional donors; research papers of media NGOs who implement projects and
think-tanks working in the sector. Online and academic sources relating to the field of
Information Communication Technology for Development (ICT4D) and the debates
regarding technology and social change are also consulted.
These diverse sources have been used due to the limited academic literature on the
subject of media development itself. In reality, there is only a small (but admittedly
growing) body of academic work focused on the media development sector. As
Geertsema-Sligh (2019) notes “there is not much scholarly or theoretical research in
the area (Geertsema-Sligh, 2019: 2440). Historically, there have been few academic
courses at third level education devoted solely to media development; often the
subject is covered as a module under international development or political
departments.
Recent exceptions to this in the UK are Masters programmes at the University of East
Anglia, University of Westminster, LSE and SOAS in London. The programmes aim
to provide an understanding of the relationships between media and development, and
contemporary practices as defined by states, NGOs and other actors. They cover
theories and concepts and practical skills around the themes of media and
development and communications.
As a result, to get recent and up to date assessments of media development practice
and projects, the literature review needed to draw on a combination of academic and
so-called grey literature. This includes research emanating from organisations working
in the sector. These organisations include UN institutions such as UNESCO and
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UNDP, they include government funded research such as Centre for International
Media Assistance and DFID, and they included implementing organisations such as
BBC Media Action, IREX and Internews. These organisations produce research
evaluation of projects and policy documentation relating to the media development
industry.
The literature review was followed by the data gathering process. Data gathering was
divided into two phases; the creation of Case Studies and two fieldtrips for data
collection to the focus region. Research Trip One to Nairobi and Dar es Salaam
during May 2014; and Research Trip Two to Nairobi during February 2015. These
data gathering phases will be described in more detail below.

Data Gathering: Phase 1 Case Study Country Profiles
Detailed case profiles of the two countries under review were created to give a deeper
insight of the ‘ecosystem’ in which media development projects are undertaken and to
contribute to a better understanding of why certain media development projects are
being carried out.
The Case Study is an approach to research that assists the exploration of a
phenomenon within its context using a variety of data sources. This ensures that the
issue is not explored through one lens, but rather a variety of lenses which allows for
multiple facets of the issue to be revealed and understood. Robson describes Case
Study as “a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a
particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple
sources of evidence” (Robson, 1993:146).
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De Smaele has argued that “media systems are given shape not only by economic but
also by political and cultural factors… behaviour patterns, questions of culture and
habits” (De Smaele, 1999:186). The shape of media development projects are also
determined by the same factors.
According to Yin, a case study design should be considered when: (a) the focus of the
study is to answer “how” and “why” questions; (b) you cannot manipulate the
behaviour of those involved in the study; (c) you want to cover contextual conditions
because you believe they are relevant to the phenomenon under study; or (d) the
boundaries are not clear between the phenomenon and context (Yin, 2003). Certainly
(c) above is significant for this research undertaking - the context is relevant to the
research project under study.
Shuttleworth, noted “case studies make more interesting topics than purely statistical
surveys…. The general public has little interest in pages of statistical calculations but
some well-placed case studies can have a strong impact” (Shuttleworth, 2008:2).
Robson argues that until recently case studies have been considered in methodology
texts as “kind of 'soft option', possibly admissible as an exploratory precursor to more
'hard-nosed' experiment or survey, or as a complement to such approaches but of
dubious value itself (Robson and McCartan, 2016:151).
In many studies, it can be appropriate to study more than a single case. Yin (1994)
suggested that carrying out multiple case studies is more like doing multiple
experiments, they may build upon the first experiment, perhaps carrying the
investigation into an area suggested by the first study; or they may seek to
complement the first study by focusing on an area not originally covered (Yin, 1994).
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In this instance, a case study approach was adopted to gain a detailed understanding of
the media landscapes in which current media projects are being carried out, and also
what media assistance needs there may be. Two case studies are presented as then
comparative issues in these countries can be highlighted and analysed which will
serve to support the evidence from both and enhance the credibility of the evidence.
The first foundation of the case study is the subject and relevance. For example,
statistical analysis has shown that birth-rates in African countries are increasing. A
case study on one or two specific countries becomes a good focused tool for
determining the social and economic pressures driving this. Similarly, with regards to
this research thesis, statistics have shown widespread growth and penetration of new
technologies and mobile phones in Africa. This case study will be a tool for
determining the reasons driving this and then its effect on media development
activities. Context is key.
There are two key approaches that guide case study methodology; one proposed by
Robert Stake, (1995) and the second by Robert Yin (2003). They use different terms
to describe a variety of case studies. Yin categorises case studies as explanatory,
exploratory, or descriptive. He also differentiates between single, holistic case studies
and multiple-case studies.
Stake (1995), by contrast, uses three terms to describe case studies; intrinsic,
instrumental, and collective. According to Stake, if you are interested in a unique
situation, conduct an intrinsic case study. This means that you have an intrinsic
interest in the subject and you are aware that the results have limited transferability. If
the intent is to gain insight and understanding of a particular situation or phenomenon,
then Stake recommends using an instrumental case study to gain understanding. Stake
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uses the term collective case study when more than one case is being examined. In
these terms, the case study method in this thesis is both instrumental and collective
(Stake, 1995).
A major advantage of a case study as a methodological approach is that it provides
much more detailed information than what may be available through other methods,
such as surveys. Case studies also allow one to present data collected from multiple
methods (i.e., surveys, interviews, document review, and observation) to provide the
complete story.
For this research, Kenya and Tanzania were chosen as the case study countries. Both
countries went through a process of media liberalisation during the last decade of the
20th Century and as a result have seen a proliferation of media outlets and platforms.
Not all the outcomes of the liberalisation process have been positive as noted in the
literature review, but it provided the countries under review with dynamic and plural
media landscapes in which to investigate the media development sector.
As Deane et al explained: “liberalisation, particularly of broadcast media, has often
been partial, haphazard and evolutionary rather than revolutionary, but it has
nevertheless been transformative” (Deane et al., 2003a:70).
Media Development NGOs have a well-established presence in these two countries
and have been carrying out media development activities for decades. For instance,
one area of focus has been supporting community radio,– i.e. radio produced by and
for the community, independently of state or commercial interests – which has a long
tradition throughout sub-Saharan Africa, and is widely considered important as a tool
for social change, participatory development and poverty reduction (Skuse 2005;
Slater and Tacchi 2004).
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Another focus for media development NGOs in the region has been helping the
process of converting previously government-controlled state broadcasters into public
service broadcasters. However, this process has been difficult and “there are very few
examples of former state broadcasting monopolies successfully transforming
themselves into genuinely public service broadcasters” (Deane et al., 2003a:74).
Thus, donor-supported media development activities are well established in both of
the case study countries, therefore providing ample secondary documentation but also
suitable participants for the primary data collection.
Another benefit of case studies as a method is that they typically rely on multiple data
sources of information and methods to provide as complete a picture as possible. This
is a strategy which also enhances data credibility and reliability (Yin, 2003). Potential
data sources may include: documentation, archival records, interviews, direct
observations, and participant-observation (Baxter and Jack, 2008). In comparison to
other qualitative approaches, with case study research, investigators can integrate
quantitative survey data, which facilitates reaching a holistic understanding of the
phenomenon being studied. This research integrated primary qualitative interview data
in the case studies to add further in-depth information.
There are many relevant indicators and data available for the research on Kenya and
Tanzania which will make it possible to profile the media and ICT environment, as
well as development and economic indicators. These measures will enable the study to
give a comprehensive picture of the media and telecommunications landscape in the
country.
For example, with regards to the media landscape, there are three primary indices
which are used by media development organisations to evaluate their projects as
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baseline data and final data. The indices by Freedom House, IREX and Reporters
Without Borders form the ’oligopoly‘ (Burgess, 2010) of media rating systems so this
research used them as a starting point.
The indices focus on the social, economic and political environment as they relate to
the media sector of a country. They are constructed by assigning quantitative
measures to expert qualitative assessments. These numbers therefore are very different
from either actual numbers of economic indicators like number of people living in a
city, number of cars produced in a year or estimates like Gross Domestic Product,
Foreign Direct Investment Inflow as a share of GDP, etc.
Another source for profiling the media environment in Kenya and Tanzania is
Intermedia ‘Audiencescapes’ research16. AudienceScapes is well-known resource for
the international development community for media habits and communication
information on developing countries from a bottom-up perspective. It provides
information for traditional and new media in terms of access and general use,
including radio, television, mobile phones, newsprint and the internet. While not
completely up to date (the most recent user data for these countries is 2010/2011) it
provides invaluable qualitative research into local audience media and telecoms habits
in the countries under question.
Thus, for the case study in this research thesis, data from these multiple sources will
be synthesised in the analysis process rather than handled individually. Each data
source is one piece of the “puzzle,” with each piece contributing to the researcher’s
understanding of the whole media landscape. Baxter and Jack suggest this

16 http://www.intermedia.org/research-findings/audiencescapes/
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convergence adds strength to the findings as the various strands of data are braided
together to promote a greater understanding of the case (Baxter and Jack, 2008).
As noted, primary interview data will also be included with secondary data, as
stakeholder insights, in the case study profiles, and these will reveal in more detail the
media systems, market structure and audience habits in Kenya and Tanzania.
By accessing these data sources for the country case studies, the thesis can build a
picture of both the background social and political environments and the media
landscape. Cross-referencing the data sets will help spot trends that have happened in
these countries over the past years and also provide information such as audience
habits of traditional media and in addition to usage patterns for newer technologies
such as mobile and internet.
Looking below the surface of the statistics will give a picture of whether the
technology revolution is having a tangible impact in these countries. For instance,
despite rising access to mobile phones and the steady growth of these countries’
economies and populations, gender inequities and income disparities continue to
present barriers. As noted by Murthy “in many fast--‐emerging economies…… the
privileged live in a highly connected information society, while those at the bottom of
the income pyramid (BOP), and especially BOP women, remain disconnected”
(Murthy, 2011a:2).
Shuttleworth proposed that a case study is “an in-depth study of a particular situation
rather than a sweeping statistical survey. It is a method used to narrow down a very
broad field of research into one easily researchable topic” (Shuttleworth, 2008:1).
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In this case, by choosing to add qualitative interview data in the case study, this
research is able to go beyond the quantitative statistical survey and understand also
social or cultural conditions which might affect media assistance requirements in the
region.

Data Gathering: Phase 2 Qualitative Interviews
Berg claimed that “interviewing may be defined simply as a conversation with a
purpose. Specifically, the purpose is to gather information” (Berg et al., 2004:67)
In addition to secondary data sources, interviews are important sources of case study
information. This type of qualitative research tries to understand and interpret the
meaning of situations or events from the perspectives of the people involved and as
understood by them.
A choice between research methods rests fundamentally on a set of decisions about
the questions a researcher wants to answer and the practicality of gathering the kind of
data that will answer those questions. Whereas, it is said that quantitative research
seeks to identify the relation among a set of variables, qualitative research aims to
gain some understanding of a phenomenon. Collecting these descriptions can be done
in several ways, of which face-to-face interviews are the most common.
Kvale defines the purpose of the qualitative research interview as "to gather
descriptions of the life-world of the interviewee with respect to interpretation of the
meaning of the described phenomena" (Kvale, 1983:174). This description was
deemed most aligned with the research objectives, where semi-structured interviews
could garner from interview participants what exactly was being implemented in
projects and the advantages and disadvantages of these activities.
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In this instance, it was felt that, whilst data could be obtained through policy and
programme documents of the donors and NGOs implementing the projects, many
documents are not readily available and also were not up to date. Interviewing staff of
these organisations would give a much more current view as to what their activities
are and it would also be possible to garner the negative or less successful aspects of
some of their project work.

The interview was also chosen as a suitable research method because, despite
quantitative and statistical data, there are many cultural and local determinants that
effect behaviour and adoption of new technologies in different countries. A good
example of this was described by Amy O Donnell, project manager for Frontline:
SMS radio17 in interview with the author. When talking about the potential of
gathering market research information using mobile phones, she claimed that many
local women in Kenya didn’t like sharing information about their age, sex and profile
over text to ‘faceless institutions’:
In their communities everyone knows each other and they take pride in the
community and being known. It was almost insulting to be asked by text “who are
you?!” as it questioned their position in the community18

This insight into how Kenyan women feel about using ICTs can be best gained by
surveying those involved on the ground in implementing the projects. It illustrates the

17 Frontline SMS: Radio is an organisation which is creating a buzz in Africa with their free,
downloadable, open source software which allows users to use SMS to communicate with large
numbers of people using just a laptop and mobile, and is now being harnessed by many local and
community radio stations in Africa.
18 Amy O Donnell in interview with the author London 2012
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complexities of personal ICT use in region. There is a practical and local element to
every international development project and these are the details that are not
immediately apparent from analysis of the secondary data sources.
The primary advantage of in-depth interviews is that they provide much more detailed
information than what is available through other data collection methods, such as
surveys. It can be argued that to understand the potential for digital technologies in
media development projects it is logical to ask those implementing the projects at first
hand.
Interviewing is the most common format of data collection in qualitative research.
Most qualitative research interviews are either semi-structured, lightly structured or
in-depth (Mason,1994). When choosing the interview, there are several forms of
interviews that are possible: Open-ended, Focused, and Structured or survey. In an
open-ended interview, key respondents are asked to comment about certain events.
They may propose solutions or provide insight into events.
Unstructured interview resembles a conversation more than an interview and is always
thought to be a “controlled conversation,” which is skewed towards the interests of the
interviewer (Gray, 2013). Non-directive interviews, a form of unstructured interviews,
are aimed to gather in-depth information and usually do not have pre-planned set of
questions (Jamshed, 2014).
In contrast, semi-structured interviews are those in-depth interviews where the
respondents have to answer pre-set open-ended questions and thus are widely
employed by different professionals in their research. These types of interviews are
conducted once only, with an individual or with a group and generally cover the
duration of 30 min to more than an hour.
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In this project, the research schedule contained a series of open-ended questions and
the interviews were semi-structured. A key feature of the semi-structured interview is
in the partial pre-planning of the questions. Semi-structured interviews allow for
replication of the interview with others, but are less controlled. Woods contends that
“a great deal of qualitative research (grounded theory, thematic analysis, etc) uses
semi-structured interview material” (Woods, 2011:7).

In a semi-structured interview, as conducted in this instance, the researcher provides
some structure based on his or her research interests but works flexibly and allows
room for the respondent’s more spontaneous descriptions and narratives (Brinkmann,
2014).
The ability to ask some spontaneous questions is sensitive to the participants need to
express themselves. They also may provide a more relaxed atmosphere in which to
collect information—people may feel more comfortable having a conversation with
you as opposed to filling out a survey (Boyce and Neale, 2006).
As the interview was the primary data gathering instrument for the research, a semistructured interview was chosen where questions were carefully designed to provide
adequate coverage for the purpose of the research. Major questions were developed in
the form of a general statement which was then followed by a sequence of subquestions for further probing.
In terms of research instrument design, the author drew up a schedule of interview
questions in advance of the first field trip. This schedule (see Appendix A) has 20
questions which were grouped into themes, such as Local Media Environment,
Funding of projects, Journalism Practice, Current Media development Activity. The
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questions were derived from the primary Research Question, and were sub-themes
within the hypothesis.

Conducting the Fieldwork

For this thesis, the author travelled to Nairobi and Dar es Salaam over two research
field trips in 2014 and 2015 to meet and interview a sample of stakeholders in the
media development sector. Of the interviews conducted most of these were face-toface on the field trips; some were done via skype and a small number were completed
by email.

Most of the fieldwork involved interviewing using semi-structured questions with
various categories of respondents from the participating organisations. These took
place primarily in the respondents’ offices either in Nairobi, Dar es Salaam or
London. A number also took place in cafes, though this did affect sound quality of the
recordings.
When using the interview as a methodology the author had to decide whether to take
notes, tape the interview, rely on memory or write in the answers. In this case, the
author decided to use a dictaphone for most of the face-to-face interviews apart from
one or two where the tape recorder was not permitted for security reasons (US
Embassy, Dar Es Salaam) or the environmental noise was not suitable (Fes Media and
Tanzania Media Fund, Dar Es Salaam). In these instances, handwritten notes were
taken.
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The Role of the Researcher

The role of the Researcher in the study is also a factor that requires consideration.
Hughes (2012) maintained that qualitative research is “not totally objective because
the researcher is subjectively involved in the very choice of a problem as worthy of
investigation and in the interpretation of the results” (Hughes, 2012:6).
Denzin & Lincoln (2008) claim that in qualitative studies the researcher is an
instrument of data collection. Greenbank (2003) argued that consumers of the
research need to know about the human instrument. The qualitative researcher needs
to describe relevant aspects of self, including any biases and assumptions, any
expectations, and experiences to qualify his or her ability to conduct the research
(Greenbank, 2003).
In this study, the author brought her experience of working in the media development
industry to the work. Having been a former actor in the sector - having previously
worked for BBC Media Action, one of the largest Media Development Organisations
(MAOs) - it could be argued that the author was an “insider” and had knowledge of
the industry. While not being a full participant in the study the researcher brought
previous knowledge, assumptions and even ideology to the study. Attia and Edge
(2017) argue that the researcher always has a particular standpoint.
Punch (2008) maintains that the qualitative researcher should explain if their role is
emic --an insider, who is a full participant in activity, programme, or phenomenon, or
the role is more etic –from an outside view, more of an objective viewer. There could
be a great deal of variations in between –a researcher can start as an outsider and then
becomes a member of the group. Or the reverse can occur –the researcher starts as a
member of a group then becomes a more objective observer (Punch, 2008).
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This process of reflection by the researcher, or reflexivity, is a process of self-critique
to examine how her own experiences might or might not have influenced the
researcher process (Dowling, 2006). Reflexivity acknowledges the role of the
researcher as a participant in the process of knowledge construction and not merely an
outsider-observer of a phenomenon. So, reflexivity requires researchers to reflect upon
and articulate their position and subjectivities (world view, perspectives, biases), so
that readers can better understand the filters through which questions were asked, data
were gathered and analysed, and findings were reported (Patnaik, 2013).
Relevant researcher’s positioning include personal characteristics, such as gender,
race, affiliation, age, personal experiences, linguistic tradition, beliefs, biases,
preferences, theoretical, political and ideological stances (Bradbury-Jones, 2007).
These positions of the researcher may impact the research several ways. First, they
can affect access to the ‘field’ because respondents may be more willing to share their
experiences with a researcher whom they perceive as one of them. In this study, the
authors’ position as a previous employee in the sector may have resulted in the
researcher achieving easier access and greater response from interview participants.
The researcher brought her insider knowledge of the sector, its motivation and its
possible flaws, to the interview process. This may have meant that the researcher did
not always ask participants to qualify or expand on certain answers during the
interviews as the interviewer understood the terminology and context without having
to go into as much detail.
However, the author could engage with participants on a professional level within the
discussions and understand the jargon and also the practicalities of implementing
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projects in-country. This allows the researcher to find issues that are often missed
(such as subtleties and complexities) (Hughes, 2012).
The positions of the researcher may also shape the nature of researcher–researched
relationship, which, in turn, affects the information that participants are willing to
share; for instance, interview participants may feel more comfortable talking about
project failures with a colleague from within the sector who can empathise with the
challenges of the work, than with an outsider.
Bradbury-Jones (2007) maintains that reflexivity can occur throughout all phases of
the research process, including the formulation of a research question, collection and
analysis of data, and drawing conclusions (Bradbury-Jones, 2007). Kacen and Chaitin
(2006) argued that the worldview and background of the researcher affects the way in
which she constructs the world, poses questions, and chooses the lens for filtering the
information gathered from participants and making meaning of it (Kacen and Chaitin,
2006).
Doctoral research demands a high level of critical analysis of the subject matter, but
the researcher acknowledges the potential impingement of subjectivity on the analysis.
In this instance the researcher reflected on herself as the researcher in an attempt to
provide more effective and impartial analysis. The researcher of this study, coming
from a predominantly white, Christian, liberal democracy in the West of Europe,
might bring that bias to the research and interviews, and the analysis of data. Kvale
called it “the asymmetrical power relations of the research interviewer and the
interviewed subject” (Steinar Kvale, 2002).
Temple and Young (2004) maintain that positionality can affect research outcomes
and interpretations, because “one’s position within the social world influences the way
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in which you see it” (Temple and Young, 2004:164). The researcher reflected on
whether she had directed some of the participants towards answering the questions in
a particular way and concluded that while she had certainly endeavoured not to,
objectively this could have occurred. As Wilkie argues “it is a subtle readjustment to
your self-awareness that can make a profound difference to what you get out of your
research” (Wilkie, 2015).
Furthermore, working as a western researcher in an international context, especially in
the global south, gives rise to ethical issues and questions, which will now be
addressed.

Research Ethics
Any research that involves human subjects or participants raises unique ethical, social
and political issues. Research ethics is interested in the analysis of any ethical issues
that arise when people are involved as participants in research. There are several
objectives in research ethics. The first and broadest objective is to protect human
participants.
Thus, the research should be conducted with integrity and minimises physical, mental,
legal or financial risk for the participants. The research was undertaken with ethical
principles such as avoiding doing harm, seeking informed and voluntary consent from
those taking part, respecting confidentiality and anonymity of participants.
A secondary objective of research ethics is to ensure that research is conducted in a
way that serves interests of individuals, groups and/or society as a whole. Another is
to examine specific research activities and projects for their ethical soundness, looking
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at issues such as the management of risk, protection of confidentiality and the process
of informed consent.
Doiron and Asselin (2015) claim that there are several dilemmas for researchers
planning to work in Global South countries with “few or different ethical standards for
conducting research… from the Global North academic community” (Doiron and
Asselin, 2015:1). These dilemmas can include: 1) differing views on what counts as
research: 2) differing values and policies on gender, religion, inclusive practices and
other social and cultural areas; 3) the insider/outsider phenomenon (white privileged
researchers working in non-white communities); and 4) development of culturally
sensitive research instruments (Doiron and Asselin, 2015).
Hosted in the School of Media at TU Dublin (then DIT), the project was granted
ethical approval and complied with the ethical requirements as set out by TU Dublin’s
Research Ethics Committee. Falling within the broad domain of social sciences
research, the project was informed by ethical guidelines such as those of the
Sociological Association of Ireland and the British Sociological Association.
The project also incorporates the field of development studies to the extent that the
primary research question is centred on media and development. This is an ethically
complex field of enquiry. Development studies often involves work with research
participants at completely different levels of social and economic power to the
researcher.
However, there is a notable lack of literature that deals specifically with the ethical
dimensions of social science in developing contexts. Whilst work has been undertaken
to both comment upon and critique medical research, this is far from true for social
science research ethics generally. Brown et al. (2004) claim that
149

It is fair to say that there is a notable paucity of literature that deals specifically with
the ethical dimensions of social science in developing contexts... With a few notable
exceptions very little from within quantitative social science has been published on
the ethical difficulties presented by the methodological complexities of
underdeveloped regions since ... the early 1980s (Brown et al.,2004:5).

Andrew Sumner, from the Institute of Development Studies UK, argues that this field
has yet to explore fully many of the ethical dilemmas raised by doing research in
developing countries (Sumner, 2007).
In the past, development studies have faced criticism from ‘post-development theory’
and ‘post-colonial theory’. As covered in Chapter 3, some scholars suggest that
‘development’ itself might be a problem because it presents a Western view of
development as modernity that is then imposed on the Third World. In the same way,
media assistance and development has been criticised for transplanting its own models
of democracy and journalism on recipient nations (LaMay, 2007; Barker, 2008).
Thus, there are a number of special considerations for research in developing
countries and contexts. In particular, research projects in these contexts can involve
some of the world’s least powerful and most vulnerable populations. The
relationships between the researcher and the researched in such contexts are likely to
be asymmetrical, and this may impact both on the welfare of participants and the
veracity of findings.
In this case the researcher was a white, female from a Western European nation. In
terms of the profile of the interview participants, some were European employees and
managers from donors, NGOs or Media Assistance Organisations. Some were local
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staff from Tanzania and Kenya. All of the interviews were conducted in English, and
in public spaces such as their workplace, a café or hotel lobby.
The researcher needed to consider whether there was any implicit bias in the form of
interviewees seeking to give answers they thought the interviewer might want.
Crawford (1997) refers to this as “courtesy bias” - the tendency for respondents to
give answers that they think the interviewer wants to hear, rather than what they really
feel. Courtesy bias can be a hurdle to gaining useful and reliable data.
However, Crawford suggests that this can be mitigated or avoided by the creation of a
good interview environment and an appropriate relationship between the interviewer
and the respondent (Crawford, 1997). In this instance, project documentation relating
to the structure of the projects themselves would back up the information relating to
the make-up of media projects, which would corroborate the interview data.
Consideration must be given to the idea that the participants were being deferential
given the privileged position of the researcher. However, as noted previously, many of
the key informants were also white westerners and those participants that were local
were often in senior positions within the organisations and so had their own seniority
and authority to counter this.
Interview participants were at all times professional, courteous and helpful during the
interview process and there was mutual respect for each other’s professional position.
Consideration must also be given to the issue of gender. As Järviluoma et al. (2003)
argue “the importance of gender should not be understated, as it is not an
inconsequential detail that may be ignored in research situations. On the contrary it is
a significant topic of research as such” (Järviluoma et al., 2003:27). It could be
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argued that the researcher’s gender impacted on the behaviour and responses of the
interview participants in the same way as her ethnicity and race, and thus would
impact on the data collected.
Interestingly, Huddy et al (1997) propose that less-well educated respondents are more
influenced then well-educated by the interviewer’s gender. They argue that well
educated people are not affected by gender as much because they are more
accustomed to inter-gender relations (Huddy et al., 1997). In this case, it could be
argued that the informants were well-educated in so far as they had relatively senior
roles in the participating organisations and in addition familiar with dealing with
different genders in their day to day work in these international organisations.
Conducting fieldwork overseas, particularly in the Global South, can also be a
challenge. The researcher may face logistical complications, health and safety issues,
cultural differences, language barriers, and more. Lunn argues that “the reality is that
each situation is unique and the individual researcher must negotiate their own path
through a variety of ethical challenges and dilemmas” (Lunn, 2014: xix).
For this fieldwork conducted in-country in Tanzania and Kenya, the researcher
managed any potential complications by making very detailed logistical arrangements
in advance. All the participants were asked for their consent in advance by email to
interview with the author and participate in the study. Participants were fully briefed
on the purposes of the study to support informed consent and were free to withdraw at
any time. They were provided with detailed information about the project, its aims,
and potential future publication. The researcher made clear the purpose of the
research and was in frequent contact with the participants in advance of meetings, by
email and mobile phone.
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The interviews were conducted in English and in the context of one professional to
another, and in public spaces or offices. This is not to say that there were not
language barriers, but by using a Dictaphone the researcher could double check the
data at a later date to assist comprehension. Not all interviews undertaken provided
relevant or pertinent data.
Despite detailed plans and preparations in advance of the fieldwork in this instance,
Lunn concludes that, because of the complexity of fieldwork in the ‘global south’,
“there is no one correct way to conduct research 'ethically' …despite what formalised
paperwork from ethics review boards suggests” (Willis, in Lunn, 2014:268).

Interview Participants: Types and Roles

To get a good spread of opinions the participants in the interviews were stakeholders
at various levels of the media and media development industry. The individuals who
participated in the research were either from international donor organisation who
fund media development projects, or staff from Media Development NGOs and other
individuals working in the ICT or media sector.
Potential respondents were initially identified by search through company websites
and documentation, and by recommendation from other interview respondents, based
on their job responsibilities, position and involvement in media development
activities. Social Networks and LinkedIn were also a source of potential respondents.
Respondents were also selected on the basis of the researchers’ individual judgement
on the grounds that they could provide the necessary information needed for the
research.
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All of the individuals were emailed in advance and given details of the research and
the objectives for meeting and interviewing. Those who were contacted were very
positive in their response to participate in the research. Respondents were asked to
and agreed to participate in interviews, either in person, by skype or email.
Participants were notified that the interview would be published in the research thesis
or the print media in Ireland. Participants were informed of the availability of
confidentiality should it be required. None of the participants in these interviews
requested not to be identified or to use a pseudonym, thus their real names have been
used.
The participants were primarily speaking on behalf of their organisations. Their role
in the organisations was predominantly project staff, implementing the projects incountry. Some of the participants are well-known in the media development
community but they still spoke as representatives of their organisation or projects. For
example, James Deane is a well-known media development advocate and expert, but
he spoke from the position of his role as Policy Director for BBC Media Action. A
few individuals were not attached to any organisations such as the local journalists
with whom the researcher met, such as Maurice O’ Nioango and Elsie Eyakuze.
The interview participants came from different types of organisations as outlined
below

a. Donors: these are the organisations that finance media development projects.
Bi-Lateral funders include the UN, the EuropeAid, UNESCO. Government
funders include USAID, DFID (UK), Irish Aid, DANIDA (Denmark), German
overseas development agency (KFW), NORAD (Norway) amongst other.
According to much of the literature from the funding agencies, they are aware
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of the growth in and optimistic of the opportunities presented by ICTs.
However their documents seem unsure as to exactly what impact these are
having. The researcher asked respondents whether their positive attitudes to
ICTs are directing their policies and whether this is reflected in new funding
opportunities for media development. Are the changes that are happening in
technology impacting on international donor policy in terms of directing
funds? Are the donors prescribing the technological elements of projects or
are implementing agencies free to choose which media to use?

b. Project Implementers/ Media NGO staff: These are the individuals at the
vanguard of the media development industry. These respondents could tell the
researcher the objectives and formats of projects taking place on the ground.
Are projects using digital technologies instead of old media? In what way?
Are the projects meeting their stated objectives? What success have they had
using digital technologies? What are the practical hurdles with using digital
technologies in African projects? What are the problems in implementing the
projects that do use ICTs? And what is the future role of media assistance?

c. Journalists/ Media staff: journalists were interviewed to contribute to an upto-date picture of the media landscape in their country, and also what
conditions are like working as a journalist in the present day in Kenya and
Tanzania. They were also able to give an additional perspective on whether
digital technologies are being used by the media industry in their country, and
by journalists, in what manner and to what success.
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d. Research Organisations: these organisations provided background
information on the countries under review, both in terms of economic and
social data but also in terms of citizens opinions on matters of public interest.
For instance, Afrobarometer is a pan-African, research network that conducts
public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, economic conditions, and
other issues in more than 35 countries in Africa. They state that through their
research “ordinary citizens can have a voice in policy-making processes that
affect their lives”19. They produce research on subjects such as corruption,
poverty, democracy and attitudes to government.

Of the 40 individuals interviewed over the course of the research, 20% were from
donor organisations, 48% were from NGOs implementing media projects in some
form, 10% were journalists and 12% were research organisations. The remaining
participants were from a news outlet, a journalism network or a local activism
organisation which use media.

The list of participants in the interviews is outlined in Table 1.

19 https://www.afrobarometer.org/about
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1

NAME
Amy O Donnell

2
Carol Morgan
3
Caroline Ford
4
Ernest Sungura
5
Aran Corrigan
6
Daniel Dedeyan
7
Mark Montgomery
8
Rolf Paasch
9
Colin Spurway
10
Kris Kapella
11
Anthony Wafula
12
Ida Jooste
13
Alex Pitkin
14
15

Abel Oyuke
Rosemary Okello
Orlale

16
Bart Sullivan
17
Kees De Graaf
18
Siema Patterson
19
John Okande
20
Jackie Davies
21
Chloe Spoerry
22
Eric Chinje
23
Tom Rhodes
24
Angela Okune
25
Erik Hersman

ORGANISATION
Frontline SMS

Type of Org.
Mode
NGO
Face2Face
Interview
Face2Face
BBC Media Action
NGO
Interview
Skype
BBC Media Action
NGO
Interview
Face2Face
Tanzania Media Fund
NGO
Interview
Face2Face
Irish Aid Tanzania
Donor
Interview
Face2Face
USAID Tanzania
Donor
Interview
Department for
International
Face2Face
Development (UK)
Donor
Interview
Face2Face
FES Media Tanzania
Donor
Interview
BBC Media Action
Face2Face
Tanzania
NGO
Interview
Face2Face
FeminaHip Tanzania
NGO
Interview
Face2Face
HIVOS
NGO
Interview
Face2Face
Internews
NGO
Interview
Face2Face
Frontline SMS
NGO
Interview
Face2Face
Afrobarometer
Research Org Interview
Face2Face
Ford Foundation
Donor
Interview
Email
Farm Radio Tanzania
NGO
Survey
Skype
Twaweza Tanzania
NGO
Interview
Face2Face
UNDP
Donor
Interview
Face2Face
UNESCO ICT
Donor
Interview
BBC Media Action
Face2Face
Kenya
NGO
Interview
Face2Face
HiviSasa
NGO
Interview
African Media
Face2Face
Initiative
NGO
Interview
Committee to Protect
Journalists East
Non-Profit
Face2Face
Africa
Journalism
Interview
Face2Face
ihub Research
Research Org Interview
Non-Profit
Face2Face
Ushaihidi
Tech
Interview
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Location
London
London
Dar Es
Salaam
Dar Es
Salaam
Dar Es
Salaam
Dar Es
Salaam
Dar Es
Salaam
Dar Es
Salaam
Dar Es
Salaam
Nairobi
Nairobi
Nairobi
Nairobi
Nairobi

Nairobi
Nairobi
Nairobi
Nairobi
Nairobi
Nairobi
Nairobi
Nairobi

26
Judy Kimamono
27
Daudi Were

Search for Common
Ground
Making All Voices
Count

NGO
Donor

28
Claudia Lopes

Robert Munuku

Africa’s Voices
Embassy of Ireland,
Kenya.
Action for
Transparency

Sasha Kinney

PAWA

Maurice O’nioango

Medeva Journalist
The Star Journalist
and UGC App Lead

29
Vincent O Neill,
30
31
32
33
Dickens Olewe
34
Rob Burnet
Elsie Eyakuze

Well Told Story
Mikocheni Report
Blog Tanzania

Victor Bwire

Media Council Kenya

Josh Oguare
Gerry Power

Kibera news Network
MC Saatchi World
Services

James Deane

BBC Media Action

Dmitry Shishkin

BBC World Online

35
36
37
38
39
40

NGO
Embassy
NGO
Non-profit
activism
group

Face2Face
Interview
Face2Face
Interview
Skype
Interview
Face2Face
Interview
Face2Face
Interview

Face2Face
Interview
Email
Journalist
Survey
Skype
Journalist
Interview
Skype
NGO
Interview
Email
Journalist
Survey
Email
Research Org Survey
Email
Journalist
Survey
Face2Face
Research Org Interview
Face2Face
NGO
Interview
Email
Media
Survey

Nairobi
Nairobi

Nairobi
Nairobi
Nairobi

London
London

Table 1. Interview Participants

These interviews helped to uncover not only what the funders’ priorities and
motivations are in relation to their objectives with media development interventions
but also the practical realities of managing projects on the ground.

At the early

stages of the research, it became apparent that the general attitude of those working
for media development organisations was one of scepticism towards the impact that
digital technologies might have on the media development industry. They questioned
the real role of social media in the so-called Arab Spring for instance, in contrast to
the cyber-utopian narratives of the time.
158

For example, James Deane, from the BBC Media Action spoke about a recent large
grant the organisation had received from the Department of International
Development (DFID). Deane mentioned that they did not yet know to what extent
they would actually use digital or social media. He spoke how their most innovative
and creative project at the time called “Shankaboot” – an interactive web-based video
series filmed in and around Beirut, Lebanon and the world's first Arabic Web Drama
Series, which won the Digital Emmy in 2011. However, this series “did not reach that
many people!

If the objectives of the projects are civic engagement and reach, well

the project was not deemed an unqualified success” (Deane, 2012, in interview).
These insights revealed through face-to-face interviews in the research the reality of
digital technology use for media development objectives and in particular negative
aspects or failures in projects, which may not have been revealed using other research
methods. Using face-to-face, semi-structured interviews enabled the author to extract
information that may not have been an answered in a survey question (Boyce and
Neale, 2006).
By conducting interviews with both media assistance donors and practitioners in
Africa, the research unearthed the real-world practical experience and data needed to
illustrate the landscape for digital technology and journalism in Africa. It is a
practitioner focused study with real world informants providing an industry
perspective on the issues of media development assistance.
As Esipisu and Kariithi (2007) note, despite the uptake of new technologies in Africa,
“the African mass media system faces age-old problems stemming from poor
ownership structure, a weak financial base, low quality staff (particularly journalists),
lack of access to information, and conflict with authorities” (Esipisu and Kariithi,
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2007:22). Using qualitative methods in this research helped uncover to what extent
digital technologies are being used by media assistance organisations to address such
problems in the media systems.

Key Organisation Profiles
From the analysis of the interview data, it became apparent there were a number of
key organisations which could add support to the research argument and act as
illustrative examples for key points. The projects that such organisations undertake
provided interesting perspectives on media development activity in an East African
context. They are relevant for illustrating the different form of media development
activity being implemented. In order to elaborate on their role within the research
design, the relevant larger organisations are briefly introduced below with further
details outlined in subsequent chapters.

1. BBC Media Action
BBC Media Action (formerly the BBC World Service Trust) is the BBC’s
international development charity. Funded independently by external grants and
voluntary contributions, the purpose of the organisation is to promote development
through the effective use of the media.
BBC Media Action receives funds from international development agencies to provide
journalism, media production and management training to organisations and
practitioners around the world, which assist the development of an independent media
with fair, accurate and objective news reporting.
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It works in partnership with the BBC World Service and other local media and
development partners in over 35 developing and transitional countries around the
world. They provide mentoring and training for journalists and development
professionals.
BBC Media Action has established and managed Schools of Journalism in Belgrade,
Sarajevo and in Ekaterinburg (Russia) and these projects provided media courses for
national, community, public and independent broadcasting stations. Other training
projects include post-conflict broadcasting courses.
Another aspect of their work is to encourage programming on topics not traditionally
covered by the local media, and to foster partnership and understanding between
media organisations and other sectors such as NGOs, educational establishments and
the civil service. They have established and supported independent media
organisations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Nepal and several regions of Africa.
The researcher met and interviewed three key informants from the organisation:
Jackie Davis – Project Manager – BBC Media Action Kenya
Colin Spurway – Country Director – BBC Media Action Tanzania
James Deane – Director of Policy and Learning

2. The African Media Initiative
The African Media Initiative (AMI) is a pan-African organisation that seeks to
strengthen the continent’s private and independent media sector from an owner and
operator perspective to promote democratic governance, social development and
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economic growth. It does so through a set of activities aimed at transforming the
media and communications landscape on the continent.
AMI’s overall goal is to promote the development of pluralistic media as a necessary
and critical ingredient of democratic governance, as well as economic and human
development in Africa. The organisation was established in 2010 and is headquartered
in Nairobi, Kenya.
AMI’s work focuses on the following five priority areas:
1. Expanding Access to Finance and New Revenue Streams
2. Building a Leadership Cadre in the Media Sector
3. Strengthening the Media Owners and Operators’ Community
4. Harnessing the Digital Revolution through Technological Adaptation and
Innovation
5. Content Development for African media outlets, by African journalists

The researcher met with the CEO of African Media Initiative, Eric Chinje, based in
Nairobi.

3. Internews
Internews is an international non-profit organisation whose mission is “to empower
local media worldwide to give people the news and information they need, the ability
to connect and the means to make their voices heard”
Internews trains both media professionals and citizen journalists, increases coverage
of vital issues and helps establish policies needed for open access to information.
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Internews programmes create platforms for dialogue and enable informed debate,
which bring about social and economic progress. Internews has worked with 4,800
radio and television stations and print publications worldwide. Activities include:


Training. Internews trains 8-10,000 media professionals each year in
journalism, production, and management. For more advanced students,
Internews offers training in topics such as computer graphics, media law, and
investigative journalism.



Production. To strengthen the independent media sector, Internews works with
local media professionals to produce original programming.



Media infrastructure: Internews provides a broad range of infrastructure
support to enable independent media to provide vital news and information,
including providing journalists and stations with production equipment,
creating production studios, and building radio stations from the ground up.



Media law and policy. To allow independent media to fulfill their “watchdog”
function, Internews has worked for the adoption and implementation of fair
media laws and policies in 21 countries.

In Kenya, Internews works with media to develop a response to issues such as
HIV/AIDS, child and maternal health and malaria using broadcast and print media.
Internews Kenya also supports projects that counter hate speech, promote peaceful
solutions and further better understanding of election issues.
The researcher interviewed Internews Kenya Country Director Ida Jooste.
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4. UNESCO
UNESCO encourages international peace and universal respect for human rights by
promoting collaboration among nations. UNESCO pursues its objectives through five
major programmes: education, natural sciences, social/human sciences, culture and
communication/information.
Projects sponsored by UNESCO include literacy, technical, and teacher-training
programmes, the promotion of independent media and freedom of the press and
attempts to bridge the worldwide digital divide. UNESCO’s approach to media
development includes tailored activities that are context-sensitive, and which also take
account of the challenges and opportunities created by the rapidly changing media
environment.
UNESCO Media Development Activities include: Journalism education and training;
Journalism Curricula; Journalists Safety Indicators; Media Development Indicators.
The special-purpose International Programme for the Development of
Communication (IPDC) is a unique multilateral forum in the UN system that
mobilises the international community to support media in developing countries
through a grant-making process.
UNESCO Kenya is involved in many projects to encourage freedom of expression and
support independent media. Their project "Empowering Local Radios with ICTs" is
funded by the Swedish aid agency, SIDA and aims to bridge the gap between poor
people - especially women and girls - and encourage public debate on issues of local
public concern.
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This is achieved through a series of capacity-building activities in local radio stations,
improving the programming quality, providing training on the use of ICTs and helping
them to increase their geographical range of news coverage with a network of
correspondents. The project, furthermore, focus on gender equality actions and
financial sustainability of the radio stations.
The researcher met with UNESCO project Manager John Okande.

5. FARM Radio
Farm Radio is a Canadian charity working with more than 650 radio partners in subSaharan countries to fight poverty and food insecurity. They help African radio
broadcasters meet the information needs of local small-scale farmers and their
families in rural communities.
They provide training services to broadcasters, including direct in-station training,
distance education and custom workshops to help them meet a higher standard of farm
radio services. All training is directly targeted toward the needs and realities of
broadcasters
They aim to provide and exchange practical and timely information for use by their
broadcasting partners (community, public and private radio stations, farmers
associations, productions houses). They work in three areas: Impact Programming,
Broadcaster Resources, and Broadcaster Training.
They have also created, Barza, an online community for African radio broadcasters.
This is a space for broadcasters, who all share similar experiences even though they
can be thousands of kilometres apart, to interact and share resources with their peers.
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Broadcasters can access a library of scripts, Farm Radio Weekly, and on-line training
modules. It also offers a way for broadcasters to share scripts and programmes that
they have created. And it is a place where broadcasters can discuss issues, chat, and
follow each other.
The researcher spoke with Bart Sullivan, Radio and ICT Manager with FARM Radio.

6. HIVOS
Hivos (Humanist Institute for Cooperation) is the Dutch organisation for development
and it supports social change, digital activism and rural innovations. They support
civil society organisations and “infomediaries” (e.g. independent journalists,
hacktivists, academics and civic watchdogs) to make information accessible and
usable for citizens who wish to hold governments and companies to account.
HIVOS works in areas so these infomediaries also feel safe and independent enough
to use the available space for expression, dialogue and debate. They want
powerholders to have a more open and responsive attitude towards transparent and
accountable governance.
With their Kenya Media Program (KMP), they aim to improve the quality of
journalism in Kenya and contribute to a responsive, representative and accountable
government through citizen engagement. Its purpose is to strengthen the existing
media landscape in Kenya. As a dedicated media facility, the KMP provides a
framework of various interventions aimed at improving the professionalisms and
effectiveness of the media in Kenya.
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KMP focuses particularly on improving the professionalism and effectiveness of
public interest and investigative or quality journalism. Financial resources are made
available for selected media-related institutions, development organisations, training
institutes, policy and research initiatives, media houses and journalists.
Their key funding partners are: the United Kingdom’s Department for International
Development (DFID), Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA),
Canadian Development Agency (CIDA) and the Netherlands Embassy. HIVOS
implement the project on their behalf.
The researcher met with Anthony Wafula, Programme Manager for KMP.

7. Tanzania Media Fund (TMF)
The TMF aims to support an independent, quality, diverse and vibrant media in
Tanzania by enabling investigative and public interest journalism and facilitating
critical reflection and learning.
Through funding and learning activities, they support quality journalism that better
informs the public, contributes to debate and thereby increases public demand for
greater accountability across Tanzania. TMF’s interventions focus on strengthening
the media through a combination of training and mentoring, buoyed by grant-giving.
TMF offers five different grants. These have been developed in order to increase the
quality, quantity and diversity of investigative and public interest journalism products
in the media as well as to strengthen the professional capacity of journalists and media
institutions.
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TMF provides mentoring to both individual and institutional grantees. Mentorship for
individual grantees largely focuses on enabling journalists to increase their skills and
thus the quality of their products during the course of their grant.
For example, one grantee, Envirocare received a capacity building grant to engage 20
journalists in reporting on chemical management in the textile and tanning industries
in Tanzania. Journalists on the project received investigative journalism training
before they went into factory premises to investigate approaches to disposal of
wastewater from leather treatment processes after which they wrote exposés on the
impact of the pollution.
The researcher met with the Head of TMF, Ernest Sungura in Dar Es Salaam.

8. FeminaHip
Femina Hip is a civil society initiative working with youth, communities and strategic
partners across Tanzania. Since 1999, their aim has been to promote healthy lifestyles,
sexual health, HIV prevention, gender equality and citizen engagement.
Femina Hip employs a range of communication vehicles, including traditional and
social media products, used in a strategic and complementary way to achieve their
objectives. They also promote active learning through outreach activities and
multimedia products focusing on entrepreneurship, financial literacy and secure
livelihoods.
Its media products have has grown from one magazine (Femina) to two magazines
(Fema and Si Mchezo!), two television products (Fema TV Talk Show and Ruka Juu),
an interactive website (Chezasalama) and an interactive SMS platform. All are backed
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by community mobilisation and face-to-face interaction through Fema Youth Clubs.
Femina’s media products are estimated to reach an audience of about 11 million.
According to Femina, they are the largest local, multimedia civil society organisation
working with youth, communities, and partners throughout Tanzania. Edutainment is
their main approach, whereby Femina entertains and educates audiences through reallife stories, testimonials and docudrama.
Femina conducts strategic communication through clear messaging and a participatory
production process, which gives voice to young people; resulting in a more relevant
end product which effectively transmits knowledge, shifts attitudes, and creates
behavioural change, triggering social action.
This messaging is brought directly to the audience through magazines, TV, radio,
social media, SMS as well as community mobilisation activities which, taken together,
reinforce key messages.
What marks out Femina even more is the powerful brand they've created over the past
12 years. They are a very well-liked and hugely trusted brand, associated with young
people and use their edutainment approach to ‘educate by stealth’.
The researcher met with Kris Kapella, Strategy Development and Evaluation Advisor
from Femina Hip.

9. Twaweza
Twaweza is a citizen-centred initiative, focusing on large-scale change in East Africa.
Twaweza means 'we can make it happen' in Swahili. Twaweza works towards
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enabling children to learn, citizens to exercise agency and governments to be more
open and responsive in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda.
They seek to enhance ‘citizen agency,’ the ability of men, women and young people
to get better information more quickly, cheaply and reliably; monitor and discuss
what’s going on; speak out; and act to make a difference.
Twaweza supports ordinary citizens in East Africa to:


Access information – by expanding the means and channels through which
people can access information



Exercise agency – to express views, take initiative to improve lives, and hold
government accountable



Get better services – such as primary and secondary education, primary health
care and clean water, and exercise greater control over public money

Twaweza works to provide practical information to everyone, to foster quality
independent media and citizen monitoring services. By addressing these issues
through its partner organisations, Twaweza works to create what it calls an 'ecosystem
of change. They undertake public and policy engagement, through media partnerships
and leadership of initiatives such as the Open Government Partnership.
Twaweza works through 'five networks,' which already reach millions of citizens
across East Africa and are important in their lives – mass media, mobile phones,
religion, teachers' unions and fast-moving consumer goods. Twaweza builds
partnerships in all these areas to spread ideas, draw in new voices and open up
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conversations. It works like a venture fund, initiating ideas and getting new
organisations off the ground.
Twaweza is supported by a consortium of donors who provide long-term support
towards the overall programme. These are Sida, UK Department for International
Development (DFID) Tanzania and Uganda, the Hewlett Foundation, AJWS and
Danida.
The researcher spoke with Kees De Graaf, Director of ICT Programmes at Twaweza.

10. Well Told Story (WTS)
Well Told Story is an innovative, socially‐oriented media research and production
company based in Kenya. Since being established in 2009, Well Told Story has
developed and produced a set of media intended to reach and engage young people
with important information that can contribute positively to their lives.
Their main project is centred on a character called Shujaaz, an on‐going multi‐media
communications platform encompassing monthly comic books (30m+ free copies
distributed to date), daily syndicated radio shows, SMS, online, video, and national
TV. This project has reached more than 69% of Kenyans aged 15 ‐24. The prerecorded radio shows are syndicated to over 26 FM stations across Kenya six days a
week, with the Saturday edition running for a full 20 minutes.
The comic book, written in local dialect, sheng, is set in a fictional world that mirrors
the real one, and aims to inspire and motivate Kenyans between the ages of 18 and 35
to get involved in political and social issues that affect their future. It has won two
International Emmy Awards.
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All their media is free to the audience and is financed by development agencies who
wish to use the powerful brand of the Shujaaz character to transform the lives of
young people. Recent partners include The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, UK’s
Department for International Development, The World Bank, and others.
The researcher spoke with Rob Burnett, Founder and CEO of Well Told Story.

The 10 organisations introduced above are just some of the participants from the
interviews, but their projects provided key relevant data, and are used are used to
illustrate and highlight aspects of using digital technologies in current media
development practice in Kenya and Tanzania.

Data Analysis
Qualitative research results in large amounts of detailed data. This data usually comes
from interview transcripts and/or observation notes and must be re worked or
‘reduced’ to represent major themes or categories that describe the phenomenon being
studied.
Data reduction facilitates the revealing of findings simply and efficiently. Depending
on the type of data being used the analysis will differ. According to Berg “the actual
task of analysis will depend on the data-gathering method or methods used in the
research process… The overall effort will be to create descriptive accounts based on
the information captured by various data-collection technologies” (Berg et al.,
2004:183).
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With the qualitative interviews, the content was interpreted so it related to the
objectives of the project. Wood advised that a useful way to keep the various
objectives in mind is to keep in front of you a summary of the main concepts,
relationships, and hypotheses that are central to the study (Wood, 2000). The
interview schedule in this instance was derived from the thesis research question and
sub-questions (see Appendix A).
The data analysis involved sequential steps including transcribing, reduction,
categorisation, clustering units of relevant meaning, and determining themes from
these. Transcribing the interviews was a slow process, but unavoidable.

This

process resulted in large amounts of data that had to be reworked or ‘reduced’ to
represent major themes or categories that describe the issues being studied. Data
reduction can help the revelation of findings quite efficiently.
The researcher must decide how he or she will code the data to enable categorisation –
and the themes to emerge. Another decision the researcher must make when analysing
data is whether to analyse the interview data obtained from each participant
independently or whether to use cross-case analysis. In this instance each
respondent’s data was analysed first and then cross-referenced.
Braun and Clarke (2006) described thematic analysis as a way of seeing, as well as a
process for coding qualitative information. The researcher must make many decisions
about the process of identifying themes, and he or she must inform others why
specific categories were chosen. They argue that “thematic analysis is a poorly
demarcated, rarely acknowledged, yet widely-used qualitative analytic method”
(Braun and Clarke, 2006:2). They describe what should ideally happen during each
phase of analysis and this research followed a similar manner of analysis. Table 2
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below breaks out the stages of analysis based on phases suggested by Braun and
Clarke (2006).

Table 2. Qualitative Data Analysis

Phase 1

Becoming
familiar with
the data

This involves transcribing
the data, reading and rereading the data, noting
down initial ideas
regarding themes.

This researcher spent
considerable time listening
to and transcribing
interviews which were each
at least 40 minutes in
duration, producing very
large amounts of data. From
this effort, several themes,
perspectives and points of
discussion were noted.

Phase 2

Generating
initial codes

This stage of the analysis
involves the researcher
coding or categorising
interesting features of the
data in a systemic fashion
across the entire data set,
collating data relevant to
each code or category

From the large amount of
data produced during the
first phase the researcher
started to divide and code
the interview data according
to certain points or issues,
such as opinions on use of
technologies in projects or
views on donor policies.

Phase 3

Searching for
themes

In this phase the
researcher collates codes
into potential themes,
gathering all data relevant
to each potential theme

From the coded data above
the researcher could start to
identify and gather certain
codes together and group
them together. Most
interview participants had a
view on the benefits or not
of ICTs in journalism in
their country, and all could
speak about recent changes
in the media landscape in
their country. These could
be grouped together to
create an argument from
various participants.

Phase 4

Reviewing
themes

The researcher checks if
themes worked in relation
to the coded extracts,
generating a thematic
‘map’ of the analysis

The data was reviewed to
provide evidence for each
argument or theme. Such as
discussions regarding
problems encountered when
using ICTs in media
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development projects. This
provided support for each
theme.
Phase 5

Refining
categories and
themes

The researcher defines
categories and named
themes and undertakes
ongoing analysis to refine
the specifics of each
theme

The researcher confirmed
whether there was enough
data or evidence for each
theme or issue. For instance,
it emerged from the data
that there was mixed views
of whether technology was
of benefit for journalism in
the region, and the data was
refined to support different
perspectives on this theme.

Phase 6

Producing the
report

The researcher selects
“vivid, compelling extract
examples”, and
undertakes final analysis
of selected extracts,
relating back to the
research question and the
literature

The overarching themes
were extracted from the
coded and categorised data.
Some themes were more
central and some secondary.
For instance, the
practicalities of using
technology in media
development projects was
an overarching category and
journalism training was a
secondary one. Extracts and
examples relating to these to
themes were selected for
supporting the conclusions
in the Discussion and
Closing chapters.

Coding

As noted, a common way to approach qualitative data analysis in this case is the
construction of themes. Sometimes these have already been decided when designing
the study, or if the data collection is structured around these predefined themes. In
other cases, the themes are constructed afterwards.
Coding was an important part of qualitative data analysis and is the process of
grouping interviewees’ responses into categories that bring together the similar ideas,
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concepts, or themes that have been discovered. The analysis of qualitative data
usually involves the selection of quotes to support the presentation of the findings
(Grbich, 2012). This was the method used here where quotes will support the findings.
Upon initial reading of the interview data the researcher looked for these patterns or
themes among the data. The researcher was able to discover a variety of themes,
codes, or even possible categories that provided the beginnings of analysis, and/or
ideas for future interviews.
Wood described analysis as an exercise that draws on your background knowledge,
your ability to listen with an open mind, and your ability to link particular
observations and pieces of information to more general concepts (Wood, 2000).
Bogdan and Biklen (1998) provide common types of coding categories but emphasise
that the central questions or hypotheses will shape the coding scheme. This was the
case here. The researcher could reduce the data and categorise according to the survey
questions. These were grouped and clustered according to larger themes such as Local
Media, Project Activities, and Journalism Practice.
The use of software for qualitative data analysis has increased rapidly over the past
few years. Researchers are, however, not quite agreed on whether it improves the
quality of the analysis (Grbich, 2012). In this instance the author did not use software
but undertook the coding, categorisation, reduction and extraction processes manually.
It was felt that this approach would lead to greater familiarity with the data and
important for deducing what the important themes were.
Once the themes were identified and the data reduced, then the findings started to
emerge from the data. In this instance, the subcategories of the questions became
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apparent from the findings around themes of: Journalism Practice and New
Technologies; Donors views on media development in Kenya and Tanzania; Media
Development projects currently in implementation; The use of new technologies in
media projects in Kenya and Tanzania; The traditional medium; Problems with
integrating ICTs into media projects; Engagement with ICTs; The potential for digital
technologies in Media Development.
These findings fed into salient themes for further exploration in the Discussion
Chapter which would relate back to our literature review, including the narrative of
Africa Rising and ICTs: the digital divide, Radio Convergence with ICTs; and the
problems of citizen participation and engagement using digital technologies in these
projects.

Conclusion
In this chapter the research methods used to gather and analyse the data to address the
hypothesis were reviewed. A mixed methods approach was used and the rationale for
this was presented. By applying the case study and qualitative interview methods the
thesis gained direct and deeper knowledge of the extent to which digital technologies
are being used by the ‘media development’ sector. These methodological approaches
were deemed the most appropriate research methods to present a comprehensive and
up-to-date picture of current media development activities being undertaken in subSaharan Africa.
The research gained insight into how citizens of Kenya and Tanzania are currently
interacting and engaging with their media and digital technologies. The data helped to
illustrate the consumption of media in these countries.

Local media consumption

patterns are important to the research because almost all donor-funded media
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development projects are now undertaken after baseline research has been carried out
into local media patterns and habits. This is so their projects can be tailored to suit not
only the objectives of the funders but also the actual media habits in any given
country.
The data also provided insight into the effect of digitisation on the media landscape. In
particular the growth of alternative media spaces was noted such as online forums and
blogs which break news and where citizens can debate issues.
Using secondary and primary data, it was discovered the extent to which media
development organisations have adjusted to take into account the growth of digital
technologies in Kenya and Tanzania, if they can contribute to donor objectives and if
so to what extent and to what success. This would inform the primary research
questions of whether media assistance is still relevant, from practitioners working on
the ground.
These findings shall be presented in detail in the next two chapters.
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Chapter 5
Country Findings

Introduction
Having contextualised the research question in earlier chapters on the relevance of
media assistance in an ever-increasing digital environment and mapped out the
research design in the previous chapter, this chapter now presents Case Studies of the
two countries on which the study focuses – Kenya and Tanzania. As illustrated in the
Research Map above, this chapter addresses the environment for media assistance
activity in the case study countries. The research specifically focuses on Kenya and
Tanzania. In the following chapter findings regarding current approaches to media
assistance in these countries will be presented and discussed.
In order to examine the impact of digital technologies on media assistance in the
chosen case study countries, the thesis puts forward the following sub-question
relating to the environment in which media assistance takes place, specifically: What
are the characteristics of the current media and information environment in the
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selected case studies of Kenya and Tanzania? In so doing, this chapter will provide a
contextual analysis for the two case study countries which serves as a needs analysis
for their media systems.
Also addressed are the media habits of the citizens of Kenya and Tanzania, the extent
to which newer technologies and new digital forms of journalism are taking hold, and
the health of the public sphere. This will assist in a deeper comprehension of what
type of media development interventions might be required in these countries, and
whether digital technologies have a useful role to play in addressing these needs.
This chapter draws on sources from relevant documentation, grey literature and
sundry media development source material – as well as primary data – to create
detailed country profiles for Kenya and Tanzania.
Firstly, a justification for the selection of this region and the two case studies is
presented.

Rationale for the Case Studies

In the period since ‘media development’ gained considerable momentum in the 1990s,
a lot has changed in the area of media assistance. As noted, media development in
the period 1989 to the late 1990s focussed on transitional democracies in postCommunist Eastern Europe. Once free market principles had been established, the socalled “media missionaries” started focusing their attention elsewhere. As discussed in
Chapter 2, these media interventions in the post-Soviet states were not deemed an
unequivocal success (Džihana, 2011; Lauk, 2008; Rhodes and Lange, 2007).
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However, the policy focus of the traditional donors of media development has in any
event moved strategically and geographically to other regions.
One explanation for this change of geographic focus could be because a number of
countries entered the EU and so could no longer be the recipient of democracybuilding funds – by definition they are meant to be democratic. The assumption was
and is that there is now a sufficient plurality of information and communication in
these former Soviet satellites.
The literature reviewed in Chapter Two underscored how media assistance has been
employed by donors to promote democratisation (Howard, 2003). Since independent
and reliable news media play such a crucial role, especially in free and fair elections,
they are regarded as key part of such citizen decision-making, and democracy. After
the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, it was considered necessary to establish new
independent media outlets in these countries to assist with the process of
democratisation and therefore donors focused on that region during the period.
There has also been a growing awareness more recently of the role of media in
potentially spreading violence, and this has resulted in more programmes in conflictaffected and fragile states, with a focus on peace-building and countering hate-speech
(Kalathil, 2017). This was in evidence in Kenya around the time of the 2007 elections
and some radio stations were shown to have contributed to encouraging violence at
that time (Allen and Gagliardone, 2011; Marsh, 2014).
Consequently, following the turn of the century, for a variety of reasons, international
media donors turned their attention more to the Middle East and to Africa (Kumar,
2006).
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The region has drawn attention for additional reasons. Having once earned the title of
the ‘the hopeless continent’ by The Economist (Dowden, 2000), Africa has more
recently been defined as the world’s fastest growing region (African Development
Bank, 2013). A flow of positive economic statistics has made Africa a focus for
international investors, and much of this growth and optimism around it has been
attributed to ICTs. Kenya in particular has been the centre of much technological
investment and international focus, earning it the moniker ‘silicon savannah’ 20.
As noted in earlier chapters, many African countries have seen an increase in both
media and access to information, through liberalisation of traditional media and
dissemination of new technologies. However, it should be cautioned that these
changes are not necessarily having the positive effects on the broad populace assumed
by the techno-determinist view. Research from Afrobarometer showed that after a
decade of growth in Africa, ‘lived poverty’ remains pervasive across the continent
(Mitullah and Kamau, 2013; Dulani et al., 2013).
This paradox will be explored further in the current chapter, where a detailed picture
of the two Case Study countries - Kenya and Tanzania – is presented. The focus of
this research thesis is the media and media systems in this region, and whether media
assistance interventions using digital technologies can address the needs of these
systems and citizens. Thus, it is necessary to present a comprehensive analysis of the
‘information ecosystems’ of both of these countries.
To start, a brief overview of the history of journalism in the region is presented to
contextualise the current environment for media assistance activity and the needs of
the journalism sector.

20 Mobile Phones Transform Africa, Time Magazine (Perry, 2011)
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A brief history of journalism in Sub-Saharan Africa

When looking at media development work in sub-Saharan Africa, it is important to
acknowledge Africa’s long experience of colonialism and the events that followed
(Bourgault, 1995; Gicheru, 2014; Kasoma, 1995; Ronning, 1994). These impact the
environment for media freedom and independence just as it has in the democracies of
the West, and will impact further the issues that media development projects need to
address.
For instance, Mano (2009) argues that difference approaches to journalism training on
the continent originate in the “partition of Africa in Berlin, in 1884, which created
rigid vertical lines of command with little lateral interaction between African
institutions, countries and regions” (Mano, 2009: 281).

Sources: Shaw, 2009; Birmingham, 2008, Mwesige, 2009; Gichero, 2014; Skjerdal, 2013

Figure 6. Journalism in Africa
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As noted in the diagram above, during the Colonial period [19th century up until the
period of independence in the 1950s], the media served the information needs of
missionaries and colonial settlers (Shaw, 2009). Prior to this, news was circulated to
the people in the form of oral discourse “with communal storytellers (griots),
musicians, poets and dancers playing the role of the modern-day journalists” (Shaw,
2009:5).
Kasoma argues that the press was more independent during colonial times than it has
been subsequently during military or one party rule (Kasoma, 1995). The press
played more or less a critical watchdog role in dealing with the colonial administration
according to Shaw (2009). After liberation in the 1950s and 1960s, press freedom
violations, unknown during the colonial period, were used by the new African leaders
to control their journalists.
Eribo and Jong-Ebot argue that at independence, the media “became ideological tools
of the new African leaders, and were brought under state control and made to sing the
praises of dictators in the name of national unity and development” (Eribo and JongEbot, 1997:x).
During the Post-Colonial Period (1970s and 1980s), therefore, the role of the press as
government watchdog was overshadowed by its role as “public cheerleader for
development efforts’ in areas such as health, agriculture and education, and steering
clear of politics (Bourgault, 1995). This style of journalism, referred to as
‘development journalism’, emerged out of a compromise between “nation building”
and “a free and unfettered press” (Bourgault, 1995:173). However, the practice of this
style of development journalism has attracted criticism for promoting political
agendas instead of people’s interests (Skjerdal, 2013).
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Later, the decade following the fall of the Berlin Wall, was called the decade of
democratic journalism. Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa underwent significant
political reform (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994) and the press played an important
role in forcing autocratic African regimes to press for democracy (Shaw, 2009). Calls
for governance reforms from citizens of these countries, and international donors,
brought in a new era of competition for political leadership. This helped open up
governments to criticism from the media and was conducive to a more open and free
press (Karikari, 2010; Myers, 2014).
The diversification of the media sector across the sub-Saharan continent was
accompanied by better legal and institutional frameworks in support of media freedom
and the new constitutions adopted in the region in the last three decades have all
enshrined some right to the freedom of expression (Wasserman and Benequista,
2017).
This brief timeline of journalism in the region contextualises the current day
environment for media assistance activity and serves as a backdrop for the
presentation of findings from the direct research, which now follows.

Country Profiles
This section will now present an in-depth look at the media ecosystems of both
countries as background to current media development activity. This chapter directly
addresses the sub- question:


What are the characteristics of the current media and information environment
in the selected case studies of Kenya and Tanzania (RQ2a)?
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This will help gain greater insight into the context for media assistance practice in
these countries, the characteristics of which will then be presented in the following
chapter (RQ2b).
This chapter will therefore provide the reader with an understanding of important
aspects of media systems in both these countries: market structures, the level of press
freedom, and an analysis of the journalism profession in each country. The following
analysis draws on Hallin and Mancini’s Comparing Media Systems (2004), which
outlines a conceptual framework for the analysis of media systems consisting of four
dimensions. These are:


Structure of media markets - newspaper circulation rates, relative importance of
newspapers and television as sources of news



Political parallelism - the “fact that media in some countries have distinct political
orientations, while media in other countries do not” Hallin & Mancini, 2004: 27).



The role of the state



Professionalisation of journalism sector

These themes will be drawn upon for analysis of the media systems of both Kenya and
Tanzania in the following sections. This current chapter will therefore help assess the
needs and weaknesses of the media systems in Kenya and Tanzania which could be
addressed by the media assistance sector.
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Case Study: Kenya
Overview
Table 3. Kenya Overview

Population21

48,397,527 (July 2018 est.)
Forty per cent of whom are under 15
years of age
40 ethnic groups

Human Development Index22

0.590 - Medium Human development
category - positioning it at 142 out of 189
countries and territories

Poverty Levels
Population living below income poverty

36.8%

23

line, PPP $1.90 a day (%) (2015)

Freedom House Press Freedom

‘Partly Free’ Rank 48/100

Index24
Transparency International
Corruption Index 2018

25

Score: 27/100
Rank: 144/180

Reporters Without Borders 2019

32.44

World Press Freedom Index26

Rank 100/180

Languages

English (official), Kiswahili (official),
Kiswahili numerous indigenous
languages

Statutory Code of Ethics

Yes. Media Act 2013

21 CIA World Factbook
22 UN Development Index Statistics 2018
23 UNDP http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/country/KEN
24 Freedom House 2018
25 https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018
26 https://rsf.org/en/ranking

187

Background
Kenya gained independence from Britain in 1963, but was a de facto one-party state
under the Kenya African National Union (KANU) party until 1992. This was
followed by a multi-party political system post-1992 that has helped the liberalisation
of the Kenyan economy and the media environment (Abdi and Deane, 2008)
Kenya is a leader in Africa in some key economic sectors— notably in
telecommunications. This has been attributed to its growing youthful population, a
dynamic private sector, highly skilled workforce, improved infrastructure and its
pivotal role in East Africa (The World Bank, 2018). It has become a key centre for
technology in the region
The country still faces development challenges, illustrated by its ranking on the
Human Development Index, and made more difficult by political and social upheaval
in past years, the most well-known of which was the civil unrest and riots that broke
out during the disputed presidential election in 2007. Up to 1200 lives were lost and
nearly one million people displaced during that time.
Kenya is a top ten recipient of aid (OECD, 2018). Economic liberalisation has been a
priority with these donors and aid has thus been conditional on an opening up of the
economy.

The political environment for media in Kenya
Mainstream media frequently reflect the environment in which they operate (Abdi and
Deane, 2008) and there are some notable events that have occurred in Kenya in recent
years that have impacted on the media sector. The most significant of these is the
aforementioned unrest during the 2007 elections and the subsequent outburst of
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violence. The events of 2007 illustrated the political and ethnic tensions that have
been a constant under the surface of the country.
This was highlighted by Irish Ambassador to Kenya, Vincent O Neill:
There are over 42 ethnic groups living reasonably peacefully together. But, from time
to time within the country, you get a lot of sparking points between tribes and across
counties, over grazing rights or whatever ... There's a fragility keeping the country
together in ways (O Neill, 2015, in interview) 27.

Abdi and Deane (2008) argue that politics in Kenya has become more split and
factionalised along political and ethnic grounds and as a result the media have been
drawn into, and often aligned with these different political interests (Abdi and Deane,
2008). This was highlighted in 2007 when local radio stations were accused of
inciting hate speech during the unrest (Marsh, 2014). The Kenyan government and
international reports alleged that ethnically-based radio stations in Kenya were partly
responsible for inflaming ethnic hatred (Allen and Gagliordone, 2011).
Abdi and Deane have noted how staff at these stations may not have the skills to
mediate such on-air discussions:
[During the 2007 elections] These talk shows had become an outlet for a public
debate and an expression of voice which had been suppressed for decades. Many of
these voices were angry, disaffected and determined on change. In any society, such
debate in such a political environment would have required skilful and careful
moderation. That is not what generally happened. People hired to broadcast in these
stations were rarely trained journalists or commentators, but sometimes entertainers

27 Vincent O Neill, Irish Embassy in interview with author Feb 2015
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and other personalities familiar to their audience. Personnel from these radio stations
have acknowledged that they have little or no training in mediating discussions in
conflict situations (Abdi and Deane, 2008:4).

Even during peaceful periods, the media in Kenya are influenced by politicians and
ethnic allegiances. Harwood et al (2018) argue:

Politicians at every level of government have used ethnic allegiances as a tool to
mobilize support. Just as ethnic identity is woven into Kenyan society and politics; it
too is woven into Kenyan media. It is reflected in both the decisions about which
stories to cover and how to cover them, as well as how audiences perceive ethnic bias
in reporting (Harwood et al., 2018:6)

In addition to ethnic tensions from within, another factor is the threat of violence from
outside Kenya. Since 2011, the country has faced several terrorist attacks by the
Somali group, Al-Shabaab, as retribution for the Kenyan military's involvement in the
group's home country of Somalia. For instance, in January 2019, they claimed
responsibility for the death for 21 people in a shootout in a hotel complex in Nairobi
city centre.
Lohner et al. (2016) stress that “political volatility due to ethnic divisions and the
threat of terrorism from Al-Shabaab impact on the current structural conditions of
Kenya’s political and media system” (Lohner et al., 2016:48).
A new Constitution was adopted in 2010 in the aftermath of the riots that took place in
2007, and this Constitution was regarded as an instrument that would potentially
reform the social landscape and foster harmony (FesMedia, 2012). It has been
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praised for expanding freedoms of expression and of the press, specifically by
prohibiting the state from interfering with the editorial independence of individual
journalists and both state-owned and private media outlets (Freedom House, 2015).
However, Transparency International 28 found that Kenya’s rank in the Corruption
Perceptions’ Index (143rd out of 180 countries under review) “calls to question the
reforms that have been instituted in various sectors since the adoption of the
Constitution of Kenya 2010” (Transparency International Kenya, 2014).

Market Structure
Despite the growth in media outlets since liberalisation of the market, Kenya suffers
from concentration in media ownership (Mbeke et al., 2010; Titus and Brombart,
2016). This is most likely because there have been no ownership regulations or
restrictions imposed upon corporate or political interests.
The growth of the media sector has been closely tied to Kenya’s political history, and
this means that there are still strong links between large media players and the
political environment. According to Mbeke, almost every media channel can be
identified with a political party or personality (Mbeke et al., 2010).
The media is often considered a tool to promote political agendas. Nyabuga claims
that “most detrimental to media diversity, pluralism, and independence are the profit
motive and the political allegiances of most of the media outlets” (Nyabuga et al.,
2013:75).

28 Transparency International is an NGO which aims to combat corruption and publishes the Global
Corruption Barometer and the Corruption Perceptions Index
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A report by Internews on this subject called “Factually True Legally Untrue – Political
Media Ownership in Kenya” found that while media ownership is sometimes obvious,
media owners often use their spouse, parents or friends to register their media outlets,
making it difficult to obtain clear data on media ownership (Nyanjom, 2012). Maina
(2015) maintains:
Concentration of ownership remains a major issue in the Kenyan media landscape, yet
the Programming Code proposes to increase the number of licences one person may
hold concurrently. No attempt is made to rein in cross-ownership between print and
broadcast media” (Maina, 2015).

The author concludes that “ultimately the best safeguard for a vibrant and pluralistic
broadcasting sector would be a genuinely independent regulator” (Maina, 2015).
Freedom House noted positively that “Kenya’s leading media outlets, especially in the
print sector, are often critical of politicians and government actions. They remain
pluralistic, rigorous, and bold in their reporting” – however they also “pander
frequently to the interests of major advertisers and influential politicians” (Freedom
House 2014).
The market is dominated by four groups: Nation Media Group (Mwananchi
Communication Ltd), Standard Media Group, Radio Africa Group, Royal Media
Service and MediaMax Communication Group. This environment, in which only a
handful of players are shaping the media ownership structure, is reinforcing barriers to
market entry in the media sector. Media ownership in Kenya is thus concentrated in
the hands of a few very powerful people, leading to unfair representation of voices in
their favour.
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Therefore, media concentration, political bias and lack of genuinely independent
regulator are problems within the media ecosystem in Kenya which prevent the media
from performing its role to its full potential. As noted by Price and Krug (2002),
media need an ‘enabling environment’ that is supportive of a free and unfettered press.

Professionalism of journalism sector
The professionalism of journalism is exhibited in the observance of standards such as
verification of news content, confidentiality of sources, fairness, and public interest
(UNESCO).
Academic research into journalism in the region illustrates the challenges of being a
journalist. These include: the repression coming from the many authoritarian regimes,
the oppressive legal systems kept on from the colonial period, the self-censorship of
editors, and the bribing of journalists (Eribo, 1997; M’Bayo et al., 2000; Wasserman
and Jacobs, 2012).
It must be qualified that these problems do not exist across the entire continent of
Africa but there are similarities with regards to the obstacles and challenges that
journalism face in the two countries under review for this research.
Despite the growth of the media sector in Kenya in the past decades, it has been said
that there is not necessarily improvement in the quality of news in the media
(Nyabuga et al., 2013). What has improved is the diversity and not the quality per se.
Nyanjom (2012) blames the perceived lack of professionalism on the absence of
professional training and orientation. He points out that many prominent members of
the media sector practice without any paper qualifications (Nyanjom, 2012).
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Journalism training in Kenya is available from a variety of institutions, ranging from
universities to small colleges, but quality and standards of training are matters of
concern (Power, 2006). Lohner (2016) argues that “one of the structural factors
indicating the level of professionalisation and development of journalism as a
profession in its own right is the condition of professional education and training”
(Lohner et al., 2016:69). Ireri found that local journalism and communication
colleges are faced by a myriad of problems, chief among them being lack of resources,
unqualified lecturers, and proliferation of new low-standard colleges (Ireri, 2018)
For instance, in a study called “Criteria and Indicators for Quality Journalism Training
institutions and Identifying Potential Centres of Excellence in Journalism Training in
Africa,” UNESCO found that of all the near to 30 universities in Kenya offering
communication courses, only University of Nairobi was mentioned as a potential
centre of excellence (Berger and Matras, 2007).
Most schools and colleges offer courses that are general in nature and experts have
claimed a need for a more specialised journalism training in order to mainstream
topical issues and concerns (Schmidt and Deselaers, 2015).
International Media Development Organisations also provide training programmes.
The largest of these are Internews, HIVOS and BBC Media Action, who have been
surveyed for this research and their projects will be outlined in more detail in the
following chapter.
Another challenge for the journalism profession in Kenya is that journalists are poorly
paid and this leaves them vulnerable to bribery. Media organisations have spoken out
against corruption but in practice, bribing journalists is common. It has been called
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‘grassroots editing’ - the practice whereby Kenyan journalists receive money to run
stories that are biased in favour of the person who has paid the bribe.
The pay levels for both electronic and print media are inadequate and this has
promoted corruption (FesMedia, 2012). Even senior editors have been implicated and
many of them are suspected of being on a retainer for personalities in positions of
power (FesMedia, 2012).
Investigative journalism is also frustrated by political intimidation. The Committee to
Protect journalists in Kenya reports that journalists frequently experience harassment,
intimidation and even violence for doing their job. In September 2018, Daily Nation
journalist Barrack Oduor was assaulted and abducted and his source allegedly
murdered. Oduor had been working on a story about a woman who alleged she had
been impregnated and abandoned by a prominent politician (Rhodes, 2018).
Reporters Without Borders note that “during election campaigns, the media are
routinely subjected to physical attacks by the security forces and the public… Their
equipment is often confiscated, and their writing is censored. Journalists can pay
dearly for covering opposition events or for portraying President Uhuru Kenyatta’s
party and its flaws in a negative light” ("World Press Freedom Index 2018 | Kenya").
As a result, self-censorship is a common practice among the Kenyan media, and it
affects all levels.
This section has illustrated the myriad problems facing journalists and journalism
practice in Kenya. The next section will present the media market for audiences and
citizens in Kenya to provide a clearer picture of the limitations of the media, both old
and new, in Kenya.
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Kenyan Media
Economic liberalisation has helped grow the media in Kenya, allowing an opening up
of the media and communication space. At the same time, there has also been a
growth in the middle class in Kenya, which provides buying power to support an
advertising base, and thus media companies have flourished.
Kenya has over 100 radio stations, including about 30 vernacular broadcasting
stations, providing at least one local language radio station for each of Kenya´s largest
ethnic groups (Schmidt and Deselaers, 2015). There are more than 60 free to view TV
stations and an unconfirmed number of print newspapers and magazines. New
players in TV and radio have grabbed viewership and listenership from state owned
KBC’s platforms, reducing it to a small player in a market dominated by private
broadcasters.
The variety of media outlets in different formats (print, radio, television and online)
gives the Kenyan media scene the appearance of plurality and diversity.
Television

TV Stations Market Share

30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Citizen TV

KTN

KTN News

Source: GeoPoll February 2019
Figure 7. Kenya TV Stations
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NTV

K24

Television is still a luxury in Kenya but is a trusted medium of news and information
(Nyabuga et al., 2013). Research conducted by the Kenya Audience Research
Foundation (KARF) in 2016 found 30.6% valued TV (Amadala, 2017).
Television is a regular feature of city life rather than country: The number of Kenyans
getting news from television displays the major differences between urban and rural
areas, with 57 per cent of urban respondents getting news from this channel every day,
while only 20 per cent of the rural people do the same (Mitullah, 2012).
One of the reasons for the popularity of television is because entertainment centres
such as restaurants, cafes and bars put up television sets to attract more customers. “At
7pm every day these social venues are packed to the brim as most people flock there
to catch the evening’s prime time news bulletin. Clients even know which bar,
restaurant or cafe offers the channel of their choice” (FesMedia, 2012:8).
In February 2015, Kenya introduced Digital Migration 29 for television, almost 10
years after the process had begun in Europe. The changeover was poorly managed and
despite months of notice, when the government switched off the analogue signal, it
left most Kenyans without TV for days. Resourceful Nairobians plugged computers
into their TV and streamed it for themselves but most Kenyans were left with blank
TV sets for a period during the switchover.

29 Digital Broadcasting Migration is a process in which broadcasting services offered on the traditional
analog technology are replaced with digital based networks over a specific period. The transition or
switch from analog television to digital television is referred to as the Digital Migration.
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The biggest effect that digital migration has had on the Kenyan media scene is the
increase of TV channels. Since digital migration Kenyans have access to over 337 TV
channels, 66 of these are local channels (KARF, 2017).
The introduction of digital TV has seen the emergence of stations that deal with
various issues such as education, farming, health, women and children issues among
others. So, one positive result is that a segment of the TV industry has embraced the
“educative role of mass communication” (Nyabuga, 2016:44).
However, many people have not yet converted to the digital signal as new set-top
boxes are too expensive, and several boxes are required to get the same number of
channels (Davies, 2015, in interview)30.
In contrast to the generally held view that digital television removes control of
broadcasting from the state and allows much more extra territorial involvement,
Ugangu (2018) argues that the transition to digital television in Kenya has in fact
created more leverage for state influence over the media landscape. He claims that the
digital migration process maintains state control in more subtle ways over the
countries media landscape (Ugangu, 2018).

30 BBC MA, Jackie Davies, Feb 2015 in interview with author.
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Print Media

Newspapers Market Share
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
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10%
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Daily Nation The Standard

Taifa Leo

People Daily

Source: GeoPoll 2015
Figure 8. Kenya Print Media

In Kenya, the print media audience is smaller than radio and TV audiences (Bowen,
2010). Ibelema and Bosch argue that there are several barriers to wide circulation of
newspapers, including the logistical challenge of distribution to remote rural
communities, literacy limitations and high purchase prices forced by limited
advertising environments (Ibelema and Bosch, 2009).
Research conducted in 2010 found that 37% of respondents said they had not read a
newspaper within the last year; when they were asked why, many cited the cost or
inability to read or understand newspapers (Bowen, 2010). About one quarter of nonreaders at that time said that they were simply not interested in getting news and
information from print media
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As the print media is considered expensive, Kenyan vendors rent out daily newspapers
for a nominal fee for an hour or two. Once the individual has read the paper it is
handed back to the vendor who will place it back on the newsstand (FesMedia, 2012).
The introduction of 47 counties in the country’s recent devolution reform has
increased the number of new publications. The 2010 constitution created a
decentralised system of government and Kenya shifted from centralised control to
devolution in which 47 counties were given a free hand to set their development so the
leadership, the tax collection, the delivery of services has become decentralised.
With this devolution of power, there is a growing need for local newspapers that cover
local issues and local governance. Making local governments and citizens talk to each
other is essential to that process of local government, but there is a severe shortage of
local news (Spoerry, 2015, in interview).

Radio

14%

Radio stations market share
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Radio Citizen

Radio Maisha

Radio Jaimba

Source GeoPoll 2019

Figure 9. Kenya Radio Stations
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Classic FM

Research consistently underlines the prominence of radio in Kenya, which has the
highest penetration both in rural and urban areas (Bowen, 2010; Gilberds and Myers,
2012a; Minderhoud, 2009).
Nearly all Kenyans are radio listeners, and nearly all of them use radio as a regular
source of news and information (as opposed to listening strictly for entertainment): 89
per cent of Kenyan adults get news and information from the radio on at least a
weekly basis (Bowen, 2010).
There has been a large expansion of FM radio outlets in recent years, and this has
included local-based and vernacular radio stations across the country. While
commercial local-language radio is vibrant, there are few non-commercial community
radio stations.
Community broadcasting offers a distinct broadcasting service dealing specifically
with community issues that are not normally dealt with by private and public
broadcasters (Nyabuga et al., 2013). A community radio station is one that is run for
the community and by the community and, most important, it is not run for profit.
Of note is that local radio that is focused on the community, but not commercially
driven nor politically owned, has been identified as a potentially positive resource for
cross ethnic dialogue and debate in Kenya (Gustafsson, 2016; Mohamed, 2016;
Oburu, 2016).
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Information and Communication Technologies
Table 5. ICTs Kenya
Mobile Phone Penetration

49.5 million (Q2 2018/19)
106.2%

Digital Television

Changeover: February 2015

Internet Users

43,329,434 (31 Mar 2019)
83% Penetration

Facebook Subscribers

7,000,000 (31 Dec 2017)

internet Gross Domestic

2.9%

Product (iGDPs)

Sources:
Kenya Communications Authority https://ca.go.ke/document/sector-statistics-report-q2-201819/
Internet Users and Facebook Subscribers: https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm
iGDP: The measure of the internet’s contribution to a country’s economy (Manyka et al.,
2013)

Kenya has seen a significant growth in mobile phone uptake with figures showing
mobile phone penetration in Kenya by 2017 was over 100 percent (CCK, 2017). The
penetration level of more than 100 per cent is attributed to multiple SIM-card
ownership.
The mobile sector is the predominant provider of data and internet services to Kenyan
users, accounting for 99 percent of total internet subscriptions. As such, internetenabled mobile phones are the primary drivers of the growing internet uptake in
Kenya (Freedom House, 2015).
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Landline telephone coverage remains largely inaccessible, with fewer than one
telephone line per 100 people. Investment in ICT has thus focused instead on bringing
mobile and internet access to all parts of the country.
However, whilst internet penetration continues to increase across the country, there is
still a large difference in access between rural and urban areas. Internet use in Kenya
is mainly concentrated in urban areas; according to a 2013 report by the McKinsey
Global Institute, Kenya’s urban internet penetration rate stood at 78 percent, compared
to a national rate of 39 percent (Manyka et al., 2013).
Additionally, the cost of mobile devices and internet subscriptions remains an struggle
for many poor Kenyans to access the internet.
Despite widespread access to mobile phones for basic uses such as voice calls, some
of the more innovative uses of mobile phones have been less widely adopted. Abel
Okuye from Afrobarometer maintains that “news services are more for the elite. It is
not very common with, for example, the rural population (Okuye, 2014, in
interview)31.
Social networking sites are becoming very popular but regular users of the internet are
predominantly young, male, relatively wealthy and relatively well educated compared
to the population as a whole (Nyabuga et al., 2013).
Smartphones are also gaining in popularity in Kenya. According to the Consumer
Barometer survey by Google, the percentage of people who use a smartphone to
access the internet in Kenya has increased from 27 per cent in 2014 to 59 per cent in
2018 (The Connected Consumer Survey, 2018).

31 Abel Okuye, Afrobarometer, May 2014 interview with author.
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---This section presented the media environment in Kenya, how Kenyan citizens access
news, their preferences, and adoption of new information and communications
technologies. These technologies are impacting on the ways in which citizens in
Kenya network, share information, and try to affect change. The next section now
discusses this in the wider context for media assistance activity in Kenya.

Discussion
It has been noted that Kenya has become a regional centre for technology and
innovation in East Africa. But despite its connectivity, among all media and ICT
platforms that Kenyans have at their disposal, radio remains the most widely
available, reaching directly into more than 85 percent of Kenyan adults’ homes
(Muema and Mwaura, 2012). Radio continues to be the mainstay of news
consumption in the country. This is largely because radio is affordable and its
broadcasts can reach even the remotest parts of the country. Importantly the cost of
buying and running radio sets is low.
Research from the Kenya Audience Research Foundation underscores how Kenyans
still prefer traditional media. The survey shows 94% of the media consuming
population consume TV, Radio and Print while only 33% consume new media (Media
Establishment Survey Kenya 2015, 2015) .
Regardless of widespread mobile penetration, seventy-six per cent of the Kenyan
population live in rural areas, and many of these are remote areas, where “last-mile”
issues of electrification, infrastructure, and network connectivity still present major
challenges to consumption of news media.
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Even urban areas including the capital, Nairobi, still do not have universal electricity
connection as only 53 per cent of total households have access to electricity (Nyabuga,
2013).
Radio is also by far the media channel mostly used by small‐scale farming households
in Kenya for receiving agricultural information (Bowen, 2010). And despite large
investment in the ICT and Technology sector, agriculture is the mainstay of the
Kenyan economy (Kamonzo, 2012).
So, while at first glance, Kenya appears to have one of the most connected and plural
media sectors in Africa, in terms of accessibility at an individual level, there are
socioeconomic and geographic divides: urban and affluent citizens enjoy wide access
to media in all forms, especially digital, while rural and poor populations do not.
Consequently, despite growing mobile and internet penetration, there remains a stark
rural-urban split in access to and use of most media and newer digital technologies.
The busy media scene to be found in urban areas is in contrast to rural areas, where
state radio dominates and one or two other stations are likely to be available to
residents there (Matende, 2012).

What this means is that the internet as a potential forum for expression and source of
news and information has been limited to one part of the population – those in urban
areas.
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Case Study: Tanzania
Overview
Table 6. Tanzania Overview

Population32

55,451,343 (July 2018 est.)
Approx. two-thirds of the population is under 25
More than 130 ethnic tribes

Human Development

0.538

Index33

Low human development category - positioning it at
154 out of 189 countries and territories

Poverty Levels
Population living below

49.1%

income poverty line, PPP
$1.90 a day (%)34 (2018)

Press Freedom Index35

‘Partly Free’ Rank: 45/100

Transparency

Score: 36/100

International Corruption

Rank: 99/180

Index36
Reporters Without

36.28

Borders37

Rank: 118/180

Languages

38

Kiswahili or Swahili (official), Kiunguja (name for
Swahili in Zanzibar), English (official, primary
language of commerce, administration, and higher
education), Arabic (widely spoken in Zanzibar),

Statutory Code of Ethics

Yes. The Media Services Act of 2016.

32 CIA World Factbook
33 UN Development Statistics 2018
34 UNDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/TZA
35 Freedom House 2018
36 https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018
37 https://rsf.org/en/ranking
38 CIA World Factbook
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Background
The United Republic of Tanzania, in East Africa, was formed by the union of
Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1964. Since independence from Great Britain, Tanzania
has progressed into a multi-party democracy that assures the separation of powers
(Stiftung, 2014).
The current government is headed by the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party and
they have maintained the same ideals of socialism for decades. Tanzania has been
claimed one of the most politically stable countries in Africa (Bjerk, 2010). The
national language of Kiswahili is said to be a significant unifying factor within the
country (though English is used as the official language) (CIA, 2017).
Since the 1990s, the country has had strong economic growth and in 2011 was
predicted to be one of the fastest-growing countries in the world (Cooksey and
Kelsall, 2011).
This growth may not have translated into poverty reduction however (Cooksey, 2012).
As the table 6 above illustrates, Tanzania continues to rank among the lowest on the
Human Development Index and there is substantial poverty in both urban and rural
areas.
Corruption is cited as one of the major constraints for doing business in the country
and Tanzania has made slow progress on Transparency International’s Corruption
Perceptions Index (CPI). (Transparency International, n.d.).
Transparency International notes that corruption in Tanzania is a significant problem
at all levels, from provision of public services and public procurement to the workings
of the political system (Lindner and Banoba, 2014).
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While the president and others have claimed to be on the forefront of the anticorruption fight, opponents have said that his efforts are insincere and merely to
appease international donors (Kambenga, 2012)
A report for the European Union on their overseas governance promotion noted that
“the United Republic of Tanzania turned from “donor’s darling” to problem child with
regard to anti-corruption and governance reforms” (Montgomery, 2017:116).
International donors are therefore focused on addressing transparency and governance
in Tanzania.

The political environment for media in Tanzania
While the constitution of Tanzania provides a foundation for the protection of freedom
of expression in the media, in fact, Tanzania has a series of laws that are often used to
punish critics of the CCM government and “the courts and parliament are
fundamentally hostile to journalistic freedom” (Matumaini, 2011:1). Kambenga
argues that laws dealing with libel, defamation, and anti-terrorism have remained in
place as barriers to press freedom (Kambenga, 2012).
The Media Services Act of 2016 was enacted in November 2016 and established a
statutory Media Services Council. This has been criticised as not being independent.
The East African Court of Justice (EACJ) noted that multiple sections of Tanzania's
Media Services Act restrict press freedom and freedom of expression, and has called on
the Tanzanian government to repeal the act (Avenue et al., 2019). One issue of concern
is the requirement that all journalists must seek accreditation, and that those without
such accreditation would not be allowed to practice as journalists (Ishabakaki et al.,
2016).
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The Cybercrimes Act and the Statistics Act (2015) are also seen by media
stakeholders as not having “been made for the purpose of promoting media freedom,
but of restricting it” (Titus and Brombart, 2015:16). The Cybercrimes Act grants the
police broad powers of search and seizure and criminalises the publication online of
information that the state deems “false or misleading” and “to levy heavy penalties
against individuals involved in a host of criminalized cyber-activities” (Freedom
House 2016).
This limits the scope for digital publication and encourages heightened selfcensorship. For instance, the founder of the popular social media blog JamiiForum,
Maxence Melo, was arrested in December 2016 on multiple charges, including
managing a domain not registered in Tanzania, based on the provisions of this bill,
and strict bail procedures kept him behind bars (John, 2016).
Journalists in all media face high risks for criticising the ruling party Chama Cha
Mapinduzi (CCM) or the government. Journalists, especially those operating in rural
areas, are reported to face regular harassment and beatings, and have been known to
receive death threats from government officials if they expressed opinions in
opposition. Nicknamed the “Bulldozer,” President Magufuli has tolerated no criticism
of himself or his policies since becoming president in 2015 (Reporters without
borders: Tanzania, 2019).
IREX’s Media Sustainability Index (2012) reported that on many occasions, journalists
have been prevented from reporting or taking pictures on stories or events negatively
portraying the ruling party or the government (Kambenga, 2012). This has created an
environment where journalists fear losing their jobs if they dare to question the
government or media owners.
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As a result, only a small portion of civil society in general, and journalists, feel free to
express themselves. Titus and Brombart (2015) claim that most feel “intimidated by
the draconian anti-media laws that exist in Tanzania, as well as by the powerful
interests of the owners of the various media houses” (Titus and Brombart, 2015:14).
And with CCM having won every election since the establishment of the multi-party
system in 1992, future advances for the media in Tanzania will likely face challenges
(FesMedia, 2010).

Market Structure
Like Kenya, the media industry in Tanzania has grown rapidly over the past decades.
The media landscape in Tanzania has become more diverse following the advent of
multi-party era in the 1990s (IPSOS, 2012). Fifteen years ago, the media on the
mainland consisted of two newspapers and one State owned radio station. Today,
Tanzania has many privately-owned newspapers, radio and television stations.
However, the media landscape continues to be dominated by a few large players and
media organisations are concentrated in a small number of hands in Tanzania. The
government controls two daily newspapers, and the two main political parties own one
each. As of September 2018, 175 newspapers and magazines were registered in
Tanzania with the majority of them privately owned39.
IREX’s Media Sustainability Index (2012) found that most media owners are
politicians who started media outlets to promote themselves and curry political favour.

39 GeoPoll Online and Print Consumption Aug/Sept 2018 https://tanzania.mom-rsf.org/en/media/print/
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Like in neighbouring Kenya, such political owners tend to heavily influence the
editorial slants of their organisations (Kambenga, 2012).
Powell calls this the “phenomenon of news media ownership for political ends”.
Newspapers emerge during election periods, and then disappear, thus “electoral
politics dominate the media industry,” (Powell, 2017:92). He argues that this
“produces a form of media capture dominated by the centralized state, an emerging
democracy marked by rent- seeking and corruption, in a wider context of inequality
and exclusion enabled by elite-driven privatization processes and global capital”
(Powell, 2017:93).
Thus, like in neighbouring Kenya, media in Tanzania is owned and controlled by
politicians and elites. There have been attempts to limit cross-media ownership in
2009 - only after media conglomerates had already expanded in a concerning manner but these were not followed through (Media Ownership Monitor Tanzania, 2018).

Professionalism of journalism sector
According to Le Pelley (2010), the journalism profession in Tanzania suffers an
apparent lack of capacity, a high degree of sensationalism, corruption, job insecurity,
editorial interference by media owners, and poor and risky working conditions (Le
Pelley, 2010).
Certainly, like elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa, corruption is a problem. Media
professionals accept payments or gifts in exchange for certain types of coverage,
otherwise known as “brown envelope” journalism. Skjerdal noted “there is legitimate
reason to believe that this phenomenon and other types of informal incentives and
bribes are common in African media practice” (Skjerdal, 2010:367).
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This can be understood if put in context and levels of remuneration; 75-80% of the
Tanzanian journalists work as freelancers and these freelancers are poorly paid and
often earn below minimum wage (Sungura, 2012). In general, staff journalists have
better income than freelancers, but the modest wages still result in some of the most
competent and best educated journalists leaving the profession to work in better paid
fields such as public relations (ibid).
Powell noted a form of “brain drain” where investigative reporters leaving the field of
independent journalism for the “commercially profitable world of government and
corporate communications” ( in Powell, 2017:91). Of course, this is not unique to
Tanzania.
There is also a problem with regard to lack of advertisement power for Tanzanian
press. In neighbouring Kenya, a single newspaper like The Nation sells 250,000
copies a day and can depend on strong advertising revenue as well as sales to fund it,
whereas quality papers in Tanzania sell a maximum of 25,000 copies (Sungura, 2012).
The main advertiser in the press is the Tanzanian government who has, at times,
withdrawn advertising as a reaction to unwelcome editorial content.
Advertising therefore plays a very strong role in self-censorship, and editors will
avoid antagonising advertisers. It is an issue of survival, especially if a newspaper
relies on advertising revenue (FesMedia, 2012).
Powell maintains that there are “multiple constraints facing the media in Tanzania”
(Powell, 2017:93) and he calls this “media capture”. As noted, regulation can limit
freedom of expression and promotes self-censorship, but reporters are faced with
“other forms of censorship such as intimidation, unfavourable economic
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circumstances, top-down economic and political development, and self-interested
ownership patterns” (Powell, 2017:93).
Thus, although giving an outward impression of press freedom, there is limited space
for criticising government in Tanzania and limited transparency (Le Pelley, 2010).
Unsurprisingly then, there is little such criticism in Tanzanian media.
This was noted by Newell who found “a general reticence within Tanzanian culture to
publicly question or criticise” (Newell, 2012:2). This culture of not questioning or
criticising the state has been found to impact negatively on the motivation of citizens
to engage in governance programs. This will be discussed in more details when
analysing media development programmes being implemented in Tanzania.
This section examined the challenges to the media sector in Tanzania. In the next
section, patterns of media use in Tanzania are explored. This provides essential
background to Chapter 6 where methods appropriate in media assistance projects are
discussed.
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Tanzanian Media
Television

There was no television network operating in mainland Tanzania until 1994. Upon
independence in 1961, it was decided by President Nyerere’s cabinet that television
was too expensive to introduce to the whole population and radio was prioritised as
the medium to unify the newly independent state (Katz and Wedell, 1977).
Consequently, television was introduced to the Tanzanian population quite late, but
has since become a popular media in the country, in particular for youth.

TV stations market share
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0%

Source: GeoPoll Tanzania Q2 2017

Figure 10. Tanzania TV Stations
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There are currently 48 television channels licensed under the Tanzanian
Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA)40. Only a small percentage of the
population has access to television, however, due to high costs. Few people in rural
areas own a television set, which means that the TV audience in the country is still
largely concentrated in the urban areas. People in rural areas are able to watch
television through community viewings in public establishments, like coffee shops
and pubs (Murthy, 2011b).
Deregulation has lifted restrictions on broadcasting activities in most sub-Saharan
African countries including Tanzania. This liberalisation has opened the market to the
wider distribution of satellite TV services, both private and state funded (Mytton et al.,
2005). Nwokeafor and Langmia (2010) argue that digital television has
“revolutionised the way millions of household viewers receive and interact with their
televisions” (Nwokeafor and Langmia, 2010).
In December 2012, Tanzania became the first country in mainland Sub-Saharan Africa
to switch off its analogue television signal. However, at the time, this change to the
digital signal changed TV viewing habits: there was a shift away from TV in the
country, viewership dropped after the digital transition and there was a shift towards
radio. The reason for this is that viewers now need a digital antenna and decoder and
that is an expense that a lot of lower middle, or lower class Tanzanian cannot afford
(Kapella, in interview, 2015).
It is interesting to note that these sorts of transitions to newer technology such as with
digital migration do not suit the whole population in Tanzania, as in Kenya. Cost is a
central issue here. Despite digitalisation, in Tanzania, recent research by satellite

40 https://tanzania.mom-rsf.org/en/media/tv/
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operator SES found that 52% of homes in Tanzania don’t have TV access yet, out of a
total of 11.7 million households. Among the 5.6 million homes that do have TV
reception, 55% receive their TV channels via satellite, while the rest are still served by
terrestrial and cable networks (Satellite Monitor Study, 2018).

Print Media

Newspaper market share
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Source: IPSOS Synovate, May 2014

Figure 11. Tanzania Print Media

The private press has grown strongly since the introduction of multi-party democracy
in 1992 and most of the major newspapers in Tanzania are published in Kiswahili;
thus readership is not affected by those who don’t read in English. The major hurdle
for newspaper readership is circulation, as circulation is mostly limited to the urban
areas in the key regions.
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Long distances and poor road infrastructure in Tanzania results in the delay of
newspapers reaching rural centres on time and there are many outlying areas that the
print media never reaches at all. A survey conducted by Murthy found that the largest
proportion of non-readers of print media cite non-availability in their area as the prime
reason for non-readership (69%) (Murthy, 2011). Consequently, newspaper
readership is higher for urban residents. The most widely read newspapers are
printed and distributed from Dar es Salaam (Murthy, 2011).
In the same survey, other reasons cited as obstacles to reading newspapers were that it
was too expensive (19%), the audience do not have the time (14%), they are not
interested (23%) and that they cannot read newspapers (13%) (Murthy, 2011). Otiso
claims that despite increased access to media in Tanzanian society, a reading culture
still does not have a strong hold in most of the population (Otiso, 2013). Hence, print
media is not the most popular media in Tanzania.

Print media has also suffered recent setbacks including operating under a political
environment dominated by repressive laws. A government directive in 2018 to reregister all newspapers and magazines took owners by surprise, leaving them with
only one choice: to either re-register or close down business (Bazira and Muhanika,
2019).

Radio

The state-owned Tanganyika Broadcasting Corporation (TBC) began broadcasting
nationally in 1956, while still under colonial control. Following independence, TBC
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was placed under the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting in 1965 and renamed
TBC Taifa.
Following liberalisation in 1992, the Tanzanian government allowed the establishment
of private radio stations which have flourished. But given the country’s large
geographic size and low population density, few stations are able to have full national
reach.
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Figure 12. Tanzania Radio Stations

Research by Murthy (2011) found that 83% of Tanzanians said they get news and
information from radio. Radio is the top source for every age group and income group
tracked, as well as both males and females, and rural and urban dwellers (Murthy,
2011). More recently IPSOS confirmed that radio was the most frequently used media
channel (IPSOS, 2014).

218

Tanzania has close to 120 ethnic groups, each of which has its own language. Local
and community radios are therefore of great relevance to the local populations. As
noted in Kenya, the costs associated with running community media outlets are very
high, thereby discouraging communities’ access to media. Again, some community
radio stations have been established by politicians to boost their popularity in their
constituencies.
The rise in access to mobile phones represents a potential boost for access to broadcast
media in Tanzania by people listening to the radio on their cell phones. And as with
Kenya, radio in Tanzania is becoming more interactive over time, with increase in use
of mobile phones and with more radio call-in shows.
Interestingly, although Tanzanians may listen to these call-in shows, radio is seen
more as a medium for passive entertainment than as a forum for voicing one’s
opinion. One study found that 76 percent of radio listeners listen to radio call-in
shows, but only five percent had actually called in to one of these shows in that year
(Murthy 2011). This may also be culturally specific to Tanzania where citizens are
just starting to be comfortable with expressing their opinions in public. This shall be
explored in more detail in Chapters 6 and 7.
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Information and Communication Technologies
Table 7. ICTs Tanzania

Mobile Phone

80% (as at Dec 2018) 43,497,261

Penetration
Digital Television

Changeover: Dec 2012

Internet Use

23,000,000 (31 Mar 2019)
38% Penetration

Facebook Accounts

6,100,000

internet Gross
Domestic Product

1.3%

(iGDPs)

Sources:
Mobile: TRCA Dec 2018
https://www.tcra.go.tz/images/documents/telecommunication/TelCom_Statistics_December_2018.pdf
Internet Users and Facebook Subscribers: https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm
iGDP: The measure of the internet’s contribution to a country’s economy (Manyka et al., 2013)

As noted, Tanzania has experienced a large upsurge in telephone ownership with the
introduction of mobile phones. The total number of mobile phone subscriptions rose
from close to zero at the turn of the century to some 43 million by Dec 2018
(Tanzanian Communication Regulatory Authority (TCRA), 2017) which is a
penetration of near 80%.
With the increase in mobile phone penetration there has also been greater access to the
internet. The use of internet is becoming more widespread among Tanzanians and
especially among younger Tanzanians between 15-30 years (Femina Hip 2013).
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Huge discrepancies however remain in the consumption pattern. A survey conducted
by Femina Hip highlighted that access to the internet is confined to urban areas of
Tanzania, as the majority of internet users are based in urban zones (Femina HIP,
2013). Like Kenya there appears an urban-rural split.

Furthermore, as exciting as this new online public space is for Kenyans and
Tanzanians it needs to be highlighted that more than 70% of Kenyan and Tanzanian
citizens still get their news from radio.

Discussion
To address whether digital technologies have impacted on the relevance of media
assistance in the chosen case study countries (RQ2), this chapter examines the
characteristics of the media and information environment in the case studies of Kenya
and Tanzania (RQ2a).
In Tanzania, mobile phones and the internet are certainly becoming important
communication and news gathering tools in Tanzania. However, factors such as
infrastructure, high illiteracy rates, access and poverty levels prevent many
Tanzanians from accessing new sources of information.
Access to media outlets and the new virtual space is determined by two factors; cost
and location. The main challenge that prevents citizens from accessing the media in
Tanzania is not lack of availability or lack of information, but rather poverty. Most
cannot afford to buy newspapers or radio and television sets.
In terms of print media, lack of distribution networks due to bad roads and
inaccessibility make it incredibly difficult for those in rural areas to access newspapers
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or print media. What this means is that those living in rural areas, the majority of the
population - have difficulty accessing TV and Newspapers.
The lack of a dependable electricity supply is another of the main factors that prevent
many rural people from using electronic media, from the internet to television sets and
is a serious issue for access to broadcast media in Tanzania. Lack of stable sources of
electricity has an impact on the ability to access all media and communication devices
and is disproportionately a problem in poorer and more rural provinces (Murthy,
2011).
Those in rural locations have had much lower access to main power grids than those
living in more urban locations. Murthy found that close to half of all Tanzanians
who say they have never watched television cited “problems with electricity” as one
of the reasons for non-use (Murthy, 2011). Only 11% of those living in rural parts of
the country (which constitutes 72% of the population) had access to the main power
grid in 2014 (African Development Bank, 2015).
As a result, those living in urban areas (and in turn more stable electricity sources)
are thus more likely to have access to broadcast media, network coverage and also
print media for distribution reasons.
Therefore, like in Kenya, and possibly even more so, there is a sharp distinction
between those living in urban and rural areas with regards to access of information.
Many media largely remain reserved for urban dwellers, while the broader portion of
the population residing in rural areas is left out. As such, it appears that “Tanzania
still lacks a diverse broadcasting sector essential to a functioning democracy that can
contribute to the public interest” (FesMedia, 2010:5).
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The media in Kenya and Tanzania face many challenges to being able to fulfil its
democratic potential as watchdog and public sphere. But in both countries, the
affordability and accessibility of both old and new media should not be
underestimated.

Stakeholder Perspectives
The previous section presented secondary data to illustrate the landscape for media
assistance in Kenya and Tanzania. This chapter explores the context for media
assistance activity in these countries and in particular the impact of digital
technologies on journalism and the media systems in these two countries. This will
influence what types of media interventions are now needed and whether traditional
media assistance continues to be relevant.
Key stakeholders who participated in the interviews contributed valuable insights in
this area and in this section these insights are presented as supporting evidence of the
impact of digitisation on the media environment. They also provide perspectives on
the techno-optimistic funding environment for media assistance in these case study
countries, which may influence the projects being undertaken.

Digital technologies, Social Media platforms and news production
The interview participants, or key stakeholders, contributed important insights
regarding the impact that digital technologies have had on news production and
consumption and the public sphere in Kenya and Tanzania. Stakeholders noted the
emergence and growth of user generated content (UGC) and citizen journalism as one
of the most evident changes of the increasing use of digital technologies. Kenyans
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and Tanzanians increasingly report eye-witness accounts on their mobile phones,
telling stories and reporting local news.
Citizen journalism is seen by some as a remedy to the widening gap in societies where
traditional news media are in decline or not fulfilling their watchdog role (Banda,
2010; Riaz and Pasha, 2011). Platforms such as Twitter have certainly changed the
landscape for journalism in the region and Moyo (2007) suggests ‘new’ technologies
offer alternative platforms of expression in the face of state monopolies of the mass
media in Africa (Moyo, 2007). It has been called ‘citizen-driven’, ‘participatory and
‘democratic’ journalism for these reasons.
The stakeholders confirmed that digital technologies and social media platforms have
changed the way journalists gather and disseminate news. Journalists in Kenya now
file stories, pictures, and audio and visual clips from the field using their laptops and
mobile internet connection facilities. The larger media houses have invested in
converged newsrooms such as those seen in the headquarters of BBC and CNN. The
Standard Group, for example, has a converged newsroom where reporters working for
the radio, television, online, and newspaper share stories, pictures, and videos.
Mabwaezera (2015) noted that “there is no denying that journalists in Africa, like their
counterparts in the rest of the world, are experiencing the disruptive practice of new
digital technologies on the way that they gather, produce and distribute news”
(Mabweazara, 2015:1).
Stakeholder Dickens Olewe is a Kenyan journalist who has worked at The Star in
Kenya and is a scholarship recipient in Stanford University in California focusing on
using new technology in the news process. He argues that Kenyan media and
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journalists have adapted but at different paces. “In terms of journalists, they were
really quick in adopting being in social networks” (Olewe, 2015, in interivew)41.
The bombing of Westgate was an important event in motivating Kenyans to sign up to
social networks and showed how social media could provide another platform for
news “because mainstream media was absolutely inadequate in covering West-gate”
(Dickens Olewe, 2015). This event was “very, very important” for getting people in
Kenya to start using social media for news.
Olewe notes that “the independent voices on social [media] were amazing [during
WestGate] and the Kenyan media, especially the broadcast media were absolutely
incompetent, they did not ask any questions. People on twitter got together and put
out a list of questions they wanted the media to ask” (Olewe, 2015, in interview).
Stakeholders confirmed that social media platforms such as Twitter have enabled new
voices to be heard, providing alternative news sources to mainstream and other media
that are be controlled by the government or elites. For instance, in Tanzania people
are using Twitter in particular because the official mainstream news tends to be selfcensored.
Titus and Brombart (2015) concur that social media has provided a new platform for
journalists and members of civil society in Tanzania to express themselves more
freely on various issues (Titus and Brombart, 2015).
For instance, stakeholder Kris Kapella from Femina Hip noted that:
People don’t think they can get the most accurate and open information from
traditional media outlets and so the strength of something like Twitter in Tanzania in

41 In skype interview with author March 2015
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particular is that people can get live real time information as it happens, with Twitter
people are using it as a substitute for traditional news media (Kapella, 2014, in
interview).42.

Kapella notes how “in the past the government has cracked down on newspapers that
have been overly critical of the government so as a result there is self-censorship”.
Elsie Eyakuze, a blogger from Tanzania writes the popular MikoCheni Report, notes
“the growth of social media has been significant, not necessarily challenging
traditional media so much as bringing in a whole new dimension of interaction
between producers and consumers of content. It has enhanced the dialogue and
democratic space” (Eyakuze, 2015, in interview). 43
Stakeholders noted that digital technologies have impacted on the way journalists
undertake their work in the region and they are very aware of social media and online
sources. Josh Ogure, from Kibera News Network, confirms that new technologies and
social media “are being used a lot in Africa for news” (Ogure, 2015, in interview)44.
Maurice Oniang’o, an independent journalist from Kenya who has been recipient of
the Thompson Foundation ‘Young journalist from a Developing country Award’,
claims:
In the past five years the media has experienced dynamic changes which include
embracing new media techniques in delivering news. Today almost all media houses
have active social media channels through which they deliver news through as well as
interact with their audience. All the major TV, Radio and Newspapers in Kenya have

42 Kris Kapella, Femina Hip, interview with author May 2014.
43 Elsie Eyakuze, Blogger, Tanzania, Mar 2015 In email communication
44 Josh Ogure from Kibera News Network in email communication with author Mar 2015
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an active Twitter account, Facebook account and websites through which they update
their audiences on current issues and stories that they are following (Oniang’o, 2015,
in email communication).45

Oniang’o himself is “always keen on trends on Twitter and it has always updated me
on breaking news before I see it on TV or listening to it on radio”. For instance, the
Westgate mall terror attack46 was reported on Twitter “hours before any TV or radio
stations picked it up” (ibid).
Nyabuga reports: “today’s journalist will hardly depend on the newsroom diary or
phone tip offs from sources but will also have their eye on social media platforms to
see what has been posted” (Nyabuga, 2016:44). Kaigwa and Wu (2015) refer to
Twitter as Kenya’s virtual “town square” (Kaigwa and Wu, 2015:154). Kaigwa
argues that journalists now consider it to be a “part of their beat, staying tuned to
trending blogs and other updates. It has become common to see news broken on
Twitter by a blogger… legitimizing it .. and publishing it in the Kenyan news media”
(Kaigwa, 2017:193).
In addition to integration of digital technologies into journalism practice, other
websites and blogs have sprung up, encouraging citizen engagement and interaction

45 Maurice Oniang’o, Freelance Journalist Kenya). In email communication Mar 2015
46 On 21 September 2013, unidentified gunmen attacked the upmarket Westgate shopping mall in
Nairobi, Kenya. The attack, which lasted until 24 September, resulted in at least 67 deaths, including
four attackers. More than 175 people were reportedly wounded in the mass shooting, with all of the
gunmen reported killed.
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and eye-witness reporting. Kenya boasts a vibrant blogging community, some of
whom have become quite famous (such as Robert Alai and Patrick Gathara). 47
Eric Chinje from African Media Initiative confirmed “there are three or four bloggers
in Kenya who contribute to influencing the agenda, no doubt about it” (Chinje, 2015,
in interview)48.
For example, Robert Alai is a high-profile blogger in Kenya who has become so well
known that whistle-blowers willingly go to him to introduce sensitive documents to
break the story on the internet. “You will see the mainstream media following up to
try and make a story out of that, and I think that tells you where the trend is
going……Bloggers are breaking the stories” (Dickens Olewe, 2015, in interview).
Josh Ogure from the Kibera News Network argues that citizen journalists are the new
watchdogs:
In the last five years Kenyan media was somehow ranked as the most trusted
institution, but that’s not the case anymore, they have changed, Kenyan media have
got into bed with the government, they would rather cover up the government than
serve the public with the truth. Social media and citizen journalism has become a
great alternative (Ogure, 2015, in interview)49.

47 Robert Alai, is a Kenyan blogger, internet entrepreneur and cyber-activist. Alai has been sued and
briefly incarcerated for his highly opinionated political and sometimes personal attacks on politicians,
government officials and business leaders.. Patrick Gathara is a Kenyan journalist, blogger, and writer.
He is a regularly published commentator on regional and international affairs. His work has appeared in
multiple publications, including The Washington Post, Al Jazeera,
48 Eric Chinje, African Media Initiative, in interview Feb 2015
49 Joshua Ogure, Kibera News Network, email communication Feb 2015
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Olewe agrees that citizen journalists are carrying out the real watchdog role: “They
are taking over from mainstream media. For example, with a platform like HiviSasa 50
we democratise journalism where everyone can report their stories” (Olewe, 2015).
Chloe Spoerry is the founder of ‘HiviSasa’, an online county-level newspaper, and she
argues that due to a centrally owned media, two out of three Kenyans receive written
news that is not locally relevant, poorly distributed, slow, biased, easily censored and
costly. She refers to the severe lack of local news in Kenya and Tanzania, and that
new citizen journalism tools such as HiviSaSa address that gap: “stories will never be
killed any more” (Spoerry, 2015, in interview).
Online news has filled gaps in information and news requirements of local audiences
who are neglected in Kenya due to either accessibility, ownership or infrastructural
issues. Spoerry claims “Hivisasa is a real tool for democracy, it creates more dialogue
between local governments and citizens…. I’m talking about accountability and
transparency” (Spoerry, 2015, in interview)51.
Tom Rhodes, from the Committee to Protect Journalists in East Africa, agrees that
digital storytelling is “certainly playing a major role [in news]. The stories that you're
not seeing on the press, you're seeing on social media. People are talking about it
there”. He cites the example of Jamiiforums in Tanzania, an online news forum and
discussion website. “Jamiiforums is this amazing cathartic tool where disgruntled

50 The ‘HiviSasa’ platform is an online, local, county-level Kenyan newspaper tailored for the mobile
web. It sources all its news stories from local citizen reporters (i.e. anyone who wants to report the
news) who are paid via mobile-money for each article they publish. Professional journalists/editors
curate the incoming articles and choose the best ones for publishing.
51 Chloe Spoerry, HiviSasa, Feb 2015 in interview with author
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politicians will go and upload very sensitive documents” (Rhodes, 2015, in
interview).52
The increasing popularity of these social networking sites like Twitter and Jamii
Forums show a potential for online and citizen journalism. Jamii Forums is
Tanzania’s number one most visited website and the most popular destination for
Kiswahili speakers. “JamiiForums is unique in Africa in terms of the openness of the
platform, and the site has a moderator to try to keep by validating claims” (Titus and
Brombart, 2015:41).
Another informant suggests that mainstream journalism in Kenya could learn from
social media and some of the bloggers, such as Robert Alai, Ory Okolloh and Gathara
who “give context as well as reporting, which you don’t get that in the mainstream
media”. Robert Munuku, from the organisation ‘Action for Transparency’, claims
that as a result of blogging and citizen journalism “mainstream media have stepped up
their game, they've stepped up the quality of their news, they've stepped up the quality
of their research, and the veracity of the content” (Munuku, 2015, in interview).
Munuku adds “when you look at political issues, on-line conversations and on-line
behaviour is slowly affecting political issues in the country”.
What the stakeholder insights in this section reveal is how the internet and citizen
journalism is seen as an important new platform for dissemination of news. They
underscore how citizen journalism, blogging and social media platforms are affecting,
possibly challenging, how the mainstream media is working in Kenya and Tanzania.

52 Tom Rhodes, Committee to Protect Journalists East Africa in interview with author Feb 2015
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Robert Munuku claims these online media are “they are keeping them on their toes”
(Munuku, 2015, in interview).
This is supported by academic literature. Mabweazara et al (2014) claim that online
and digital journalism are “thriving on the continent” (Mabweazara et al., 2014:1) and
Mudhai (2011) argues that mainstream media in Kenya show signs of struggling to
catch up with an active blogosphere and to remain relevant, as events are increasingly
debated via social media as they occur (Mudhai, 2011).
Abdi and Deane noted that Kenya has a lively blog culture and that they “provide a
key form of public debate and a source of investigation at a time when investigative
journalism is under threat in the country. As such, blogs provide a growing form of
democratic expression and accountability, and fresh opportunities for dialogue and
debate across cultures and communities (Abdi and Deane, 2008:11).
It will later be determined whether the changes brought by digitsation is impacting on
the projects being undertaken by media assistance organisations and its relevance in
an increasingly technological environment.

Funding environment for Media Assistance in Kenya and Tanzania
The stakeholders who participated in the interviews also had noteworthy insights into
the environment for funding of media assistance projects and technology in the region.
One aspect of the relevance of traditional media assistance approaches in the region is
the extent to which they continue to be supported financially.
As discussed in earlier chapters, there is great enthusiasm amongst donors about the
potential for ICTs, and the mobile phone in particular, in the development sector.
Traditional donors and new donors are recommending ICTs to address issues such as
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governance and transparency to citizen participation to health programmes. Some of
these are also traditionally media assistance goals.
ICT now forms a significant part of many donor funded projects and with the entry of
the technology foundations - such as Gates Foundation and Omidyar Network - into
the media assistance space, their media projects encourage technology solutions for
development problems. Nelson says these foundations take a strong interest in digital
media projects (Nelson, 2009:17). Sara Chamberlain from BBC Media Action noted
how these “tech companies, particularly foreign tech companies, they're very focused
on high-end technology, the cutting-edge, the latest end user interface design….
essentially touch screens and Apps” (Brown-Martin, 2014).
Over the recent past, Kenya’s capital, Nairobi, has grown into a global technology hub
and a regional role model for innovation. Nairobi is home to the first tech incubator in
Africa, the iHub, which has supported a movement of young tech-savvy Africans to
develop a community. There are also technology hubs springing up across Tanzania:
Kinu, Buni Hub and DTBi are local innovation hubs along the lines of iHub. This
proliferation of tech communities and clubs, and “Tech-Hubs” has led to the term
“Silicon Savannah”.
The energy coming from Kenyas buzzy technology centre has gained the attention of
governments and donors who are keen to support it. Social Tech companies, not-forprofit organisations, for-profit technology initiatives are increasingly establishing
themselves in these centres on the back of donor funding.
In their recent strategy report “Doing Development in a Digital World” the UK’s
Department of International Development proclaimed optimistically that “digital
technologies offer an unprecedented opportunity to revolutionise the global
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development system, change lives, transform entire economies, stimulate growth and,
ultimately, end reliance on aid” (DFID Digital Strategy 2018 to 2020, 2018). The
organisation admits however to “falling prey to fads, buzzwords, and endless jargon”
(Orton-Vipond, and Powell, 2018).
This illustrates how donors are promoting use of ICTs in development projects aimed,
for example, at promoting accountability, transparency or at guaranteeing peaceful
elections, and there is certain optimism around these technologies.
Many of the stakeholders interviewed for this research confirmed that the funders of
media and development projects were encouraging the use of new technology in their
programmes.
Stakeolder Alex Pitkin from Frontline SMS53 confirms that “there are lots of projects
that get funding because they are doing something innovative…. It’s more likely to
get funding if they have good ideas on technology” (Pitkin, 2015, in interview) 54.
Bart Sullivan from the Canadian NGO FARM Radio, which undertakes projects in
both Tanzania and Kenya, revealed “there is a lot of excitement around this. Almost
all the projects we are funded to work on combine radio and mobile and online
technologies… And ICTs in general” (Sullivan, 2015, in email).55

53 Frontline SMS is a NGO which teams SMS with Radio for interactive discussions. It is a free, opensource software used by a variety of organisations to distribute and collect information via text
messages (SMS). Their radio product - Frontline SMS: Radio - helps radio stations increase listener
engagement, build interactive programming and manage data in real-time, all using SMS
54 Alex Pitkin, Frontline SMS, in interview with author May 2014
55 Bart Sullivan, FARM Radio, Email communication with Author, March 2015
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Daniel Dedeyan from USAID in Tanzania attests that “there is an excitement about
new technologies to transform lives and bring about social and political change” and
agreed that at USAID “we’ve had that excitement” (Dedayan, 2014, in interview)56.
He revealed that they “are definitely getting a push from Washington to be
innovative” in their projects (Dedayan, 2014, in interview). USAID are one of the
larger funders of media development work in the region and this would have an
impact on the direction of the media development sector.
Dedayan noted that, historically, a major obstacle to some of USAID’s development
goals, such as accountability and transparency, has been information flows in
Tanzania. Now ICTs are viewed with optimism as a possible solution to these
problems (Dedayan, 2015, in interview).
Sasha Kinney who works with PAWA254, a community-based activism organisation
in Nairobi, also spoke of “the big technology bias” that has appeared in the aid sector
over the past five years. Kinney claims the message that the NGO community is
getting from donors is: “Tech is new, we have to use tech. Tech will revolutionise
everything on its own”. But she maintains that “people forget to give training in the
fundamentals…It's kind of backwards” (Kinney, 2015, in interview).
Kinney warns “this idea of advanced technology, it’s funder-driven and it’s popular,
and there's very little regard as to what is really appropriate to reach a certain audience
or engage them” (Kinney, 2015, in interview)57.

56 Daniel Dedayan, USAID Tanzania, interview with author May 2014
57 Sasha Kinney, PAWA, in interview with author Nairobi Feb 2015
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This is of note because it tells of the push for use of new or digital technology
regardless of whether they are the appropriate intervention or tool or whether their use
is evidence-based. Kinney confirms “no-one ever asks about adoption or usage, no,
because they also don’t want to see failure… They're not really thinking through
really what's needed” (Kinney, 2015, in interview).
Colin Spurway from BBC Media Action Tanzania concurs:
With the pressure on donors to show innovation there is very often a pressure to be
doing things with smart phones and Apps. It is an extremely bad idea because the
people you’re actually trying to reach, let say this woman, she doesn’t have a smart
phone for Apps and even if she does have such a phone, it is probably one of those
crappy little Nokia with a broken black and white screen and she can’t even read it
(Spurway, 2014, in interview).

From the interview data and from observation during the two field trips to Nairobi and
Dar es Salaam in 2014/2015, it is apparent that donors are excited about technology
for development and for media development. Consequently, aid organisations based
in Kenya and Tanzania are designing media programmes in an environment where
funds are becoming more easily accessible for technology-focused solutions. Whether
direct or indirect, there may be subtle pressure to use these technologies. The
researcher heard from informants that sometimes a technology element is added on to
grant applications for potential projects just to secure funding. This illustrates the
mind-set emanating from the capital at the time.
The media assistance interventions that are being implemented in Kenya and Tanzania
on the back of this donor funding shall be examined in more detail in the next chapter.
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What this section illustrates is an environment in Kenya and Tanzania where donors
are certainly enthusiastic for digital technologies in their programmes and view them
as possible solutions for their development objectives. Will this impact on the
relevance of traditional media assistance methods? This will be addressed in the next
chapter which analyses the uptake, and effectiveness, of these technologies for media
assistance objectives.

Key comparative issues in Media Assistance in Kenya & Tanzania
As can be garnered from the case studies presented here, neighbouring countries,
Tanzania and Kenya are different not only in their history, politics and economy but
also in terms of their current day openness to press freedom, technology and
innovation. Kenya is much more technologically advanced than Tanzania, especially
in urban places such as Nairobi. Kenya appears to enjoy more freedom of media than
Tanzania although they are both ranked “Partly Free” by Freedom House. There are
political and cultural reasons for these differences, and with its background as a
socialist country for several decades, Tanzania does not have the same culture of
entrepreneurship that can be witnessed in Kenya.
It has been shown that there has been a sharp increase in use of digital technologies in
both Kenya and Tanzania in recent years, predominantly use of mobile phones, and
also an increase in internet use.
New digital technologies have helped to advance the economy in both these countries
and arguably, its public sphere as more people are brought into the new public space.
Mobile phones and social media have widened the public sphere and this has given
citizens of these countries’ new platforms for discussion. Citizen journalism and
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blogging is a growing practice and the internet as a medium has provided citizens of
Kenya and Tanzania with an alternative view to the mainstream media. This has
provided an outlet for dissenting and critical views of the government, in particular in
Kenya.
Digitisation of Television and satellite TV has meant that more channels and
platforms, not regulated by local governments, are available to those who do own or
access a television.
Open Government initiatives have resulted in more information made available to the
public and journalists. For instance, Kenya was the first sub-Saharan country to put
its data online. The Kenyan government launched the “Kenya Open Data Initiative”
in 2011, making key government data freely available to the public through a single
online portal.
But while government information is now technically free and available to the public,
access to it is limited because only a small percentage of Kenyan citizens have the
internet capability to access the information, or the educational level needed to absorb
it (Foster, 2012).
Indeed, this is being addressed in Kenya, and elsewhere, by a relatively new field of
journalism called ‘data journalism’ or ‘data driven journalism’ (Gray et al., 2012;
Howard, 2014) where journalists are trained in statistical analysis so they can interpret
this data for the wider population and present it in a more comprehensive way for
audiences. This is one area that media development organisations in the region are
addressing with training and capacity building.
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However, both Kenya and Tanzania’s’ media and media systems face many structural,
legal, access and ownership issues. Although freedom of information is guaranteed
on a constitutional basis, regulations have limited meaningful press freedom and both
countries are ranked as ‘Partly Free’ by media freedom indices. These rankings have
dropped in past years with recent media laws endeavouring to restrict online
expression in both countries, under the guise of national security.
For instance, in Kenya, a 2014 Security Bill was fast tracked through government
saying that it needed more powers to fight militant Islamists. The bill contained
provisions that carry the potential to restrict freedom of the Kenyan press when
covering terrorist acts and issues related to national security, with harsh penalties for
individuals convicted of infractions.
While the legislation is supposedly targeted at print and broadcast media houses and
the journalists they employ, citizen journalists, bloggers or those who are active online
fear the loosely defined terminology hides an attempt to bring the unregulated online
space into ‘prosecutable reach’ (Verjee, 2014). Tom Rhodes of the Committee to
Protect Journalists claims that these laws “force journalists and news outlets to selfcensor to survive. They are a severe blow to investigative reporting in Kenya” (CPJ,
2013).
This chapter examined the challenges to the media sector in Kenya and Tanzania to
fulfil its potential democratic role as watchdog, as informant and as public sphere.
Impartial and independent journalism continues to be hampered by those issues
common elsewhere in the region – finances, concentration of ownership, harassment
of journalists and censorship (Nelson and Susman-Peña, 2012).
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The factors limiting access to or participation in the public sphere by Kenyan and
Tanzanian citizens are many and have been documented in this chapter, in particular
the sharp differences between media access between urban and rural areas. The stark
urban-rural divide is what emerges most notably from the analysis of these media
systems.
Digital technologies may not yet be fully relevant when reaching the broader
populations of Kenya and Tanzania with news and information, providing a public
sphere accessible by all or facilitating national discourse.
Furthermore, interview participants noted that the growth of digital technologies and
social media have not necessarily improved the quality of news journalism. Key
informant, Elsie Eyakuze, noted that with digital technologies “there is a lot more
feedback, interaction and it means that news from all over the country gets
disseminated faster. Not better, but faster” (Eyakuze, 2015, in interview). Nyabuga
argues “it is not clear whether these have had any significant effect on the quality of
information and news. Digital technologies have had both positive and negative
consequences for journalism” (Nyabuga, 2013).
These issues are not limited to this region of Africa or even the continent. Problems
of credibility and trust with online information are being experienced both in these
countries and globally with the growth in social media and citizen journalism. The
veracity of online news and the growth of “disordered information” is a global and
growing problem (Wardle and Derakhshan, 2017). Concepts such as the echo
chamber58, fake news and filter bubbles have risen to prominence both globally and in
58 the idea that online conversations about politics are typically divided into a variety of sub-groups,
and that this division takes place along ideological lines with people only talking to others with which
they are already
in agreement (Bright, 2017: 1).
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this region in recent years. There are many recently established initiatives to
understand the phenomena and mechanics of ‘fake news’ 59.
This chapter reflects some of the issues with regards to the growth in newer digital
technologies and social media in Kenya and Tanzania and the impact on reliable,
impartial and trustworthy information. It suggests there is still a space for traditional
media that is impartial, independent and is accessible for the broader populace. This
would suggest that there is still a gap which traditional media assistance can address.

Conclusion
This thesis asks whether digital technologies have impacted on the relevance of media
assistance in the chosen case study countries. In order to address this, this thesis put
forward questions relating to the environment in which media assistance takes place.
This chapter addresses the question: What are the characteristics of the current media
and information environment in the selected case studies of Kenya and Tanzania
(RQ2a)?
This chapter therefore presented a profile of the media systems and media
environment of Kenya and Tanzania. Secondary data and interview data from key
stakeholders illustrated the impact that digital technologies have had on both the
media ecosystem and the practice of journalism in Kenya and Tanzania.
In doing so, this chapter has provided a scene-setting and context analysis for the two
case study countries which serves as a needs analysis for their media systems. It

59 DIT Fake News Project Provenance https://fujomedia.eu/provenance/
BBC Beyond Fake News: https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p06r9vvf
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offers an overview of the media and communications environment in which Media
Development NGOs and donors implement projects in the focus countries.
Understanding the setting for media assistance will help in understanding the real
potential of digital technologies to achieve donor goals in media assistance
programmes.
For instance, dominant political issues in Kenya are ethnic divisions, the threat of
terrorism from Al Shabaab and corruption, and these issues impact on the media
sphere as well as elsewhere. They will also influence media assistance donors’
objectives.
The next chapter will present the primary data on media development projects in
Kenya and Tanzania. Analysing the project data will illustrate whether digital
technologies can fully address donor objectives and whether traditional media
assistance methods are still relevant.
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Chapter 6
Project Findings: Media Development Practice in East Africa

Introduction
In Chapter 5, the research showed, from a range of both primary and secondary
sources, the characteristics of the media systems in Kenya and Tanzania. Most
pertinent to the research question, it illustrated the extent to which the media
landscapes in these case study countries have changed as a result of digital
technologies. That chapter also outlined stakeholders’ insights into the changes
digital technologies have made on the practice of journalism in the region and
revealed donors enthusiasm for using such technologies.
Chapter 6 now proceeds to address the type of projects that are being implemented on
donors’ behalf and to what extent these use digital technologies.
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As exhibited in the research map above, this chapter takes up the research question
with regards to media assistance practice in East Africa. It presents data on media
assistance projects being implemented on the ground in Kenya and Tanzania. The
research investigated, through face to face interview with stakeholders, whether media
development agencies have changed the form and make-up of projects they implement
in these countries as a result of the evolving “information ecosystems” in which they
operate. This chapter thus directly addresses the sub-questions of:


What are the characteristics of current media development practice in a modern
East African context? (RQ 2b)



Have ICTs impacted on the practice of media assistance in the chosen case
studies? (RQ 2c)

In so doing, this chapter examines the nature of media development activity taking
place in Kenya and Tanzania and whether digital technologies are being used to
address project goals. This will help address the question of what the strengths and
weaknesses of digital technologies are compared to traditional media development
approaches for achieving donor goals. This will ultimately help explain the rationale
for a continuing emphasis on traditional media methods.

Schema for Presentation of Data
This chapter presents the data from fieldwork and comprises interview data focused
on a sample of eleven relevant organisations whose casework is representative of
media interventions in the region. To address the research question, the researcher
needed to ascertain precisely what kind of media development projects were currently
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being implemented in the case study countries, and what the objectives and activities
of these projects were. Then, it could be extrapolated to what extent digital
technologies are part of these projects and furthermore, whether these technologies
can address donor objectives in a more effective manner than traditional forms of
media.
For each project the data shows:


The type of interventions being undertaken



To what extent the media development organisations are using digital technologies
in their projects.



If these organisations are using digital technologies in their media interventions,
have they experienced success, and to what extent?



If these organisations are not using new digital technologies in current projects to
achieve their objectives, what is the rationale for this?

Thus, the data addresses the question of whether digital technologies, if they are being
integrated into media development programmes, are having the desired impact. The
chapter also examines reasons for not integrating them into projects, on the basis that
they did not serve to address donor goals.
Obstacles encountered in the use of ICTs for donor objectives will then be analysed
further in the following chapter. This will help understand the limitations of using
these ICTs for achieving media development goals.
Analysing the data will therefore address whether the cyber-optimism that is apparent
in the literature and donor policy documentation reviewed in Chapter 3, and expressed
by the stakeholders in interview, is feeding down into project activities on the ground.
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In addition, this chapter discusses an important finding that emerged from the data:
how media development projects in this region rarely solely address media sector
reform or support, but are often combined with elements of media for development.
The introduction chapter outlined the difference between what is understood as a
‘media development’ project and a ‘media for development’ project. The data in this
research revealed how media assistance projects in these countries often takes the
form of a ‘media development hybrid’ as referred to by Scott (2014). This will be
discussed briefly below as it is a noteworthy aspect of media assistance in this region.

The Media Development Hybrid
As was noted in the literature review, media assistance was associated historically
with establishing and strengthening democracy in the transitioning countries of
Eastern Europe (and elsewhere) and for those objectives the sectors’ activities were
especially focused on the professionalisation of the media sector and transformation of
the media systems.
More recently, with the field of media development expanding to other geographic
areas and widening its remit in terms of goals such as food security and humanitarian
assistance, there has been a corresponding increase in funding for media for
development activities. For instance, it is estimated that USAID spends four times
more on C4D-related projects now than it does on media development (Cary and
D’Amour, 2013).
Donors who support media development projects do so for a variety of objectives.
These vary from trying to improve accountability, transparency and governance
problems within a country, or increasing access to information, to encouraging
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behavioural change within target groups (such as promoting use of condoms or breastfeeding). The type of media development project, whether Media Development or
Media for Development, also depends on the project objectives and the target group.
The data from this research reflects that in an East African context, media
development practice is often a combination of the two strands.
Within the sample of NGOs who participated in this research, very few were focused
solely on media sector support or reform. Within the sample, there were several
projects which had media for development activities but which also contained
elements of capacity building or training as captured in the notion of the ‘media
development hybrid’ (Scott, 2014).
For example, a BBC Media Action project called Niambie (Tell Me) is an youth radio
show in Tanzania, using media to help young people understand their rights and
responsibilities. The BBC project Haba na Haba (Little by Little) is a radio show
aiming to bridge the gap between leaders and ordinary Tanzanians. Both projects
provide a platform for public discussion, helping to bring people’s voices into the
open but with additional journalism training, the projects provide support and capacity
building to local and national media.
This is an important aspect of this research. Whereas the research focus initially was
on digital technologies and media sector support, the primary data from this research
showed much donor support in this region is in the form of this media development
hybrid. That is – media-strengthening or capacity building activities hand-in-hand
with ‘media for development’ or ‘communication for development’ activities. This is
in contrast to early media development interventions in the former Soviet region
which predominantly focused on media sector reform and capacity building.
246

Thus, the data illustrates that projects in the region are very often not only focused on
media sector support but also using the media as a tool for change. Media for
development projects are projects which use radio, TV or print media to convey
messages about specific development issues. These tend to focus on food security,
health issues, environmental or humanitarian information for instance.
In these ‘media for development’ projects, the emphasis is on content: “the strategic
employment of media and communications as facilities for informing, educating and
sensitising people about development and pertinent social issues” (Manyozo,
2012:54).
With ‘media development’, the emphasis is on structure. Manyozo describes this as
“initiatives that are strategically designed to build media infrastructures, policies and
capacities ... as a way of consolidating good governance, free speech, political
citizenship and sustainable development” (Manyozo, 2012:112).

Figure 13. The Media Development Hybrid
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Furthermore, although these types of hybrid projects are focused on both content
(production of radio programmes) and structure (training and mentoring) they often
simultaneously created new platforms for national debate, a place for voices to be
heard, for discussion to take place and working towards a stronger public sphere.
This is illustrated in Figure 5.
Therefore, although these projects can be recognised for their ‘media for
development’ characteristics, in fact they also fulfil additional structural and
democratic objectives of media assistance – strengthening the public sphere,
contributing to a healthier democracy.
However, as Warren Feek (2008) suggested, perhaps the distinction between the two
areas is “false and distracting” (Feek, 2008). The data from these sample projects is
presented in the next section.
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Project Data: Media development activity in Kenya and Tanzania
Interviews with representatives from a sample of organisations undertaking media
assistance in Kenya and Tanzania provide the main source of data for this analysis and
is presented below. The data is presented for a sample of eleven organisations that
participated in the interviews and reflect media assistance activity in these two
countries at the time of the fieldwork. These organisations spearhead media
assistance in the region and the projects vary in size and the extent of their focus on
ICTs in their media development activities.
The data is organised around four categories of projects, defined by their activity and
goals, as outlined in the table:

Table 8. Categories of projects

Project
Type

Project

1. Capacity
Building using
digital
technologies

2. Traditional
Media
Development
approaches

3. The Media
Development
Hybrid

4. Strengthening
the Public Sphere
and platforms for
dialogue

UNESCO

TANZANIAN
MEDIA FUND

BBC MEDIA
ACTION KENYA

FEMINA HIP

INTERNEWS

HIVOS

BBC MEDIA
ACTION
TANZANIA

WELL TOLD
STORY

ACTION FOR
TRANSPARENCY

AFRICAN MEDIA
INITIATIVE

FARM RADIO

TWAWEZA

Name
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A. Capacity Building projects using ICTs
UNESCO - Empowering Local Radio through ICTs
A capacity building project in Africa which aims to address the lack of quality
programming for local radios and coordinated by United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) provides the first example. The
project is called ‘Empowering Local Radio through ICTs’ and focuses on local radio
stations, based in the community.
Table 9. UNESCO
Organisation Name
Who was
interviewed
Project Title

Problem Identified

UNESCO
John Okande Project Manager Kenya
Empowering Local Radio through ICTs
 Local radios lack of quality programming.


The scarcity of reporting on development issues.



Limited debate platforms for the poor



A need to upscale local radio stations with a focus on
sustainability.



Assist active participation of the poor in public debates.

Offered local stations a range of training and capacity building
options: editorial programming; producing radio programmes; use of
internet for research; management of daily contacts; training in use of
Methods

ICTs; use of internet to report; role of correspondents to feed local
news and collect testimonies; news desks’ work with correspondents
for interviewing and reporting; and income generation
 ICTs were introduced in radio programming and production.

Use of ICTs

 ICTs selected on the basis of improving editorial work, radio
programming, broadcasting, engaging audiences &financial
management.
 Helped to diversify news coverage greatly.
 Established correspondent’s networks.

Outcome

 From a very limited availability of news a few years ago, now they
have many stories coming from all over the region.
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Summary:
The UNESCO radio project in Kenya was part of a wider project across 10 African
countries over a 6-year period from 2012-2018. The objectives of the project were to
expand the news coverage and diversity in news that was broadcast by the
participating radio stations, usually based in the community. The project aimed to
improve the quality and quantity of local content for the radio station. John Okande,
the UNESCO Project Manager in Kenya, claimed that “previously, some of them
would play music for the whole day” (Okande, 2015, in interview).
Local radio is an important source for information for those living in rural areas, due
to language and accessibility issues. Few independent private local stations operate in
local areas, as most local radio stations are affiliated to big media houses, such as
Royal Media Services or Capital Group.
Okande noted “local radio stations in Kenya face many challenges such as human and
technical capacity building – including training on local content production,
sustainability strategies, reach, ethical issues guiding the management and editorial
policies, and continued independence from political influences” (Okande, 2015, in
interview).
The project focused on local radio and on integrating ICTs to modernise the radio
stations’ operations, “such as how they use basic ICTs to produce quality radio
programmes for broadcast” (Okande, 2015, in interview)60.. Trainers chose the most
appropriate software, taking into account the radio station’s technical infrastructure

60 John Okande, UNESCO. In interview with author Feb 2015
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and ICT literacy (based on previous assessment and surveys). Training also focused
on use of phones for interviewing and reporting of news.
While in some radio stations the goal was to introduce basic internet skills, other radio
stations were able to implement more complex ICTs like SMS polling or automated
call-ins. Radio stations embraced some new media elements such as WhatsApp with
their audiences. Examples of ICTs introduced by the project activities include
Frontline SMS, Freedom Fone and Crowdmap.
According to Okande there was considerable change in how things were run at the
participating radio stations, and how to use the available technologies in their day to
day running of the radio station (Okande, 2015, in interview). Use of ICTs in radio
stations resulted in improvements in sources for radio journalists and the quality of the
stories they produced.
The project has now established several correspondents’ networks, composed of
trained community members. These networks have “helped largely to diversify the
news coverage from the usual norm where they used to play the same thing
throughout the day”. Okande claims they now have “lots of content to use in their
programmes… There's more news, diversified news. There's no repetition, the way it
used to be” (Okande, 2015, in interview).
Okande states that the project improved the quality of programmes, the interaction
with listeners, mostly poor people in rural areas, and extended the geographical
coverage of news through the creation of networks of local correspondents.
This project illustrates a successful case of how integrating digital technology into the
training at the local radio stations increased diversity of content (and perhaps quality)
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of radio output as well as being a useful research and organising tool for the stations
and upskilling staff.
It illustrates how ICTs can contribute to media assistance objectives in terms of
improved quality of programming whilst also providing a platform for local
audiences.

INTERNEWS – Data Journalism project
Internews is an international non-profit organisation whose purpose is “to empower
local media worldwide to give people the news and information they need, the ability
to connect and the means to make their voices heard” (“About Internews,” n.d.).
Internews trains both media professionals and citizen journalists in Kenya and
increases coverage of important issues. Internews in Kenya supports projects that
counter hate speech, promote peaceful solutions and better understanding of election
issues. They also promote journalism around specific health issues in Kenya.
As noted in Chapter 5, a new field of journalism has emerged called ‘data journalism’
or ‘data driven journalism’ (Gray et al., 2012; Howard, 2014) . Data Journalism is a
media product gaining in popularity in many parts of the world, as a result of the Open
Government partnerships of which Kenya and Tanzania have signed up, and
governments have committed to making more data available to the public.
As more countries open up their data to the general public under Open Government
initiatives, there is a need for journalists to interpret this information and present it in
ways that is understandable to the general public. Data journalism can help a
journalist tell a complex story by using infographics for example. Journalists can now
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use this newly available data to uncover stories, better explain or provide context for a
news story. Internews is a media development NGO providing training in this field.

Table 10. Internews
Organisation
Name
Who was
interviewed
Project Title

INTERNEWS
Ida Jooste: Country Director Kenya
Health Media Project


Problem
Identified

The Health Media Project works to develop a media response to
public health issues in Kenya.



The project focuses on revealing corruption and inequality and
promoting accountability.

Working with media managers, owners and government stakeholders to
promote sustained coverage of health issues.
Includes workshops and mentoring for aspiring data journalists,
teaching how to develop a narrative around data findings to ensure the
Methods

public understands the human impact of the data and how government
can solve the problem.
Training in use and analysis of data, such as:
*How to identify public interest story angles in data
*Examining data sets for evidence of mismanagement and
marginalisation of public funds
Use of visualisation tools including maps, charts and infographics to

Use of ICTs

present the data in a way that helps audiences can understand how
complex issues relate to their own lives.
The Data journalism training uses data to give depth and integrity to
mainstream reporting.

Outcome

Internews in Kenya “have done very, very well in terms of introducing
new technologies” into media development projects according to
Internews Kenya Country Director Ida Jooste.
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Summary:
Internews Kenya had identified how local journalists were not making use of data that
had been recently made available by the Kenyan government. At the same time,
traditional journalists were finding it difficult to differentiate themselves from citizen
journalists. Director of Internews in Kenya, Ida Jooste, explained the rationale for
data journalism training:
Journalism has to offer something deeper, something different, something more
comprehensive, but the story has to be different for me as a traditional news consumer
to be interested in it…. If you just have lots of statistics and graphs and so on, nobody
would be drawn into the story, so you mustn’t forget the human element. We are
helping to produce a combination of evidence but also kind of how real human beings
are affected by government inattention or corruption or whatever the case might be
(Jooste, 2014, in interview).

Internews trained journalists in skills for high-impact data journalism - how to
interpret and integrate data into their stories. They provided capacity building for
these journalists through activities such as developing new tools to help journalists
report on health topics. They created a project website, called the “Data Dredger”,
which includes datasets to explore, tutorials on data journalism tools, free
visualisations for the trainee to investigate and publish at their own outlet and
inspiring examples of data journalism from across the world.
Using this newly available data to its full potential, journalists can create “stories via
investigative reporting and powerful interactive graphics that explain the reasons
behind and explore the solutions to some of Kenya's greatest societal, economic and
governance challenges” (“Internews Data Dredger,” n.d.) .
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Internews focused also on data literacy and digital training in the program. “We
thought that that this would be a way for journalism to give something different and
that for us as media developments players would be one of the ways we would remain
relevant. The media gets to produce and offer its audience something that citizens
don’t produce” (Jooste, 2014, in interview).
Data Journalism is a notable example of how digital tools and ICTs are being fused
with journalism in a successful manner in the region. Country Director Jooste claims
that “Internews was really pivotal in terms of helping journalists with this data”
(Jooste, 2014, in interview).

TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL - Action for Transparency
Another project which was raised in the interviews is ‘Action for Transparency’
(A4T), a project funded by the Swedish authority for development cooperation
(SIDA) and managed by Transparency International in Kenya. The overall objective
of this project is to contribute to strengthened democratic accountability and
transparency in Kenya through citizen monitoring of government expenditure.
The project aims to fight corruption and mismanagement of government funds in
Kenya and focuses on funds disbursed by the Government for the provision of Free
Primary Education (FPE). The aim is to uncover suspected corruption and
mismanagement of these public funds. Kenyans want to know “whether local
government funding is getting to the target” stressed Robert Munuku, Project Manager
in Kenya (Munuku, in interview, 2015)61.

61 Robert Munuku, Action for Transparency, in interview with author, Feb 2015 Nairobi
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The Action for Transparency project uses a combination of ICTs and traditional media
and comprises three phases of interventions designed to “catalyse a culture of
accountability and transparency through a ripple out effect” (Munuku, in interview,
2014).
Table 11. Transparency International
Organisation
Name
Who was
interviewed
Project Title
Problem
Identified

TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL
Robert Munuku Project Manager Kenya
Action for Transparency (A4T)


Government Corruption



Mismanagement of Funds

Citizens report inconsistencies they notice in government spending
directly to a project website via an App.

Methods

Training for up to 4,000 journalists, civil society representatives and
public sector employees on how to access, analyse and communicate
information on government spending.
A public awareness campaign to raise awareness of the new ICT tools.
Development of ICT tools, including the online application (app) which

Use of ICTs

enables users to compare the amount of government money pledged to
specific schools and health clinics against their own observations of
what appears to have been spent.
“Reported cases arising from the increase in awareness and reporting
have been forwarded to the relevant authorities for appropriate action.
Cases from both the education and health sectors have been discussed

Outcome

with the County leadership with a commitment given for follow-up and
redress” (Transparency International, 2018).Project Manager Munuku
claims “the App, the Facebook site and the websites connected to it are
providing a digital space for debates about corruption and misuse of tax
payers' money”.
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Summary
The Action for Transparency project seeks to tackle Government corruption and
mismanagement of Funds by giving people in Kenya and Tanzania the training and
tools to identify and report any potential misallocations of government spending,
using an App as its central focus.
End users report any suspected corruption directly into their mobile phone with the
bespoke App. The report is published immediately on the Action for Transparency
(A4T) website and on Facebook. If they don't have access to the internet, it is also
possible to report using SMS or calling a hotline number.
Project Manager Munuku describes the process: “You may find that the amount
pledged for your school does not match with reality. For instance, there may only one
teacher even though the Government says it is funding five teachers? Are there no
schoolbooks even though the government has budgeted for one book for each pupil?”
(Munuku, 2015, in interview). They have produced a tool so that citizens can report
this mismanagement.
The concept is that by exposing which institutions and individuals are involved in
corruption and providing the data to journalists and activist groups it intends to make
corruption less attractive.
One learning outcome for the team what that they could not solely rely on the
technical aspect of the programme. A critical element of the project was getting
people involved in the reporting process and a central part of the initial plan was an
App. Munuku says “it worked in Zambia, it worked in Tanzania. So, we asked ‘Can
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this app work here [in Kenya]? However, after doing a lot of research and
understanding the local dynamics, we realised “we don't just launch an app and expect
people to just report” (Munuku, in interview, 2015).
As a result, they had to make training and outreach a much larger part of the project
than in the other countries where they rolled out the same project. “We didn't want it
to be is an app-centred project. The app is just one element of the project” (Munuku,
2015, in interview). The A4T team concluded that an integral part of the project in
Kenya should be offline community-based elements and training for journalists. The
training focused on empowering journalists with skills to investigate reported cases of
suspected corruption or mismanagement of public funds and to analyse
financial/budgetary information to reveal gaps affecting the health and education
sectors.
Action for Transparency is a noteworthy example of a project using technology
combined with training journalists for transparency and accountability goals.

These three projects – UNESCO, A4T and Internews - illustrate the use of ICTs
integrated into media training work. Despite the use of newer and digital technologies
by the projects profiled above, they are often combined with traditional media, such as
radio or newpapers, in the mix.
While the projects above do employ new technologies to some extent, there is still a
number of organisations in the sample for this research who remain committed to
traditional media assistance methods in their projects. The next section focuses on
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these organisations who remain committed to traditional media in the context of media
development projects.
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B. Traditional capacity building projects

TANZANIAN MEDIA FUND
The Tanzania Media Fund (TMF) is a media sector support initiative funded by Swiss
Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), UK’s Department for International
Development (DFID), Irish Aid and The Royal Danish Embassy.

The Tanzania

Media Fund was launched in 2008 to contribute to greater domestic accountability in
Tanzania through a programme of grants and capacity building to the media.
Table 12. Tanzania Media Fund
Organisation
Name
Who was
interviewed
Project Title

TANZANIA MEDIA FUND
Ernest Sungura, Director
Grant Making Organisation


Greater accountability needed in Tanzania



Media should be upskilled to better inform citizens and to raise

Problem(s)
Identified

awareness about the responsibilities of local government and the
role that communities can play in holding their government
accountable.


Methods

Use of ICTs

Support public interest and investigative stories linked to domestic
accountability, with special attention for rural stories



Traditional journalism training



Ongoing grants and capacity building to the media.
 Very limited

“TMF has made impressive achievements in terms of number of
Outcome

individual journalists and media institutions it has reached out to, and in
the evident improvements in public interest and investigative
journalism it has sponsored and mentored” (Adams, 2014)62.

62 External Review of TMF by Gordon Adam of iMedia Associates Limited, November 2014
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Summary
According to project donor DFID, journalism standards in Tanzania has been made
worse by the deregulation of the media, the move to digital, and the growing
popularity of social media, “all of which amounts to a revolution in the media
landscape. Inevitably this rapid expansion has resulted in inexperienced staff with
little or no journalism training often being hired” (“DFID Project Completion Review:
Tanzanian Media Fund,” 2015).
As a result, there is a need for skilled, sustainable, professional media in Tanzania
better equipped to hold powerful people to account. TMF provides grants for training
and investigative reporting.
As an example of one successful project which received support from TMF is Mbeya
Highlands FM, a regional radio station. In this case, the radio station had noticed that
many of the concerns of their listeners related to a lack of access to safe water and
sanitation. With a grant from Tanzania Media Fund, a team of young journalists
travelled around three districts in the region “to see the challenges for themselves and
investigate the causes” (Sungura, 2014, in interview).
The journalists broadcast live shows featuring debates between community members
and local authorities, sharing information from their investigations on local water
plans and budgets. Sungura claims “these debates were very popular and led to
greater demand from citizens and greater response from local authorities. Water
pumps were fixed, pipes were replaced, new wells were built and new governing
boards for water were installed” (Sungura, 2014, in interview).
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Sungura believes that it is this type of media support that is needed in this region, not
innovation. Similar grants have led to more relevant issues being raised in the local
communities. Sungura confirms their media sector support work is “very traditional”
(Sungura, 2014, in interview) 63.
With regards to digital technologies in their work, in 2012 the TMF initiated the New
Media grant for individual journalists. TMF quickly came to realise that finding
quality candidates and suitable mentors for this grant was challenging. Sungura admits
that “no-one applied”. The challenges were that “some [applicants] never met quality
criteria, and some had problems with technology”. He adds “we want to use
technology going forward but we are struggling also” (Sungura, 2014, in interview).
TMF also note that experienced digital media organisations, such as Jamii Forums in
Tanzania, require help with marketing, management and governance issues rather than
the online outputs. These organisations are already skilled in the technology elements.
TMF illustrate the continued need for capacity building and support for investigative
journalism skills in Tanzania. Director Sungura attests to limited success with new
technologies but the donors view is that media should become more interactive in
future. An evaluation report from the largest donor DFID noted that future support
should focus on “supporting dialogic formats and interactivity through social media
and mobile telephony” (“DFID Project Completion Review: Tanzanian Media Fund,”
2015)
However, Sungura argues “the TMF are not seeing more accountability with new
technology” (Sungura, 2014, in interview).

63 Ernest Sunguru, Tanzania Media Fund, in interview with author, May 2015
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HIVOS
HIVOS (Humanist Institute for Cooperation) is another organisation based in Kenya
which focuses on capacity building and strengthening the existing media landscape.
HIVOS is a Dutch NGO and implements a project called the Kenya Media
Programme (KMP). This is a media support project that issues grants to both
individuals and institutions. It gives funding for investigative journalism and media
capacity support for strengthening media.
Table 13. Hivos
Organisation
Name
Who was
interviewed
Project Title
Problem(s)
Identified

Methods

HIVOS
Antony Wafula, Program Manager
Kenya Media Program


Improve the quality of journalism in Kenya



Contribute to a responsive, representative and accountable
government through citizen engagement.



Development of local content



Media accountability



Institutional development for media organisations



Safety and Protection of journalists



Media policy and legislation



Grants for journalism focusing on high impact stories



Institutional and individual grants to develop local content

 Very Limited.
Use of ICTs

 Some projects such as Kenya Community Radio Network include
training for journalists relating to engagement with social media
platforms.
An evaluation of the project acknowledged: “As few media houses are

Outcome

willing to finance a journalist to carry out the simplest of stories in Kenya,
KMP is greatly beneficial as it gives the much-needed funds to do the
stories” (Mogambi and Oyugi, 2015).
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Summary
KMP make financial resources available for selected media-related institutions,
development organisations, training institutes, policy and research initiatives, media
houses and journalists. They invest in relatively traditional structural support for the
media sector because they discovered that Kenyan media houses are “so weak”.
In the Kenyan media, “the public interest is not represented so to speak… There is a
question about the depth and analysis of reporting we are offering the public”
(Programme Director, Wafula, in interview, 2014)64.
As noted in Chapter 5, with the recent government devolution, Kenya now has 47
county governments. There is a need to build the capacity of journalists at county
levels to tell stories that would help citizens hold their leaders to account.
An obstacle for producing investigative stories is the capacity and funds to produce
the stories. KMP have focused therefore on financial support for investigative stories
that will contribute to accountability and transparency. KMP also run a mentorship
programme. The need for mentors became apparent when KMP realised that most of
the individual grantees required editorial support to help improve on their story ideas.
Programme Director Anthony Wafula at HIVOS says their limited use of ICTs is
because they believe “focusing on new media technologies is hype…..We try as much
as possible to speak of e-government but the take-up is extremely slow”. Wafula
argues that for the wider population “mobile phone use is debatable in terms of better
access to information. We have people for whom even sending a text message is a
problem” (Wafula, 2014, in interview).

64 Anthony Wafula, HIVOS, in interview with author May 2014
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AFRICAN MEDIA INITIATIVE
Another organisation which focuses particularly on capacity building in the region is
the African Media Initiative (AMI), a pan-African organisation based in Kenya. The
objectives of the AMI are to “strengthen the continent’s private and independent
media sector to promote democratic governance, social development and economic
growth”.65
Table 14. African Media Initiative
Organisation
Name
Who was
interviewed
Project Title
Problem(s)
Identified

African Media Initiative
Eric Chinje CEO
Ongoing capacity building
 Expanding access to finance and new revenue streams for media orgs
 Building a leadership cadre in the media sector with a commitment to
improved ethics and management.
 Content development for African media outlets, by African journalists.
 Focus on journalism specialisation within industries; to develop
journalism networks around important sectors of the economy, such as
finance and agriculture and networks of skilled reporters capable of
writing substantively on these issues.

Methods

 AMI develops training packages for journalists and brings together
needed expertise from the mentioned sectors.
 Created with the input of relevant partners in various industries including
Agriculture, Health, Education, Energy, Maritime Economy,
Telecommunications, and Governance.

Use of ICTs
Outcome

 Uses mainly traditional media development methods including capacity
building workshops for journalists
AMI has established networks for journalists on the African continent.

65 www.Africanmediainitiative.org
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Summary
The African Media Initiative promotes the development of pluralistic media as a
necessary ingredient of democratic governance, as well as economic and human
development in Africa. They note that “lack of ethics and leadership has curtailed the
development of a free and independent African media landscape”.
CEO Eric Chinje says their objective is “improved media performance across the
continent, that would contribute to an improved social dialogue and political dialogue
and economic dialogue on the continent” (Chinje, 2015, in interview) 66.
The AMI works with strategic partners in each sector of the regional economy to build
a ‘critical mass’ of media specialists on the issues that drive economic growth in
Africa. Chinje hopes “if you have a few journalists doing good stories in the sector
and that begins to drive advertisements, you’ll see a natural movement of media
content into that sector” (Chinje, 2015, in interview).
Research by AMI found important knowledge and skills gap among media houses
when it comes to understanding the business and financial worlds. To address this,
AMI developed a series of workshops on ‘Financial Proficiency for Media
Executives’ (funded by the African Development Bank (AfDB).
An additional example of a successful project was called ‘Encouraging the Media in
Kenya to Adopt a Pro Health Agenda: The Treatment and Coverage of Tobacco
Related Stories’. This project provided specialised training for the media community
to improve tobacco control coverage in the media in Kenya. The project built the
awareness and reporting skills of journalists on the issue of tobacco control and

66 Eric Chinje, African Media Initiative, in interview with author Feb 2015
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engaged media leaders and editors in chief to treat tobacco control stories as
newsworthy.
AMI media programmes do not necessarily put new or digital media at its centre.
Director Eric Chinje confirmed “we are training journalists but not necessarily from
new media”.

Discussion
The above three organisations – TMF, AMI, HIVOS - focus on supporting
independent media and training journalists and working with partner organisations for
capacity building within the media sector. They confirmed limited use of digital
technologies or ICTs in their work. This suggests that these newer technologies have
little role to play in established media assistance methods, such as journalism training
and editorial training, to strengthen the media sector in the region.
One possible reason is that the identified weaknesses in the media systems of these
countries are in areas not obviously related to digital innovation. As noted in the
Country Findings chapter, the problems in the media systems of Kenya and Tanzania
are particularly related to corruption, political control and concentration of media
ownership, lack of professionalism and resources, and safety of journalists.
Despite the development sectors enthusiasm for technology and innovation,
recommendations for media sustainability on the continent are told to focus on areas
of corruption, culture and business management in the media sector, not areas
necessarily related to technology (Susman-Peña, 2012).
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As remarked by Ernest Sungura from the Tanzania Media Fund, the innovative and
popular website Jammii Forums in Tanzania does not need training in technical skills
but skills in management and financial planning.
Another reason to acknowledge is that radio has the highest penetration in Africa: 77
per cent report listening to radio news at least a few times a month or more (Mitullah
and Kamau, 2013). It is the dominant mass-medium in Africa because of its relatively
low operational cost, its accessibility to illiterate populations and the continuity of the
prevalent oral tradition of most African countries (Mwesige, 2004; Myers, 2008).
So, when trying to reach or connect with audiences’ right across these countries, it
makes sense to focus on journalists working with this medium.

C. Hybrid projects: Capacity Building with Content Creation

BBC MEDIA ACTION
As noted, the data revealed that there is a category of media assistance intervention
captured by the notion of ‘media development hybrid’ and these shall be presented
here.
BBC Media Action is one of the largest and best-known of the media development
NGOs that implement projects on behalf of international donors. Funded
independently, it works in partnership with local media and development partners in
over 35 developing and countries around the world. Country Director, Colin
Spurway, discussed their principal project in Tanzania and Project Director Jackie
Davis in Kenya discussed her principal project
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Table 15. BBC Media Action Tanzania.

Organisation
Name
Who was
interviewed
Project Title

BBC Media Action Tanzania
Colin Spurway Country Director
1. Haba na Haba (Little by Little): A national radio magazine
programme
The donor, DFID UK, stated objectives in Tanzania were to improve
Tanzanians’ knowledge of key governance issues, “including their
rights and responsibilities, and the country’s political processes”.

Problem(s)
Identified

Additional objectives were “to create a national conversation which
results in Tanzanians feeling confident to freely express their views
about issues that matter to them and confident that these views are
being heard and responded to by their leaders” (Bangapi et al.,
2017:10).
 Content Production and Capacity building:
 Providing capacity strengthening to participating stations
 Supporting local partner radio stations to produce their own
local governance programmes
 This training aimed to equip station managers with the skills to

Methods

help their stations become more financially sustainable.
 Assisting those stations in delivering outreach activities, such
as community debates and Open Days
 Mentors spent time in local radio stations to help them produce
programmes around governance.
Limited use of digital technologies.

Use of ICTs

A Facebook page was established for the project and the radio show
also had a Facebook page. These were “add-ons” rather than central to
the project (Spurway, in interview, 2014).
According to the BBC, Haba na Haba, reached 7.2m listeners across
Tanzania, tackling a wide range of topics - from corruption in the

Outcome

judiciary to the circulation of fake anti-malarial drugs.
Since 2013, over 300 journalists have been trained.
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Summary
The goal of the Haba Na Haba project was to “build Tanzanians’ knowledge of
governance issues and confidence in their ability to hold leaders to account, to
encourage dialogue on national and local issues, and encourage greater political
participation” (Bangapi et al., 2017:6).
The radio programme aimed to explain government structure, systems and services, to
provide a platform for discussion and help people get involved in how the country is
run.
BBC Media Action worked on the capacity of local radio station partners and
journalists to produce programmes about local governance issues. The Haba na Haba
radio show takes a ‘topic of the week’, like obesity or access to clean drinking water,
or a range of current affairs issues, and then puts them together in a radio magazine
format “to interrogate and look into and ask government what their role is and what
they’re doing about something” (Spurway, in interview, 2015).
Outreach activities included Radio Open Days and Community Debates. The open
days took place once a year at BBC Media Action’s partner radio stations and aimed
to bring local radio and local government closer together in order to build
better relationships, and improve the flow of information between leaders, citizens and
local media and to progress government accountability.
The community debates took the format of town hall meetings, bringing citizens and
government officials together to discuss important issues in local communities.
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Spurway claims “it has been great in terms of leading to changes in local
communities” (Spurway, 2014, in interview).
The BBC Media Action projects in Tanzania use mostly traditional media assistance
methods, for the objectives of informing and educating Tanzanian citizens about
governance issues. They are not necessarily using ICTs or newer digital technologies;
instead they are undertaking radio programming hand in hand with traditional capacity
training.
Country Director Colin Spurway explained the reason why they continue to use these
methods. In Tanzania, mobile phones use is now near full penetration, but Spurway
argues how “they are very simple mobiles, people with very limited knowledge,
limited literacy, and a huge range of challenges of how you use it” (Spurway, 2015, in
interview).
Spurway says that many of their audience cannot find an address book in their phone,
or “the vast majority have never sent or received a text”. And so, “it is about
understanding their limitations” (Spurway, 2015, in interview). Thus, working out the
right platform is vital.
With regards to achieving donor objectives he reasons “we have to start off by
defining what the change is that is needed in the project? Then who the audience is?
Then, how do you reach that particular group of people?”. That is how to determine
the particular approach or intervention.
Spurway reasoned “there’s certainly a tendency when working with young people and
when there is pressure to innovate to say, well in that case, let’s use Facebook. But
you’ve got to know who accesses it and in what way. If you want to reach urban
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males, yes, Facebook is a great idea but not if you’re talking about adolescent girls in
villages and farms” (Spurway, in interview).
In these projects BBC Media Action has specific objectives, in that often they are
trying to reach the rural poor in this region, or bring them into a wider national
discussion, or support media relevant to them in their locale.
With these issues in mind, Spurway argues that using digital technologies in media
development projects can be “technically massively complicated and potentially
extremely expensive”. In contrast, with radio you can “reach three million people by
radio by just beaming it out”. Therefore, BBC MA still favour traditional media to
connect with these target groups.
BBC Media Action also undertakes projects in Kenya, outlined below.
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Table. 16. BBC Media Action Kenya

Organisation
Name
Who was
interviewed
Project Title

BBC Media Action Kenya
Jackie Davies
Sema Kenya


The need for greater public understanding of constitutional and
electoral reform and devolution,

Problem(s)



Addressing persistent challenges to corruption and impunity



Build trust in Kenya’s democratic processes by giving people

Identified

trustworthy information and improving their knowledge of
governance related issues


Provide a platform for people in Kenya to ask their leaders about
issues that affect them.



The project produced a weekly TV and radio national discussion
programme, a low-tech, ‘Question Time’-style debate show.



Brought Kenyan citizens face to face with their leaders, some of
them whom they had never even seen before. In this environment,

Methods

they could ask questions and demand accountability.


Featured a moderated discussion between a live panel of officials
and an audience of Kenyans.



Themes included: youth participation in political processes,
corruption, ethnicity, young women in leadership & youth violence.

Use of ICTs



Limited use of digital technologies.



There was a Facebook page for the show through which there was
some feedback and interaction with audiences.

People who regularly watched or listened to Sema Kenya reported
greater knowledge of key governance issues than those who did not
Outcome

watch or listen to the programme (Sema Kenya: Can a debate
programme increase people’s knowledge of democratic processes?
2015).
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Summary
The primary BBC Media Action project in Kenya was the radio debate show called
Sema Kenya. The objective was to contribute to a “genuine, credible election in 2013
and to mitigating against a repeat of the electoral violence seen in 2007” (Buckell and
Baskett, 2017:10).
The project activities were centred around the donors (DFID) goals at country level
which were: “to contribute to rebuilding trust in the democratic process in Kenya by
creating a national and inclusive conversation and debate and to encourage dialogue as
a means of settling conflicts within and among communities” (Buckell and Baskett,
2017).
The show was designed to enable individuals, communities and governments to be
better informed and more engaged in tackling governance challenges (Buckell and
Baskett, 2017). BBC MA worked to strengthen the capacity of Kenya’s media sector
to produce this governance programming.
Project Director Jackie Davies testified that they choose appropriate media and project
design to address donor objectives based on lots of sound research. Davies confirmed
that “it was probably the most researched program of its kind in Kenya” (Davis, 2015,
in interview)67.
The project team tried to ensure that Sema Kenya represented constructive, audiencedriven debate, particularly when covering sensitive issues. The radio shows were
focused not only on discussion but following up on accountability with those in

67 Jackie Davies, BBC Media Action Kenya, in interview with author Feb 2015
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power. An important element of the success of the show was that the presenters knew
that part of their role was to drive that accountability from politicians on the show.
For instance, Davies claims “If an MP or a governor or a senator says, “I'm going to
build the road, I’m going to fix that road,” then the presenter would ask, ‘Okay what's
the time frame, when is it going to start? When can people expect to see it?’ “We
didn’t allow people to just come on and make statements without follow-up” (Davies,
2015, in interview).
BBC MA delivered a mentoring programme, initially with six local radio stations, and
later with the national broadcaster Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC). The
mentors worked closely with the local radio partners to improve editorial processes,
journalistic and production skills (such as interviewing and source-checking) and
management skills (such as news-room management, programme scheduling and staff
development).
The capacity strengthening programme with KBC included: editorial training; training
in audience research and engagement; graphics; engineering support; production
training as well as production and editorial support on-air. For KBC, the partnership
with BBC Media Action resulted in the launch of a new governance programme
modelled on Sema Kenya, called Beyond the Headlines.
Management at KBC reported that Beyond the Headlines “provides a new benchmark
by which all other KBC productions are produced and that they hope to instill the
same ethos, procedures and practices across the organisation going forward” (Buckell
and Baskett, 2017:7).
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This project had limited use of digital technologies. Davies explained “even though a
lot of people are using their mobile phones to access radio content, [our project] is still
using the traditional methods. It is still what we perceive to be appropriate,
particularly in the areas we’re trying to reach - which are media dark areas”68 (Davies,
in interview, 2015). She maintains “radio is still the most effective medium to
communicate with target groups that we are after” (ibid).
Both of these BBC Media Action projects did employ digital technologies, but to a
limited extent. Spurway from the BBC Tanzania projects confirmed that both of their
radio programme projects had related social media websites, but that they were just
“future-proofing” or “add-ons” (Spurway, 2015).
Davies argues “social media is great, and this innovative ICT approach is very good,
but I still believe that old media drives new media” (Davies, 2015, in interview).
Both these BBC Media Action projects in Kenya and Tanzania demonstrate how the
organisation uses a mix of traditional media development methods and media for
development approaches to achieve donor goals related to governance and
accountability.

68 These are areas that are not reachable at all through media such as newspapers or TV.
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FARM Radio
A second organisation in the interview sample whose interventions could be termed
‘media development hybrid’ is Farm Radio International. FARM Radio is a Canadian
NGO working with radio partners in 38 African countries to fight poverty and food
insecurity.
A large part of the work of FARM Radio is training broadcasters, including direct instation training, distance education and workshops to help them produce a higher
standard of radio services. FARM Radio undertakes projects in both Kenya and
Tanzania.

Table 17. FARM Radio
Organisation
FARM Radio International
Name
Who was
Bart Sullivan, Head of ICT
interviewed
In Tanzania, FARM Radio is implementing radio campaigns on foodsecurity topics of nutrition, climate-smart farming techniques and womenProject Title

friendly market/food processing ideas.
In Kenya, Farm Radio runs radio campaigns promoting girls’ education in
the Somali refugee camps of Dadaab (Northern Kenya).
In Kenya the goal is to provide useful information on low cost methods to

Problem(s)
Identified

improve food security in rural households.
In Tanzania, the goal is to improve attitudes about the importance of sending
Somali girls to school instead of keeping them at home.
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Project objectives are being addressed with radio campaigns (3.5 months
each) with 30-minute weekly shows.


Methods

FARM Radio develops radio scripts, information packages, an electronic
news service and shares them with local broadcasters.



The broadcasters, in turn, use these resources to research, produce and
present relevant programmes for their audience of farmers



Training of local radio journalists

o

FARM Radio have successfully used various mobile channels and
technology applications in their projects.

Use of ICTs

o

Each radio show features interactive windows in which listeners can
participate with the questions of the week via their mobile phones.

o

In Kenya they use radio combined with mobile SMS and Interactive
Voice Radio (IVR) polls.

Outcome



“Digital technologies are absolutely essential pieces to making radio
more interactive in these projects” (Sullivan, 2015, in email).

Summary
FARM Radio training is targeted toward the practical needs of broadcasters. FARM
Radio measure the quality of local broadcasters’ radio services and help them take
steps to improve them, by appraising their programmes.
Digital technologies are central to these projects. Head of ICT for FARM Radio, Bart
Sullivan, says “it is often overwhelming how many people want to participate. By
using these mobile technologies more people can participate and have their vote
counted or their voice heard” (Sullivan, 2015, in email).
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Sullivan confirmed that that they have had “lots of steady participation and the
midterm evaluations are excellent… Many people in Tanzania have started to change
their practice around food/ farming and in Kenya, adults and shifting some of their
views around girls education” (Sullivan, 2015, in email).
Sullivan concedes that there are additional hurdles to using ICTs in these projects:
Cost and ease of use are the two main obstacles. Sullivan says they “currently try and
bear the costs for expensive services like sending audio messages as we work with the
poorest farmers. But in general, it is important to try and keep costs down” (Sullivan,
2015, in email).
He noted that it is important to remember the “technical abilities of the majority of
listeners, their budgets and their limitations in terms of electricity and equipment”
(Sullivan, 2015, in email). “It’s also important to make it easy to interact - many
listeners have a very basic technological capacity - if they are doubtful of their ability
- they won’t try it” (Sullivan, 2015, in email).

Discussion
The projects in this section – BBC Media Action and FARM Radio - demonstrated
having elements of media for development (M4D) - a focus on content - informing the
public about health, governance or food security issues through radio programmes but they also provide support to the media sector in additional ways: media training,
journalism training, creation of new sources of news. This ‘media development
hybrid’ contributes to ‘media for development’ objectives but also ‘media
development’ goals such as structural support for media sector.
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These projects are creating content that is needed by audiences in these countries, but
they also address weaknesses within the Kenyan and Tanzanian media systems. In
particular they address the lack of local media content, lack of quality reporting and
dialogue on important governance issues and the lack of capacity in local media to
address the information needs of rural populations.
These projects have furthermore developed platforms for discussion and debate, for
educating citizens about their rights or about elections, and have provided forums for
holding government representatives to account. As noted in the Country Case Study
chapter, these are particular weaknesses in the media systems of Kenya and Tanzania
when it comes to local rural populations.

D. Projects to strengthen the public sphere & create platforms for
dialogue
This research found that much effort is focused on accountability and governance
issues in the region. As noted, whilst some organisations fulfil the objectives of
strengthening the capacity, and providing support to, the media sector, other
organisations that took part in the interviews focused more on providing platforms for
public engagement and discussion. This contributes towards goals of bolstering the
public sphere and enabling wider groups in society participate in the governance of
their country. Platforms for national dialogue can also potentially contribute to
reducing to cross-ethnic conflict, which is a threat in the region.
As noted in the Media Development Theory of Change in Chapter 1 (Figure 2), media
assistance projects operate consecutively at different levels of a media system addressing the needs of audiences, practitioners and the sector. This section focuses on
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organisations which focus on strengthening the public sphere – providing fora for
dialogue and debate in society.

FEMINA HIP
Funded by the Swedish development agency SIDA and Irish Aid, Femina Hip focuses
mainly on engaging with youth in Tanzania. They produce a range of media, including
a widely distributed magazine, FEMA and two TV shows that target Tanzanian youth
to “promote healthy lifestyles and financial literacy”69 .
FeminiHip endeavours to educate their youthful audience through their media
products and work to motivate Tanzanian youth. Youth are key to the development of
Tanzanian society, as 66 per cent of the Tanzanian population is below the age of 25
and 23 per cent of the population are adolescents (Chipeta et al., 2013). The
government is making great efforts to get all young people to complete primary
school, but the proportion who drop out is high and many young people find it hard to
find employment. They are also a group that is frequently marginalised.

69 www.feminahip.tz
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Table 18. Femina Hip

Organisation
Name
Who was
interviewed
Project Title

Femina Hip
Kris Kapella,
FEMA Magazine
 Work towards an “empowered society that fosters democratic

Problem(s)
Identified

values, critical thinking and positive attitudes” (Chipeta et al.,
2013).
 To create dialogue amongst Tanzanian youth.
 Communicates and connects with youth through its multimedia
products as well as through face-to-face activities and outreach
interventions.
 Activities are designed to connect youth to each other and to

Methods

Femina Hip: to stimulate conversations and reflection; and to offer
an opportunity to speak up, share and express concerns70.
 Aims to foster democratic principles by encouraging volunteering,
working together, taking action, and demanding rights.
They have established websites related to their media products and an
interactive SMS platform. However, the website is not central to their

Use of ICTs

work and the SMS platform is expensive to run. “It can be expensive.
An individual SMS is quite cheap but when you talking about sending
SMS to 50,000 people… Cost is a big issue” (Kapella, in interview).
42 per cent of Tanzania's population were familiar with FEMINA HIP's
products. Each week, 2.8 million people read the newspaper Fema,
making it the most widely read in the country.

Outcome

An evaluation report by funder SIDA found: “Femina has been
effective, not only with regard to reaching youth with information, but
also in creating a dialogue with young people regarding issues of
concern” (Chipeta et al., 2013).

70 FeminaHip Annual Report 2017
http://www.feminahip.or.tz/fileadmin/03_downloads/01_reports/FeminaAnnual_report_2017.pdf
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Summary:
The Fema Magazine has been produced and printed quarterly for 20 years in
Tanzania. It has one of the largest print runs and is one of the most popular and wellknown magazines in the country. It is distributed to both secondary schools, colleges,
local government and civil society partners across Tanzania. The magazine content
includes sections on all of Femina Hip’s strategic agendas: Sexual and Reproductive
Health and Rights, Economic Empowerment, Citizen Engagement and connecting
youth.
With their print magazine FeminaHip reach every district of the country. Kapella says
“I don’t think there’s any district that we don’t reach. When it comes to print, we
reach more people than even the newspapers, they are again very limited to urban
parts of the country” (Kapella, 2014, in interview). This is no small achievement as
many rural areas in Tanzania are almost inaccessible by road.
Editorial collection is highly participatory and approximately 100 youth from ‘Fema
youth Clubs’ engage in Youth Reporting so they contribute to the content with their
own letters and stories. According to the organisation, the success of the magazine is
largely due to its community-based editorial collection process. For every issue,
editors travel to rural communities with a digital camera and document the real-life
stories and views of ordinary people.
Kapella argues that “the magazine is actually what makes us the most innovative in a
sense. We’re doing something that’s been around for ages and ages and it actually
really separates us because we can reach basically almost anyone in this country
which no other type of media can do” (Kapella, 2015, in interview).
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The Fema TV Show has been on air since 2003, highlighting different themes and
campaigns each season. Each episode features young people, experts, celebrities and
politicians discussing critical issues relating to youth lifestyles. Each show highlights
youth stories and testimonials and incorporates comic elements to reinforce the
messages and recorded 'on the road' in different locations across Tanzania.
Femina Hip say that their change programs create opportunities and platforms for
people to “actively participate in a process of dialogue, reflection, negotiation and
mobilisation. We build our work around creating intention and motivation to act”
(FeminaHip Annual Report, 2016).
FeminaHip aim “to reinforce the notion that people must take ownership of and act as
agents in their own change processes”. A key part of its approach is “Edutainment”,
entertaining and at the same time educating through their media products.
The organisation is an example of continued use of a traditional media as their main
focus, which has widespread reach throughout Tanzania to engage youthful
populations and work for social change. Their magazine and outreach activities
provide spaces for dialogue, discussion and education which can empower youthful
audiences.

WELL TOLD STORY
Another participant organisation in the research and whose goals focus on engaging
with youth is Kenyan media research and production organisation ‘Well Told Story’
(WTS). Their work aims to contribute to social change and youth empowerment and
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can also be termed “communication for social change”. Their projects provide
platforms for discussion and engagement on important issues.

Table 19. Well Told Story

Organisation
Name
Who was
interviewed
Project Title
Problem(s)
Identified

WELL TOLD STORY
Rob Burnett CEO
Shuujaaz
To encourage ‘youth discourse on governance, participation, &
transparency’ & engage young people in national conversation about
issues that affect them.
WTS use different communications platforms: monthly comic books,

Methods

daily syndicated radio shows, SMS, video, national TV. The projects
also include offline engagement with local government officials.
WTS are innovative in their use of technology. WTS employ many
media in the projects- video, radio, television, comic books, SMS,
Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram and music festivals - “which are
basically experiential media” - to achieve projects objectives.

Use of ICTs

Burnet says “we’re interested in our audience making the content, not
us”. For example, in 2014, WTS made a TV series, and they asked
their audience to make the other half of the series with their mobile
phones, and submit their video on WhatsApp. Burnet claims that
“mobile phones have changed the way people relate to one another;
they’ve turned ordinary people into media makers”.

Outcome

Their media that has reached more than 69 per cent of Kenyans aged 15
‐24 and they have won two International Emmy Awards.71

71 The main character that Well Told Story focus their stories around is a 19 yr-old Boyie, who left
school in 2009 but could not afford to go to college and remains job-less. The show reaches out to
Kenyan youth with practical ideas they can use toimprove their lives. He communicates to his listeners
in Sheng and asks them to send him text messages with ideas on making money and better living. He in
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Summary
Well Told Story endeavour to engage youth in order to achieve social and behaviour
change (Dr Christopher Beaudoin, 2016). CEO Rob Burnet says “we are focused on
how to make young people feel as if they have the power, they have the agency to
make change happen” (Burnet, 2015, in interview) 72
They have developed a platform, centred on a comic-book character called Shujaaz,
which engages youth in Kenya on important issues and provides a platform for public
discussions. Burnett claims “the combination of the comic books, syndicated FM
radio, SMS, social media, web and video animation is engaging 5 million youth every
month in a huge public conversation; to help change the way people live, think, act
and govern in Kenya,” (Burnett, in interview, 2015).
The projects are very often targeting 15-24 year olds in their projects, who are “the
right audience for innovation”. Burnet concedes that if they were designing media for
a forty to fifty-year-old audience, they would take quite a different approach. Burnett
confirms that “different media have different jobs to do” (Burnett, 2015, in interview).
Burnett maintains “for a lot of people in Africa, an exciting comic book is cuttingedge ICT. So, most of our projects combine multiple media, all the time” (Burnet,
2015, in interview).
Well Told Story and Shuujaz have become an established trusted media platform that
uses youth-friendly approaches to stimulate engagement with the population. For
Well Told Story, much of their project work is communication for development,
turn shares those ideas with youth around the country through his radio programmeme. These ideas
then form the content of the daily Shujaaz FM radios show and are the stories in the monthly comic
books, and the topics discussed on DJB’s Facebook page.
72 Rob Burnet, Well Told Story, in skype interview with the author, March 2015
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engaging with citizens and youth, and Well Told Story does not focus on capacity
building the media sector in any way. Like FeminaHip, they provide a platform for
engagement and discussion on important issues for local populations. Their projects
show positive results with an increase in volume of conversations about agriculture
and shifting attitudes.

TWAWEZA
Table 20. Twaweza

Organisation
Name
Who was
interviewed
Project Title
Problem(s)
Identified

TWAWEZA
Kees De Graaf – Head of ICTs
1. Makatuno Junction
Citizen Engagement and Government Accountability:
Production of a Kenyan soap opera that premiered in 2007. The story is
set in a fictional village named Makutano and has a cast of different
Kenyan actors. It captures different themes that affect local society such
as corruption, education, early marriages.
Throughout episodes, Makutano Junction communicates the idea that
ordinary citizens can make change happen, by solving problems and

Methods

pressuring government and public institutions to act.
The goal is that by watching the show citizens will be provoked to discuss
solutions to problems in education, health and water and take action for
the better.
Where public authorities are not doing the right things, informed citizens
are encouraged to find ways of holding public leaders accountable, like
the characters in the show.

Use of ICTs
Outcome

A mobile phone SMS platform for feedback was established.
High quality show with broad viewership
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Table 21. Daraja Project.
Project Title

2. Daraja - Maji Matone
Waterpoints in Tanzania: nearly half of the waterpoints in rural

Problem(s)
Identified

Tanzania were not working at the time & even minor breakdowns went
unrepaired for months or years.


Established an SMS reporting system



Encouraged people in rural Tanzania to use their mobile phones to
report broken down water points, hand-pumps and wells.

Methods


Work with media to put pressure on the government to get
problems fixed.

Use of ICTs



Central to the project.



Citizens encouraged to use SMS technologies to report broken
water pumps to government.

Outcome

Very little uptake of the service

Summary
Twaweza was cited by several of the interview participants as an example of a project
attempting to use digital technologies for engaging local audiences and citizens and so
it shall be analysed in detail here. They have had much success with their Makatuno
junction project, however Head of ICT, Kees De Graaf, claims that getting people to
participate in projects to report to government through mobile technologies is more
difficult than expected and that “the response rates are really very, very low” (de
Graaf, 2015, in interview).
With regards to the response to their Daraja water pump project and use of ICTs, De
Graaf, revealed “the reality did not live up to the promise. Rather than the 3,000 text
messages we had expected in our pilot, we got 53, despite our best efforts to promote
the service” (de Graaf, 2015, in interview).
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The Daraja project illustrates the complications of using digital technologies for
citizen participation in projects. The objective of the project was to engage citizens in
reporting to their local government regarding water-points, thus looking for
accountability from elected officials.
The Daraja project initially received a lot of attention and the approach ticked many of
the right boxes for donors: citizen participation, transparency, technology, innovation,
accountability and the use of mobile phones. As the project progressed however, the
problem was getting citizens to engage with local government via SMS.
De Graaf says that persuading citizens to send messages and persuading government
officials to act on those messages were the main challenges for this project. “We did
pretty well on the second part of that - our record of turning information provided by
citizens into action taken by District Water Engineers and repaired water points was
very good. The problem was the first part - persuading citizens to engage” (de Graaf,
2015, in interview).
Daraja had undertaken lots of publicity, so awareness of the initiative did not seem to
be an issue amongst the population, but they were not getting the citizens to actually
use the service. “This raises questions as to why? Do they feel that they won’t get
response? Is it a technical thing and it’s too complicated?” (de Graaf, 2015, in
interview).
Ben Taylor who worked on the project for Daraja has argued that the failures of the
project were not about technology:
Technology is not what matters here. Getting the human side of things right was
clearly going to be much harder than making the technology work. … Motivating
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people to take action is tough, especially when the promise of anything happening as
a result is distant and unclear. Our rural focus means we're dealing with a group of
people who are poorer, with less education, and less politically engaged than their
urban counterparts (Taylor, 2012).

To understand further the failure of the water pump project, Twaweza conducted a
study on citizens' attitudes towards local government in Tanzania. The study found a
“widespread sense of powerlessness among citizens, a sense that there's nothing they
can do to hold local government to account." This "powerlessness of citizens has
made them fear to form and/or join movements to raise issues, question the actions of
leaders or fight for their rights" (Taylor et al., 2012:1).
De Graaf claimed that when it came to engaging citizens with these SMS technologies
in order to hold local government accountable for their water-pumps and wells:
People don't really see the value in it... By and large, they think it's not going to help
anything. They don't see the point, and there's many things that have to be right at
that point for it to work. For example, they have to think that if they send a message,
that it will go somewhere. They have to feel responsible for it, first of all. They must
think that if I do [send a message] that there's at least a minimal chance that it will
contribute to some change. There's a whole number of things that will go through
people's minds before they actually send an SMS (de Graaf, 2015, in interview).

What is of note with Twaweza, and one of the big lessons from the failure of the
Daraja water point project, was the demonstrated power of the traditional media.
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After the Daraja project, Twaweza pulled back from their initial exuberance with
regards to digital technologies and now favour traditional media in their projects.
De Graaf, confirmed “we had actually high hopes for both ICT and mobile
phones…We thought it was going to be a major part of what we're doing, but it has
become a lot less than we thought” (de Graaf, 2015, in interview). Twaweza have
now become much more focused on the power of traditional media, rather than ICTs
to address their objectives and audiences.
When it comes to using digital technology in their projects they are “not pulling back,
but we are definitely more careful. We're putting it under serious scrutiny” (De Graaf,
2015, in interview).
De Graaf contends “ICTs that stand alone, that do something by themselves, almost
all of them, they don't work. Or many of them don't work” (de Graaf, 2015, in
interview). This is in line with Robert Munuku from the A4T project who argued that
an App-centred project was not going to work for their Kenya project. These
complications will be explored more in the following chapter with regards to donor
objectives in the region and engaging citizens with digital technologies.

Discussion
Whilst the three organisations in this section – FeminaHip, Well Told Story and
Twaweza - are not directly involved in capacity building in the media sector - some
are solely C4D projects - these projects provide avenues to engagement with local
populations, using both old and new media methods. Certainly, regardless of ICT use,
their aims are aligned in that they endeavour to increase citizen engagement,
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participation and activity in the governance of these program countries. They illustrate
a range of experiences of utilising digital technologies in projects and successes
relating to achieving their objectives.
Certainly, the platforms that these organisations create for discussions amongst youth
are important in such culturally diverse countries. Kenya has over 70 different ethnic
groups, 42 tribes, and a growing non-indigenous population73. As seen during the
2007 election, this can sometimes spill into inter-ethnic rivalry. Any platform for
public discussion between these groups, in Kenya and Tanzania, which can foster
inclusion and understanding and dissipate these tensions, therefore contributes to the
democratic functioning of the country.
In this section, the data has illustrated the extent of use of digital technology in media
development projects in a sample of media development organisations operating in the
region. It addressed the question of, when digital forms of technology are employed
in these projects, have they been effective for these organisations to achieve donor
goals? And, if not, what are the reasons for this? The next section will analyse
whether using ICTs has the desired impact, thus determining their use in future media
development work.

Analysis: Digital technologies and donor objectives
In the previous chapters, it was noted how mobile and new digital technologies are
being embraced by the development sector across Africa to address a range of
development objectives in their programmes. Media assistance has not been immune.

73 http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/kenya-population/
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In the area of governance for instance, mobile technologies have been mooted as
having the potential for empowering citizens and improving democratic processes.
In theory, these technologies expand access to information and communications
channels and create new opportunities for people’s participation, giving voice to those
who have previously been excluded from national discussions. In this research, these
assumptions and theories are tested with regards to the media assistance sector.
In this chapter, the interview data showed the extent to which media development
organisations are using digital technologies for their project objectives. This chapter
addressed the questions:
o What are the characteristics of current media development practice in a
modern East African context? (RQ 2b)
o Have ICTs impacted on the practice of media assistance in the chosen case
studies? (RQ 2c)
Organisations were asked if they were employing digital technologies, and if so with
what success had they achieved in their view? And if they were not using new media
technologies, what were the reasons for this? Answering these questions will assist in
clarifying the rationale for a continued preference for traditional media development
approaches.
What was found is varying levels of use of digital forms of technology in media
development activity from one project to the next. This was for a variety of reasons
and reflects the objectives of the different projects; the target group, the type of media
development intervention, the desired goal.
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A media project trying to reach teenagers in urban areas will have a different
perspective on utilising digital technologies than a project for capacity building in
rural radio stations. Most projects choose their activities based on objectives, research
and on a case-by-case basis, as noted by key informants.
For some organisations, digital media are central to their plans, such as Well Told
Story. Other organisations have changed little in how they address media development
goals, in particular with regards to media capacity interventions. The African Media
Initiative, Kenyan Media Programme and Tanzania Media Fund do not focus on
digital technologies at all in their programmes. Organisations such as BBC Media
Action used them peripherally, or as “future-proofing” in their projects.
Evidence from the interview data reveals how Internews, FARM Radio and UNESCO
successfully used digital technology as an add-on to their projects. Digital technology
can make positive changes when integrated either with traditional media, such as the
UNESCO radio project and Internews’ work with data journalism or software such as
the Frontline:SMS Radio product.
It must be noted though that the use of ICTs in these projects is as an add-on rather
than a central tool or strategy in the project. The Internews Data Journalism project is
part of a larger overall capacity and training programme with Kenyan journalists,
albeit a very successful part of the programme. UNESCO’s project offered ICT
training as one of a range of trainings to the local radio stations and the
correspondent’s networks were seen as one of the most successful aspects of the
programme for creating new content.
As noted, the A4T project was initially focused on an app but the team had recognised
that an app alone would not be sufficient for the project goals of transparency and
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reporting misuse of local government funds. They concluded that in Kenya the
technology element of the project needed to be backed up by local community
outreach, and especially training of journalists to interpret this data.
In the FARM radio project, mobile phones and IVR were used to complement the
training, open days and radio programmes that were created for informing rural
citizens about food security practices. But there were cost and technical literacy
issues for these projects.
Indeed, the combination of radio and mobile phones is seen as one of the most
successful outcomes of using newer technologies in media and development projects.
Mobile phones have effectively made radio more interactive, a two-way medium, no
longer one-to-many (Gilberds and Myers, 2012b; Myers, 2008; Thompson, 2013).
One participant argues that “when ICTs interact with something else, when they
interact with traditional media it becomes much more powerful” (de Graaf, in
interview)74.
The merging of radio and new technologies such as mobile phones has resulted in the
growth of call-in radio shows in the region, which were rare before the arrival of
mobile technologies. James Deane, Policy Director for BBC Media Action, has
highlighted the importance of radio as a space for public discussion and claims that
“even in countries where liberalization has been slow or non-existent, there are
important examples of talk radio catalysing major social change. …. It is happening
because many of these countries have been starved of spaces for public discussion and
debate” (Deane, 2005:181).

74 Kees De Graaf, Twaweza, in skype interview with author March 2015
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So, according to the research data, there are positive contributions that digital
technologies can make to media development projects. One important outcome is the
emergence of a new public sphere provided by the combination of old and new media.
However, the convergence process is happening slowly. Gilberd and Myers (2012)
have noted the “contextual, technical and capacity-related factors that constrain the
use of convergent technologies to facilitate knowledge sharing among development
actors and to contribute to broader processes of social change in Africa” (Gilberds and
Myers, 2012b:76).
What are the factors which constrain the use of these technologies?
As noted in Chapter 5’s presentation of Country Findings, one reason that can hinder
use of ICTs is limitations in access to the internet and network coverage in these
countries. In some regions mobile phones are not reaching the poorest or the most
marginalised. Use of the internet is the same. Access to the internet relies on
electricity, phone network and language abilities. And so, technology can only access,
or reach, a certain proportion of the population and a very limited one in a lot of cases.
The data revealed that there are additional reasons factors such as, ease of use,
network access, literacy and individual agency, that discourage media development
organisations using digital technologies to address donor goals in their projects. The
Twaweza testimony was evidence of the unexpected complications arising from using
ICTs in projects for citizen engagement.
As key informant Kees De Graaf maintained “a lot of the initiatives that have sprung
up, many of them haven't really brought the case that we thought… because
technology can only do so much” (de Graaf, 2015, in interview).
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An important factor that determines ICT use is the objective of each project. Donor
goals in the region are focused on: Accountability, Participation, Engagement,
Governance. To date, these media assistance organisations remain committed to
traditional methods when addressing these objectives. The next chapter will analyse
why this is.

Conclusion: Media Assistance activity in East Africa
This chapter presented findings from fieldwork conducted in the target countries. This
data illustrates the characteristics of current media development interventions and
analysed whether digital technologies have impacted on the practice of media
assistance in the focus countries.
Evidence was presented which illustrated the make-up and format of media
development projects currently being implemented in Kenya and Tanzania. These
took the form of both media capacity building activities as well as ‘media for
development’ activities. It was found that the hybrid form of media development
projects is prevalent in this region. This is notable for particular objectives in the
region such as engaging with youth and wider audiences on issues such as sexual
health, food security or governance issues.
Evidence was presented from interviews with media development practitioners, or key
stakeholders, in Kenya and Tanzania as to whether digital technologies can assist, or
better address their project goals, thereby contributing to the primary question of
whether traditional media assistance methods are still relevant.
The data here underscores how digital forms of technology are not necessarily being
used by individuals in the manner that donor or development agencies assume when
they are promoting technology innovation in development.
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What was revealed in this chapter is how digital technologies, such as mobile phones,
do not necessarily result in increased engagement or participation from citizens of
Kenya and Tanzania. Human factors come into play in a possibly unforeseen way
when it comes to interacting with technologies and motivating the citizens of Kenya
and Tanzania to use them for development ends. The Daraja water pump project was
offered as an example of the complications with ICTs to achieve these objectives and
the reasons why will be examined further in the next chapter.
The perspectives and interview data that were presented in this chapter will therefore
be discussed in a wider context and in more depth in the next chapter in relation to use
of digital technologies to achieve donor objectives.
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Chapter 7
Discussion

Introduction
Chapter 6 presented data outlining projects being implemented by a sample of media
development organisations in Kenya and Tanzania and the extent of use of digital
technologies in these projects.
Despite their widespread availability and potential for some development objectives,
this research found that digital technologies are not necessarily being employed
widely in Media Assistance programmes in Kenya or Tanzania. There is a mix of
experiences from the implementing organisations in this regard from the sample
interviewed.
What is apparent is that with regards to media support interventions, such as capacity
building and strengthening the sector, media assistance programmes are still using
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quite traditional techniques. ICTs can certainly contribute to much needed upskilling
of local media organisations, as demonstrated by the UNESCO radio project. With
media for development projects, digital technologies seem to be used more centrally,
if appropriate for project goals and target audiences.
Chapter 5 and 6 presented stakeholders’ insights and they testified to the enthusiasm
for technology from the funders of international media development in the region.
However, this may be misjudged. This research found that despite enthusiasm for the
use of digital technologies in media development, the digital divide still exists, and
this impacts greatly on which tools are appropriate for media development objectives.
The interview data revealed that there are other important factors that must also be
considered when planning which tools to use for media assistance programmes, and
these include issues of access, cost, the technical literacy of audiences and whether
people actually use the technologies in the way assumed. Furthermore, radio
continues to be the media of choice for the majority of Kenyans and Tanzanians.
Thus, many media development NGOs continue using traditional media methods in
their projects.
In this chapter, the findings from the field are synthesised and analysed in greater
depth. Specifically, this chapter dissects the reasons why ICTs are not being widely
used in media assistance interventions in this sample. Gaining an insight into the
limitations of ICTs for these projects will help understand the continuing appeal, and
role, for traditional media development methods. This chapter therefore contributes to
the question:


What is the rationale for a continuing emphasis on traditional media methods?
(RQ 2d.)
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This chapter offers eight salient themes which have emerged from analysis of the data.
These serve to address the overall research question and draw conclusions with regard
to the relevance of digital media technologies to the media assistance sector.
Whilst the previous chapter presented and analysed the research data, this chapter
offers a thematic analysis which advances the argument relating to the continuing
importance of media assistance in the current information ecosystems. These themes
are presented below.

Theme 1: The role of ICTs in ‘Africa’s Rise’ is being overstated
The Africa Rising trope and reality of ICT use in Kenya and Tanzania

The starting point for the research was the ubiquity of stories emerging in western
media adhering to the “Africa rising” narrative. As Taylor reported, “barely a week
passes without a new article, report or conference eulogizing the continent and its
growth figures…. Analyses thus far have had strong evangelical undertones,
suggesting that Africa has turned a corner and that its emergence is imminent”
(Taylor, 2014a:1-2)
At the same time, there appeared a growing movement expressing optimism in what
technology could do for development, and further, for Africa.

Headlines claimed

that “mobile phones transform Africa” and one periodical created the moniker of
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Kenya as ‘Silicon Savannah’ (Perry, 2011). Jeffrey Sachs 75 called mobile phones a
‘gift for development’.
It was noted in the literature review how enthusiasm for ICT4D 76 is rooted in this
techno-optimism, where technology is increasingly proposed as a solution for
development problems. As noted by Wyche and Olsen, “increased mobile phone
ownership and access to the Internet figure prominently in this optimistic narrative”
(Wyche and Olson, 2018:1).
Furthermore, optimism that ICTs can be a solution for the continent’s development
problems “was accompanied by hype about the continent’s possibility of
“leapfrogging” some stages of development, as though the whole process of
development had been rendered less problematic” (Banda et al., 2009:1).
The data from this research illustrated how in recent years there has been a push from
donors in the promotion of ICTs for development in the region. Findings from
interviews with key stakeholders revealed that the media assistance sector has not
been unaffected. The techno-optimist feels that access to ICTs can facilitate a wide
range of developmental goals, for example in fields such as health, agriculture and
humanitarian assistance. And there has of course been success in these areas.
Whether digital technologies can be applied successfully to media development
objectives, however, is a matter of debate and the central theme of this research.
Making use of them would arguably be relatively easy for donors and practitioners
working on media development, as use of these new technologies is user-driven, and

75 Sachs is an American economist and director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University. He is
known as one of the world's leading experts on economic development and the fight against poverty
76 Information Communication Technology for Development
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relatively low-cost. But incorporating digital technologies in traditional media
development models may be a more complicated process than it appears.
Kees De Graaf, who is Head of ICT at the organisation Twaweza, explained how at
his organisation “when we started that mobile phones we thought were going to be a
big hit…. because it is such a technical innovation; it makes such a difference already
in people’s lives. Penetration is very high in Tanzania. You can practically reach
almost everybody”.
De Graaf admits however that when it comes to digital technologies, “a lot of the
initiatives that have sprung up, many of them haven't really brought the change that
we thought. It has been a bit disappointing. I think we've all been, maybe, focusing
too much on the technical part of it” (De Graaf, 2015, in interview).
More than one interview participant noted that if societal change was the result of
higher mobile phone and internet penetration rates these countries would probably be
seeing the impact already.
Abel Okuye from Afrobarometer argued that “if the mobile phone brings changes,
especially by the youth in Kenya you would see the figures. I think Kenya and South
Africa have like 98% penetration, very high figures. If political transformation was
to come, there would be a lot of transformation by now for Kenyan and other
countries. But that massive usage is not translating into some of the changes. Why that
disconnect is happening, whether it’s lack of interest from people, I don’t know”
(Okuye, 2014, in interview).
Whilst mobile phone usage and penetration has been rising exponentially in this
region, a report by Afrobarometer shows that despite higher ICT penetration in Kenya,
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corruption seems to be on the rise (Afrobarometer, 2015). The report found that twothirds (64%) of Kenyans say that the level of corruption in the country had increased
in that year. This is despite an increase in access to information and news sources for
most Kenyans in the same time period (Afrobarometer, 2015) 77.
Likewise in Tanzania, despite growth in access to ICTs, Tanzanians perceive that the
level of corruption has increased also (Aiko, 2015).
So, while ICTs may have transformed the social space of sub-Saharans, Bailard points
out that the level of mobile phone penetration has far outpaced political development
in the sub-Sahara (Bailard, 2009). Thus, it cannot be assumed that technology is
triggering social change, or that “the change that accompanies new technologies are
automatically democratic and beneficial” (Allen and Gagliardone, 2011:29).
The research data suggests that it is possible that the potential of digital technologies
for developing countries is being overstated. Stakeholders in the research felt the
narrative of technology and Africa Rising did not apply to the broad population but is
“a minority” (Munuku, 2015, in interview)78
Eric Chinje from the African Media Initiative questioned the narrative of an Africa
rising. “I think the man on the street in Kenya who can hardly afford two or three
square meals a day would question the concept”. He reflected on whether digital
media has in fact ‘changed the way Africa interacts with itself’ and whether it has
‘contributed to improved policy making. The question is who is talking to who and
what impact is it having?’ (Chinje, 2015, in interview).

77 Afrobarometer, Kenya Corruption on the Rise, April 2015
78 Robert Munuku, Action for Transparency, Interview with Author Feb 2015
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Kenyan writer and investigative journalist Parselelo Kanthai refers to the “Africa
Rising” trope as ”insidious little fiction manufactured by corporate interests” whilst
Taylor notes “much of the [Africa]-boosting, local and international, will serve only
political and financial interests” in (Taylor, 2014b:3).
In a separate study on the experience of ‘Africa Rising’, Brooks found that economic
growth had limited developmental benefits for those in the middle. He argues that
“despite the optimism, poverty ratios remained stable and impoverishment was
widespread. Change was occurring, but the gains were uneven” (Brooks, 2018:1).
The Irish Ambassador to Kenya, Vincent O Neill spoke in interview of this
contradiction with regards to the Africa Rising story and these uneven gains, what he
referred to as the ‘dual narrative’:
[There is a dual narrative]. Kenya has only recently graduated but it's still a lower,
middle income country. It suddenly came into the lower part of the middle bracket.
However, there are still very high poverty rates in 40- 45%. There's huge inequity
across the country. The physical environment is very, very difficult. There are very
high rates of maternal mortality and childhood mortality in those regions. Yet, you
come down closer to some of the urban areas and you have a strong middle class. The
major disease is diabetes or hypertension or obesity…. You have a few different
worlds going and part of the economic disparities, the inequalities, are both a function
and a cause of the tribal politics that has been here since independence (O’ Neill,
2015, in interview).
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And although Kenya is the biggest and most advanced economy in East and Central
Africa, it is pertinent to remember that it is still a poor, developing country, with
approximately 38% of Kenyans living in absolute poverty (World Bank, 2014).
So, when one reads ‘Africa is rising’, this is essentially for a small, urban based group.
There are still very high poverty rates in these countries, c.40-45% but in some areas
this can be as high as 85% (O Neill, 2015, in interview).
This is an important aspect in the research. For the most part, Media Development
projects are not necessarily targeted at the urban middle classes. Media Development
projects are in the main funded by international donors to bring information to
audiences where they have problems accessing information – either in “media dark”
areas or in countries where populations or groups may have restricted access to
independent news.
As noted, media assistance is focused on strengthening of the media sector, and this
also means making more media and information available to wider populations of
Kenya and Tanzania. Often, efforts are focused on poor, rural or marginalised groups,
this is the reason why they are funded by international aid agencies and foundations.
As noted, there are large swathes of the population who are still underserved and
unreached by news and information, unable to take part in national debate or
conversation.
A 2016 World Development Report suggests that “to get the most out of the digital
revolution, countries also need to work on the “analog components” ( Peña-López et
al, 2016:1). This has echoes of the ‘enabling environment’ of which Price and Krug
stressed was crucial to the success of media assistance (Price and Krug, 2000).
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The projects outlined in this research demonstrate how donor priorities in Kenya and
Tanzania centre around governance, empowering citizens, dealing with health issues,
connecting with youth, and facilitating dialogue. Despite the excitement of the ICT4D
sector and the optimism relating ‘Africa’s Rise’ to technology, the data from this
research found that ICTs have limited application for addressing these goals in the
context of current media assistance projects.
So, despite the framing of economic growth in Africa linked to technology, the
limitations of these technologies are noted in this research. As noted by a 2016 World
Bank report: “digital technologies have spread rapidly in much of the world, but
Digital dividends – that is the broader development benefits from using these
technologies – have lagged behind… Their aggregate impact has fallen short and is
unevenly distributed” (Peña-López et al, 2016).

Theme 2: The prevalence of a techno-optimistic narrative in development
Digital technologies and ICTs are not always the correct intervention according to key
stakeholders. Indeed, they may serve the interests of corporations more than citizens.

As noted, a trend in the media development sphere in recent years has been the
emergence of a new generation of donors emerging from technology Foundations
originating in Silicon Valley who often emphasise technological solutions for
development. The Gates Foundation run by Bill and Melinda Gates; the Omidyar
Foundation established by Pierre Omidyar, owner of eBay; Google.Org; and the Skoll
Foundation (Jeff Skoll, also of eBay) – these foundations are increasingly involved in
international development, as well as media development, and have an impact on the
discourse about development. It has been called tech-philanthropy (Callahan, 2017).
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Nelson argues that the Gates Foundation “may not have invented media for
development but in recent years it has undoubtedly helped to set the agenda” (Nelson,
2009). Whilst media for development is only a part of the broader media assistance
sector, it gives some indication of the influence these foundations are having on the
discussions taking place and the influence they may have on the direction of media
assistance.
What is noteworthy for this research is that claims about the potential of technological
innovation to contribute positively to the lives of individuals and communities often
emanate from these philanthropic foundations. Donors such as the Omidyar Network,
Skoll Foundation and Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation are proponents and funders of
the use of ICTs as a solution to development problems.
Thus, it is pertinent to ask: what drives the techno-optimist view of new technologies
in development? And whose interest do they serve? For instance, a focus on
providing access to new technologies in the Third World could be seen as a
mechanism of allowing corporations to establish new channels of market entry.
The ownership structures and the means for access to the much celebrated ‘new’
public sphere, which is being enabled by the internet and mobile phones, are often
owned by transnational corporations such as Vodacom, Safaricom, Microsoft or
Facebook. Increased use of their products means more reliance on and future revenue
streams for these corporations.
In the same way that it can be argued that the state sponsored media assistance of the
1990s was motivated by the desire to create new markets for media products in
Eastern Europe, it can equally be argued that media development and assistance in the
current day, now funded more by private technology foundations, is motivated to
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create new markets for those products, whether it be mobile phones, software
applications or social media platforms.
Boyd-Barett updated the concept of media imperialism with reference to what he calls
the “digital media empires” (Boyd Barrett, 2014). He argues that the structures of
power and control that were at play in media imperialism continue to regulate access
to and consumption of global media, but “it's no longer just Disney and Dallas - it's
also now Apple, Facebook and Google” (Boyd-Barrett, 2014:118).
Indeed, Facebook’s attempt to provide free internet access to all Indian citizens in
2015 - called Free Basics79 - resulted in accusations of the corporation’s “neoimperialism”. Research by Bonilla et al. found that Free Basics exists “primarily as a
mechanism for collecting profitable data from users” (Bonilla et al., 2017).
As was noted in the literature review, there are ‘ideological connotations of the new’
in discussions about new technologies and development. Fackson Banda spoke of the
“modernist belief in social progress as delivered by technology” (Banda, 2006). This
modernist narrative is associated with an ideology about the Third World ‘catching
up’ with such Western societies. Banda argues “indeed, this narrative is subscribed to
not only by the entrepreneurs, corporations who produce media hardware and software
in question, but also by whole sections of media commentators, educationalists and
cultural activists” (Banda, 2006:4).

79 The platform, presented by Facebook as a way to help people connect to the internet for the first
time, offered a stripped-down version of the mobile web that people could use without it counting
toward their data-usage limit.
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For the purpose of this research, this serves as a critical note to the technodeterminism of recent years in relation to development in the region. Manji (2008)
warned about the dangers of technological determinism and questioned
Why are we not holding conferences about the role of the pencil in development? Or
the role of paper? There is more evidence of social progress made by these humble
instruments than all the information and communication technologies (ICTs) over the
last 20 years…. There is nothing intrinsically progressive about the pencil or paper. It
depends on who uses it and for what purpose (Manji, 2008:129)

This thesis proposes a more practical and evidence-based perspective in contrast to the
techno-optimistic narrative which has dominated the development debate in the past
decade. Key stakeholders who contributed to this research confirmed that using ICTs
in their projects was not necessarily the right approach for addressing donor goals,
despite pressure to use them.
Daniel Dedayan from USAID Tanzania confirmed in interview that “there is an
excitement about new technologies” and at USAID “we’ve had that excitement”. He
revealed that they “are definitely getting a push from Washington to be innovative” in
their projects (Dedayan, 2014, in interview).
Alex Pitkin from the organisation Frontline SMS80, argued that “there are lots of
projects that get funding because they are doing something innovative…. It’s more
likely to get funding if they have good ideas on technology”. But he questioned why

80 Frontline SMS is a NGO which teams SMS with Radio for interactive discussions. It is a free, opensource software used by a variety of organisations to distribute and collect information via text
messages (SMS). Their radio product - Frontline SMS: Radio - helps radio stations increase listener
engagement, build interactive programming and manage data in real-time, all using SMS
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“funders are doing Twitter campaigns [in their projects] when they maybe should just
be putting money into people on the ground on bikes” (Pitkin, 2015, in interview) 81.
Sasha Kinney who works with PAWA254, a community-based activism organisation
in Nairobi, also spoke of “the big technology bias” that has appeared in the aid sector
over the past five years. “This idea of advanced technology, its funder-driven and it’s
sexy and popular, and there's very little regard as to what is really appropriate to reach
a certain audience or engage them” (Kinney, 2015, in interview)82.
Kinney claims the message the NGO community is getting from donors is “Tech is
new, we have to use tech. Tech will revolutionise everything on its own”. But she
argues that “people forget to give training in the fundamentals…It's kind of
backwards” (Kinney, 2015, in interview).
This is of note because it tells of the push for use of new or digital technology
regardless of whether they are the appropriate intervention or tool or whether their use
is evidence-based. Kinney confirms “no-one ever asks about adoption or usage, no,
because they also don’t want to see failure… They're not really thinking through
really what's needed” (Kinney, 2015, in interview). As Chinje from AMI argued “the
donors want something more sexy (Chinje, 2015, in interview).
This research therefore offers evidence to counter the ‘cyber-optimism’ in
development. It needs to be considered that implementing technology-related
development solutions may serve other interests than the citizens of the “beneficiary”
country. Christensen warned of the “fundamental questions regarding the increasingly

81 Alex Pitkin, Frontline SMS, in interview with author May 2014
82 Sasha Kinney, PAWA, in interview with author Nairobi Feb 2015
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blurred lines among policy, development aid, technological determinism and
commodification” (Christensen, 2012:250).
And Gumucio-Dagron (2008) claimed “in the name of the ‘digital divide’, great
business is being made” (Gumucio-Dagron, 2008:77).

Theme 3: The Digital Divide remains a hurdle for ICTs in media
development
There is a ‘dual narrative’83 in Kenya and Tanzania and this impacts on the extent to which
media development projects should use digital technologies or ICTs.

The term digital divide was introduced in the mid-1990s and defined as the gap
separating those who have access to new forms of information technology from those
who do not (Srinuan and Bohlin, 2011). Compaine (2001) argues that “if we are
indeed in an Information Age, then not having access to this information is an
economic and social handicap” (Compaine, 2001:ix).
Access does not just mean actually having physical access (such as actually owning a
phone, for example), access also means knowing how to use these technologies, and
being able to afford to use them. So, albeit there has been much progress in Africa in
bridging the digital divide as mobile adoption rates have exploded over the past
decade, there are still many challenges.
The Country Profiles data presented in Chapter 5 highlighted the extensive changes in
the media environments of both Kenya and Tanzania. Yes, there is a huge growth in
mobile phone use and a definite growth of online activity, such as social media,

83 ‘Dual Narrative’ is the term used in interview by Irish Ambassador to Kenya Vincent O Neill in
reference to those with good access to communications and media and those who do not
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forums and blogging. Many people now use social media to access news; Twitter and
Facebook are very popular. So, there has been a very definite expansion in media and
communications channels.
There has also been an opening up of the media sector and a proliferation of media
outlets, both print and FM radio. These changes have come after a phase of
liberalisation in the media sector in these countries. Digital TV has recently been
introduced in Kenya and Tanzania.
However, these phenomena are mainly observed in urban areas. In both Tanzania and
Kenya, the majority of populations live in rural areas (c. 72% in Kenya -76% in
Tanzania) and in these areas citizens have limited access to a range of media for a
variety of reasons outlined in Chapter 5. For instance, print media is very limited in
rural areas of Tanzania due to lack of infrastructure; roads are very poor quality and,
in some areas, unpassable so distribution is difficult.
Chapter 5 illustrated this sharp urban/rural divide. It revealed how the two target
countries of Kenya and Tanzania are predominantly rural and poor, factors that
continue to hamper access to news and information. Interview participant Kris Kapella
from Femina Hip commented:
The technology is here now, it is just the fact it hasn’t filtered down to all levels of
society yet and I don’t think that is going to happen for while… The fact is here you
are still dealing with a predominantly rural poor population which doesn’t have access
to even the most basic of services (Kapella, 2014, in interview).
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These countries remain divided, with a growing affluence and connectivity for the
residents of the major cities and continued poverty for the rural majority. The Irish
Ambassador to Kenya, Vincent O’ Neill, called it the “dual narrative”.
Thus, despite widespread optimism for ICT in development, the majority of the
citizens in Kenya and Tanzania live in rural areas where access to even traditional
media continues to be difficult for many of these people. Although mobile technology
can circumvent infrastructure hurdles, access to new technologies and the internet is
still challenging. In fact, Norris believes that the rapid growth of the internet is
exacerbating existing inequalities between the information rich and poor (Norris,
2001).

There are several aspects of the digital divide which are relevant to this region:
1. Access
As has been illustrated from the country data, the use of digital technologies and
social media is mainly an urban phenomenon. The issue of limited access for rural
populations is due to a number of factors - access to either consistent network
coverage or internet access or even a consistent electricity supply.
Understanding Kenya’s official languages of English and Kiswahili is also key to
using newspapers, government documents, the internet, and SMS services, all which
are primarily in those two languages. However, only 59 per cent of rural respondents
said they can speak and understand English, compared to 80 percent of those in urban
areas (Bowen, 2010).
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Lower levels of education in rural areas also limit the scope for information gathering,
particularly given that new ICTs such as the internet and SMS services usually require
literate audiences (Bowen, 2010).
2. Technical Literacy
The technology itself is an issue. Citizens of Kenya and Tanzania are most definitely
using mobile phones in an enthusiastic manner, but at the timing of the fieldwork
these were predominantly what are called ‘feature phones’ (i.e. not internet enabled),
and are used only for making calls or sending SMS. Many of the mobile phones used
are cheap Chinese imports. They are certainly making it more affordable for larger
part of the population to have access, but many of the phones do not have the
character sets of particular languages that the users speak. Often users cannot use the
more advanced applications and services on these phones and use them mainly for
calls. As one participant mentioned, some cannot use their address book or contacts
(Spurway, 2014, in interview).
Sara Chamberlain from BBC Media Action has discussed the limited ways in which
users use their phones:
What we've discovered…is that people don't know how to use that technology. What
we discovered is that only nine per cent had ever sent a SMS. The reason that only 9
per cent had ever sent a SMS is because the majority of the phones that they have are
used, second hand, very poor quality sort of brick phones. They're copycat, so
‘Nokais’ and ‘Simsungs’ that are coming in over the border and are in foreign
languages. ……. Essentially people have a very basic piece of technology in their
hands that's in a foreign language which is really limiting their ability to actually use
it for anything other than a voice call. The majority can only make and receive voice
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calls and that's really it. That really dictated our choice of technology (Brown-Martin
2014).

Thus, mobile phones and ICTs are not yet being used to their full technical potential
by citizens in these countries. The ideology of a technology-led revolution is
undermined by the fact that it is underpinned by very basic devices and crude
applications.
3. Cost
One of the largest hurdles for Kenyans and Tanzanians to access information via new
technologies is the cost. The growing middle class are mainly based in urban areas,
and the price of more expensive phones and data schemes is out of the reach of many
citizens. Even if they can pay for a device, they cannot easily afford the
telecommunications and data usage charges that are required to access the internet.
Kenyans and Tanzanians at the Bottom of Pyramid84 (‘BOP’) are already known to be
making sacrifices of basic food and utilities, so they can buy credit on their phones:
“People would rather not buy bread or milk but have airtime” 85 (Patterson, 2015, in
interview).
This was echoed by Angela Okune from iHub: “There's no doubt that even bottom of
the pyramid they sacrifice milk to get calls. They’re sacrificing; they’re walking
instead of taking a matatu because with that 20 Ksh, they call someone and look for
job and potentially make 2000 Ksh” (Okune, 2015, in interview).

84 In Aid work this is the largest, but poorest socio-economic group
85 UNDP, Siema Patterson, Feb 2015 in interview with the author
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In a more commercial regulatory environment, where prices and taxes are lowered, we
can anticipate that prices will come down and these services will soon be within reach
of the mass population. Kenya has a more business-friendly and consumer-friendly
environment where the existence of several operators make sure the data and call
prices will fall, and cheaper mobile and Smartphones are entering the market.
In Tanzania, the government is making cost more restrictive by imposing new taxes
on mobile devices or telecommunications fees. In their report on digital inclusion and
mobile tax in Tanzania, the GSMA86 found that mobile communications is one of the
most heavily taxed sectors in Tanzania, with operators subject to 10 different taxes,
along with regulatory fees and charges.
These taxes increase the total cost of mobile ownership for Tanzania consumers and
create “barriers to affordability” (Digital inclusion mobile sector tax Tanzania, 2015).
For instance, Richard and Mandari (2018) found that transaction cost have a
significant negative influence on the usage of mobile banking services in Tanzania
(Richard and Mandari, 2018).
Consequently, at the time of the fieldwork, the cost of accessing information on new
technologies was still prohibitive for a large part of these populations. As one
interview participant remarked “technology seems to be ahead of people’s capacity to
afford things” (Wafula, 2014, in interview).
Thus, technical literacy, language barriers, electricity supply and cost restrict citizens
of these countries accessing new digital forms of media and the internet. The digital
divide remains a substantial problem in this region and the urban/rural split is a critical

86 The Global Association of Mobile Operators
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aspect with regards to uptake of digital technologies with target groups for media
development projects.
As one interview participant confirmed “for reaching the last populations or reaching
the millions of citizens, ICT is not yet the big thing” (de Graaf, 2015, in interview).
And as the World Bank notes in their 2016 Development report “the lives of the
majority of the world’s people remain largely untouched by the digital revolution”
(Peña-López and others, 2016) .
As a result, media development projects have not necessarily changed what they are
doing ‘on the ground’ in Kenya and Tanzania. Use of digital technologies or social
media platforms is often as an add-on or “future-proofing” in these projects (Spurway,
2014, in interview).

Theme 4: Participatory Radio has emerged as a new public sphere
Radio is still of huge importance and ICTs combined with radio is an area of some success for
media development

An issue of interest that emerged from the data relates to the convergence of radio and
newer forms of technology, in particular the mobile phone. In this research, the
UNESCO and FARM Radio projects illustrated how the potential for participatory
radio programming is enhanced by the spread of mobile phones.
Radio remains the dominant electronic medium of communication throughout subSaharan Africa. Gilberds and Myers found (2012) “low production and distribution
costs coupled with widespread liberalisation of the airwaves in many sub-Saharan
African countries have made radio the most affordable, pervasive and flexible mass
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medium available” (Gilberds and Myers, 2012:77). It is a medium that also resonates
with dominant oral culture in many African societies.
Many people, especially in rural areas, depend on the radio for news of the latest
innovations and market prices, to advice on tackling agricultural, health and other
developmental problems. This research shows that one of the biggest successes with
regards to ICTs seems to be convergence of new digital technologies with radio which
facilitates two-way flows of knowledge.
Research undertaken by Carleton University in Canada found that most radio stations
now have talk-shows incorporating listeners’ phone calls on a regular basis (Gilberds
and Myers, 2012). According to Freedom House, “their call-in shows have fostered
increasing public participation” (Freedom House, 2014).
These call-in radio shows are taking over the airwaves and are said to be transforming
how Africans listen to and interact with each other (Hudson et al., 2017). This twoway communication has been called “Participatory radio”.
Thompson suggests that the combination of radio and cell phone is empowering local
audiences and argues that it is because they can now engage with others and with
issues:
Radio is the original ICT in Africa, and the cell phone is its most recent add-on
ICT…. The cell phone is empowering people by allowing them to engage with the
number one electronic purveyor of information and entertainment on the continent.
As oral culture predominates in most of Africa, radio and the cell phone are simply
extensions of the human voice; they are the electronic post office that functions while
the traditional post office barely exists (Thompson, 2013:13).
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Talk-based radio, which involves free-ranging studio discussions, phone-ins, political
interviews, interviews with celebrities and music, are becoming some of the more
popular programming for broadcasters.
Talk Radio may be an old and much-used format in the West for decades, but in the
past years it has been ground-breaking for people who live in these remote areas.
Africans can now voice their opinions in public, talk to politicians about their
grievances and engage in debate in a way that was hardly possible a few years ago.
As Gordon (2012) maintains
The very definition of radio is changing …Ordinary community members have been
empowered to participate by sending in stories, calling in to give their views, and
giving comments on policies thus challenging the hegemonic control on content
production by journalists (Gordon, 2012).

Although few local radio stations have the resources to invest in significant
independent news-gathering operations, talk shows are opening up new spaces for
political and public debate, and through debate to public engagement (Lopes, 2015, in
interview).87 Converged radio has been compared to Habermas’ coffee houses, as
Deane noted:
Habermas originally argued that a public sphere, independent of the reigning
governments, was established out of a space carved out in the coffee houses of
enlightenment Europe. The radio revolution in many developing countries can
arguably be seen as a similar phenomenon, where public debate over radio meshes

87 Claudia Lopes, in phone interview with author, May 2014.
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with the billions of informal and interconnecting conversations enabled by the new
technologies of mobile telephony and the internet (Deane, 2005).

Indeed Ethan Zuckerman, Director of the MIT Center for Civic Media, claimed that
“considered together, radios and mobile phones can serve as a broad-distribution,
participatory media network with some of the same citizen media dynamics of the
internet” (Zuckerman, 2007).
Therefore, Africa's rapid spread of mobile phones, combined with the ubiquity and
popularity of radio presents a significant opportunity for public discussion. It
provides a two-way communication channel, one accessed by a broad church of the
population.
Interview participant Claudia Lopes, Project Director from the Africa’s Voices project,
confirms how radio phone-ins and text-ins can impact public debate, public opinion
and the ability of citizens to hold authority to account: “suddenly there are spaces
where people can get relevant information and within which they might even
participate” (Lopes, 2015, in interview).
The opportunity for audiences to express their opinions and gain acknowledgement of
taking part in a discussion by other members of the community seem to be significant
drivers for participation in her Africa’s Voices programmes. Lopes argues that “they
want to be recognised, give their views – and they hope the presenter will read their
message out on air and perhaps greet their mother” (Lopes, 2015, in interview).
Participatory radio echoes the positive aspects of Habermas’ ideal public sphere in the
coffee houses of Europe: discussion, deliberation and debate.
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However, Lopes admits “people in urban areas participate more and we have to be
very honest about this” (Lopes, 2015, in interview).
And barriers to participation are more complex than just access: women and girls with
low educational levels were much less likely to call in to a radio station than men and
boys of a similar income and educational level. Lopes cautioned “this divide still
exists with interactive radio essentially. It doesn’t mean that women don’t listen to
the programmes. They listen to the programmes and the programmes will reach them
but they don’t participate which is different” (Lopes, 2015, in interview).
Manyozo et al (2011) found that in rural areas, where women are economically
marginalised, the more expensive an ICT instrument is, the more its ownership is
likely to be dominated by men (Manyozo et al., 2011), further limiting women’s
ability to participate.
So, although the convergence process of the mobile phone and radio is happening and
is positive and exciting, it is still subject to the digital divide: the disparities governed
by geography, income and gender still exist. Jackie Davies from BBC Media Action
confirmed “there are huge populations in this country who don’t really have a voice in
the national debate, about anything” (Davies, 2015, in interview).
Consequently, this new public sphere is not the ideal that Habermas or the technooptimist envisages. Criticisms of the new public sphere which has been facilitated by
digital technologies and the internet were noted in the literature review. Perhaps the
concept of the public sphere is itself is a utopian ideal, as Grbeša claimed “the public
sphere is an ideal model that has probably never existed” (Grbeša, 2004:119).
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Theme 5: The ICT for Accountability Model has not delivered as promised
Participation and citizen engagement are often the objectives for using ICTs in projects but as
illustrated in the case studies these are not guaranteed.

During the field trips to both Kenya and Tanzania, it was found that there is much
development work going on in the area of citizen participation and accountability
using ICTs and apps. Aran Corrigan from Irish Aid confirmed how “there is a lot of
this going on in Tanzania, a lot of ‘accountability for checks” (Corrigan, 2014, in
interview).
Corrigan explained that “these projects depend on the idea that you empower citizens
to act and the government responds and the services get better. We all work with that
sort of model. It’s called the Accountability model” (Corrigan, 2014, in interview).88.
This Accountability Model envisions that ICTs will empower citizens to act and this
will promote openness and transparency which will result in increased government
responsiveness and accountability. It will make public discussion between citizens and
governments easier. Traditional Media Assistance also works towards these goals.
Integrating ICTs into projects for these ends is not always straightforward however,
and organisations in the sample have experienced problems with implementing ICTs
in this regard. Corrigan offered the example of the Daraja Water project in Tanzania
and its use of new technology for citizen participation in accountability and
governance projects but “it failed” (Corrigan, in interview, 2015).
The objective of that project was to engage citizens in reporting to their local
government regarding water-points, thus looking for accountability from elected
officials. The Daraja project showed how it can be a challenge to incentivise people

88 In interview with Author, Dar Es Salaam, Feb 2014
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to engage and participate with digital technologies in development projects. One
explanation proposed is that users have not seen evidence that using them will help to
make a change to their lives.
The Daraja experience was raised by several of the interview participants and is
interesting because the problem also exists in Kenya with regards to the technology
and engagement model – or the ‘Accountability model’.
De Graaf Head of ICT confirmed “we actually had high hopes for both ICT and
mobile phones…. We thought four or five years ago it was going to be a major part of
what we’re doing, but it has become a lot less than we thought” (De Graaf, in
interview, 2015).
This is in line with other research into whether Kenya’s ICT revolution has triggered
increased citizen participation. Salome (2016) found that ICTs do not necessarily
trigger better governance. She found that despite an explosion of e-government tools,
“only a small minority of Nairobi citizens use ICTs to engage with the state” (Salome,
2016:4).
Heeks (2003) found that many ICT projects aimed at better governance result in lower
expected returns especially in developing/transitional countries where 35% of egovernance related projects are likely to fail (Heeks, 2003). Recent findings from the
World Bank attest “it’s actually quite shocking how many e-government projects
fail… we see a lot of disappointment and wasted investments” (Peña-López and
others, 2016).
So, even though mobile phone penetration is growing all over Africa, people may not
necessarily want to engage with national and local governments through mobile
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phones, e-initiatives and social media. There exist numerous websites, mobile phone
and web applications for governance which are not used as often as the developers
expected.
This begs the question that if people have the technology in their hands, and if they
can afford the connectivity, why would they not engage with ICTs in these
development projects? What are the reasons that audiences and citizens did not
respond to technologies in the way presumed? (See also Fung et al, 2010).
The Daraja project found “low user expectations regarding government
responsiveness to feedback, particularly given a long history of unfulfilled promises
from politicians, government, NGOs, and others … in relation to water supply
services” (Taylor, 2012). Sika et al (2014) suggest:
Citizens are not optimistic about action being taken on the issues they raise, thus
limiting their use of the applications. This is brought on by the lack of consultation
during the creation of the ICT tools in governance, lack of follow up procedures on
the issues raised, poor communication by government on the course of action to be
taken on issues raised by citizens, and, the fact that there are more people who share
negative experiences they have had with government than there are people who share
positive experiences (Sika et al., 2014:19).

Afrobarometer research in Tanzania found that “most Tanzanians are dissatisfied with
the current level of public service delivery, but only a minority takes direct action for
change”. Many Tanzanians feel that their opinions are not heard and that it is a
useless battle to try to influence policy makers (Aiko, 2012:1).
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This is backed up by a USAID report which found that Tanzanians have “a passive
tendency to shrug and accept things as they are…….a “culture of silence,” (Dichter
and Aulick, 2013:4).
Twaweza tries to address this in their work. De Graaf says that part of the reason for
setting up the programme was “to challenge the culture of apathy and to be part of a
wider effort (through Twaweza) to replace this with a culture of citizens' agency citizens taking action to hold government to account and to improve their own lives
(de Graaf, 2015, in interview).
But Twaweza’s use of ICTs to address this was a failure. In fact, none of the
evaluations undertaken of the Daraja project uncovered evidence that Twaweza’s
information was “registering with citizens on any scale, still less triggering increased
citizen action” (Green, 2013a) (Eissa et al., 2013; Gunning et al., 2013).
It is an important point for this research, and for projects hoping to use ICT for
Accountability - the issues of agency and engagement. As Aran Corrigan from Irish
Aid noted, many donor-funded citizen engagement and participation projects which
focus on governance are based on this concept of engagement.
Angela Okune, Head of Research at Nairobi’s iHub, argues that for audiences to
engage with these technologies, whether for accountability or participation or
governance objectives, what audiences need is to see the benefit. “There's
engagement… if you’re going to see a real key benefit. If you engage, or you take
part in polls, or you vote, you do all these things and then you feel like none of that
made a difference … you just opt out” (Okune, 2015, in interview).
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Interview participant, Sasha Kinney from PAWA254, also questioned whether, despite
the huge growth in access to information, and the growth in two-way communication,
these citizen participation initiatives are creating active citizenship. She concluded,
no. “I think there's a lot behind that. It's not lack of information. I think it's that
people don't see a viable course of action. They don't actually see something that they
can do that's actually going to change things” (Kinney, 2015, in interview).
Kinney argues that Kenyan’s post-dictatorship mentality is one reason for this: “The
idea of collective action and the fact that you could really leverage your numbers as a
source of power is just still really underdeveloped here” (Kinney, 2015, in interview).
This sense of powerlessness was also noted by the head of Twaweza, Rakesh Rajani,
who observed in Tanzania, “people don't have that sense of agency that something
could – and should – be changed. ..It is basic to the way western democracies work, so
it's hard to appreciate how its absence shapes a political culture” (Bunting, 2011).
Zanello and Maassen (2011) analysed the conditions that bring citizens to become
active citizens. They found that citizen agency is driven by people but it needs some
form of accountability from the authorities to take place. They maintain that for
citizen agency to work ” they must have the conviction that they can make changes”
(Zanello and Maassen, 2011:6). Individuals are willing to participate in political life
only if they feel that somehow they are able to make a difference.
As Green notes, in the East African context, “confidence in engaging with the
governmental sectors has been eroded by years of unresponsive and corrupt systems,
so much so that even when there is a genuine opportunity to engage or provide
feedback, citizens often don’t do so” (Green, 2013b).
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Most of these projects using digital technologies are based on the model that action on
the part of the individual will lead to action on the part of those in power when they
hear from their citizens. But if change does not happen, citizens learn not to bother
participating. A key demotivating factor in the two-way interaction between citizens
and governments using ICTs is the belief by citizens that nothing will come out of the
interactions.
Findings from this research illustrate how sustaining the motivation of citizens to
participate is a challenge. Interview participants attested to the importance of
understanding what drives citizens to engage in development projects. A critical
aspect is that people must have trust in feedback or accountability mechanisms and be
convinced that, by providing feedback, they can influence positive social changes.
There must be evidence that their actions, their agency, might lead to change.
Thus, it cannot be taken for granted that citizens, when given the opportunity to
provide feedback or interact, will have the incentives to do so.
Interview participant, Okune from Nairobi’s iHub, attests how “access is not really the
issue anymore. Simply giving someone a phone is not going to make them so excited
and start calling the government and demanding their rights you know? There's so
much else involved there. I think the question is – is the government willing to
change as a result of listening to Citizens Voices?” (Okune, 2015, in interview).
Okune continues with regards to ICTs such as the mobile phone “as a communication
tool, yes, for sure it will continue to grow. As a tool to improve governance, as a tool
for social good, I think that’s a lot harder and that’s a lot more up in the air. It really
depends on, I think, government will” (Okune, 2015, in interview). And that is an
issue outside the realm of achievable goals in Media Assistance projects.
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Theme 6: Traditional Media platforms have underestimated potential for
engaging citizens
Traditional media Assistance projects provide positive results for engagement and
participation by citizens, as illustrated by project data.

As noted by participants in the research, the presumption of a link between ICTs and
Accountability processes is problematic. As illustrated by the project data, one of the
problems with digital technologies in media development work is that they do not
automatically guarantee participation by citizens or engagement in accountability
processes.
In an assessment of Twaweza initiatives, Lieberman et al. (2013) concluded “there are
lots of prerequisites to behavioural change and the usefulness of ICTs for generating
citizen action is likely oversold” (Lieberman et al., 2013).
Participation and engagement are central in media development work because of their
relationship to governance and democracy. Norris argued, political participation is the
“lifeblood of representative democracy” (Norris, 2002) and Hauser claimed that
democratic governance rests on the opportunity for citizens to engage in ‘enlightened
debate’ (Hauser 1998).
As noted in the literature review, Habermas’s study of the public sphere centred on the
idea of political participation as the core of democratic society. The public sphere
served as a forum for deliberation by citizens around issues and decisions relevant to
governing.
Habermas spoke of “the power of public discourses that uncover topics of relevance to
all of society, interpret values, contribute to the resolution of problems, generate good
reasons, and debunk bad ones” noting that “Discourses do not govern. They generate a
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communicative power that cannot take the place of administration but can only
influence it” (Habermas, 1992:452).
This concept of public sphere is central to models of deliberative democracy, which is
based on the idea that political decisions should be the product of fair and reasonable
discussion and debate among citizens. As distilled from the literature review,
Habermas, amongst others, had proposed that the media fulfilled the role of the public
sphere, until it was spoiled by its ‘structural transformation’ (Habermas, 1962; Hauser,
1998; Norris and et al, 2010).
Increasing political participation is also seen as one of the key routes to building
accountability between citizens and leaders. Accountability is enhanced when citizens
play an active role in making demands and when officials are expected to respond to
those demands.
This has implications for media development.
Often in media development projects the objective is to draw wider society into the
national conversation – reflecting a range of views and political opinions, thus
encouraging this ‘deliberation’. Yes, media assistance works towards strengthening
the independence and freedom of the media, but to what end? Because of its watchdog
role, its agenda setting role and its potential to hold leaders to account, thereby
contributing to democracy. This also involves bringing wider society into discourse,
debate and deliberation – not just urban groups or elites.
Media development projects use media and communication to help foster this political
participation. They can do this by providing access to information, stimulating
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discussion and helping people interact with decision makers. This is particularly
important around elections where media has a central role to play.
This relationship can be evidenced in the project documents from media development
organisations. For instance, the objectives of the BBC Media Action project in
Tanzania, Haba na Haba, included increasing the capacity of journalists and media
practitioners to produce quality radio programmes. This would contribute to
improving Tanzanians’ knowledge of key governance issues, including their rights
and responsibilities and the country’s political processes. They also aimed to “create
a national and inclusive conversation which results in Tanzanians feeling confident to
freely express their views about issues that matter to them and confident that these
views are being heard and responded to by their leaders” (Bangapi et al., 2017:10)
With the Sema Kenya project in Kenya, the BBC Media Action objectives were to
improve Kenyans’ access to reliable, trustworthy information and also increase their
knowledge of key governance issues. The project worked to “rebuild trust in the
democratic process in Kenya by creating a national and inclusive conversation and
debate and encouraging dialogue as a means of settling conflicts within and among
communities” (Buckell and Baskett, 2017:11).
The intended cumulative outcome for the project was that “individuals, communities
and governments…are better informed and more engaged in tackling challenges in
governance’ and thereby contributing to more accountable state-society relations and
governance ” (Buckell and Baskett, 2017:11).
Thus, while the media development sector focuses first and foremost on supporting
and strengthening the media sector it is often done in tandem with bolstering this
element of deliberative democracy – a platform for public debate. A platform for
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ensuring that citizens can become active participants in their societies, to engage
people across all sections of society.
As noted, participation is important for this research as digital technologies are often
posited as a new and better way in which global citizens can participate in the public
sphere and hold those in power to account. Can digital technologies do a better job
that traditional media in this manner?
Digital technology certainly has a role in achieving development goals, such as health
and improving public service delivery (Heeks, 2002; Sika et al., 2014; Singh et al.,
2010). And they have been mooted as assisting countries leapfrog development stages
(Fong, 2009; Steinmueller, 2001).
However, this research has shown how it can be a challenge to incentivise citizens to
engage and participate with digital technologies in some development projects. One
explanation proposed is that users have not seen evidence that using them will help to
make a change to their lives.
In contrast, results from a sample of projects that took part in this research show the
power of traditional media to nurture this citizen engagement. An evaluation of the
DFID-funded radio discussion programme, Sema Kenya, found that regular listeners
and viewers of the show were significantly more likely to participate in politics
frequently (34%) compared with those not exposed (21.5%) (Sema Kenya: Can a
debate programmeme increase people’s knowledge of democratic processes?, 2015).
In a separate evaluation for the Tanzanian radio programme, they found “Haba na
Haba contributed to people being more informed about and engaged in politics.
Audiences were more knowledgeable about the key governance issues that mattered to
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them, discussed these more with friends and family, and participated more in
governance-related activities – all factors that support bottom-up accountability”
(Bangapi et al., 2017:7).
A further example is the Twaweza project ‘MiniBuzz’, a daily current affairs
programme on TV with the goal of stimulating citizen debate among Tanzanians. Set
in a dalla dalla (a commuter mini-bus), the programme aims to “stimulate agency by
informing and providing space for exchange of views among citizens” (Wolff and
Lipovsek, 2014).
A report praised the show for its setup, which allows for a large variety of people, who
usually do not express their opinions publicly, to share their thoughts on issues such as
service delivery, quality of education, food prices and even traffic jams in Dar es
Salaam (Wolff and Lipovsek, 2014).
These types of TV and radio show are popular when trying to model behavior
changes, especially empowerment. They might empower citizens and encourage
‘agency’ to demand their rights. Wolff and Lipovsek argue “every day, millions of
people watch that show, so imagine if every day you see ordinary people like yourself
speak out and have an opinion, angry at the government or pleased with the
government. We think that if you see that every day, it will do something to your own
psyche as well. At some point, you'll start feeling it normal that you can do that”
(Wolff and Lipovsek, 2014).
A study by Rath et al (2015) found that of the 13 million Tanzanians (or nearly half of
those who watch TV regularly) who have seen Minibuzz, the majority watch it to get
information on current topics or hear the views of ordinary citizens: 18% reported this
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was the best part of the show (Rath et al., 2015). The report found that “Twaweza’s
programmes have ushered in innovative citizen agency around important social,
economic and political issues of the day” (Rath et al., 2015:93). De Graaf confirmed
Twaweza now hope to make more impact with media partnerships such as these.
What the evidence from this sample of media development projects illustrates is that
digital technologies alone have limited success for engagement and participation in
public accountability or governance projects, whereas traditional media platforms
have shown to be successful for these goals. This points to why many organisations
continue to use traditional media to achieve these same objectives.

Theme 7: Traditional Media assistance methods remain relevant
Stakeholders confirm there is a continuing need for journalism training and capacity building,
but in a different format.

Focusing on the non-technical aspects of media support interventions leads back to a
central part of media development projects since their emergence decades ago as part
of democracy support programmes. A significant aspect of ‘democracy promotion’,
media assistance has the objective of fostering ‘free and independent media’. Part of
this process is to increase the skills of journalists and strengthen the capacity of media
organisations.
The topic of training in media development projects has received much criticism over
recent years in evaluations of projects and strategies (Howard, 2003; Ognianova,
1995; Rhodes and Lange, 2007; Skjerdal, 2011). This is especially true in light of
analyses of media development activities where “parachute professors” delivered
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short, culturally insensitive and in the end, ineffective journalism training (Ognianova,
1995).
Hume coined the term “media missionaries” for the journalists and media workers who
poured into the former Soviet Union (FSU) after the fall of the Berlin Wall “to spread
the gospel of democracy…. some of America’s most altruistic journalists, who hoped
to midwife a newly independent press” (Hume, 2004).
Miller has criticised how “media assistance donors – project originators, designers and
funders – conceive of their work in ideal terms as a kind of supra-political, even
altruistic technology transfer. Exporting Western journalism as a means of
establishing democracy, from this point of view, is hardly contentious; it is, instead, a
gift, from the developed West to the ‘transitional’ or developing Rest” (Miller,
2009:10)
Eric Chinje, from African Media Initiative, spoke in interview about traditional media
development training and how it “could go on forever with nothing really happening. I
know that first hand because over two decades in the World Bank, I trained easily,
easily 2500 reporters, easily. Every year I had anywhere between 200-300 and it went
nowhere” (Chinje, 2015, in interview). As Rolf Paasch said of Tanzanian journalists
“they have been over-workshopped!” (Paasch, 2014, in interview).
However, journalism training is still recommended in media development policy
documents and during this research it was found that several of the interview
participants supported training but in new and different formats. Chapter 5 illustrated
the enduring need for further professionalisation of the sector and support for
journalists in Kenya and Tanzania.
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Eric Chinje from AMI, Ernest Sungura from Tanzania Media Fund and Anthony
Wafula from HIVOS all argued that journalism training and capacity building is still
needed in the region. They stressed however that is has to be the right type of training
and targeted at the right people. In the African Media Initiative project, Chinje
envisaged a continent-wide network of mentors and trainers in speciality subjects
which would have more impact than years and years of training individual journalists.
John Okande from UNESCO believes this format would work better: “We need to do
more mentorship, specialised mentorship on the critical elements”. “Rushed training”
was one of the leading causes of challenges amongst community radio stations. Radio
agents admitted not being completely comfortable with the technologies, but did not
communicate this due to lack of time” (Okande, 2015, in interview).
Dickens Olewe supports a mentoring approach, “not necessarily just a seven day thing
and then go back to your newsroom….. that doesn’t work I think.. because it's a
different eco-system” (Olewe, 2015, in interview).
He suggested that embedding trainers and mentors in newsrooms is the way forward.
“Something the Code4Africa did about two years ago, they sponsored a training
fellow to be in the news room for six months. Essentially you have your training but
then you also have somebody seconded to follow you in the newsroom and to be a
resource to help you with the stuff you have learnt and also to help at no cost.. His
expenses are paid for by the sponsoring organisation and through that, you can
hopefully start planting seeds of change” (Olewe, 2015, in interview).
Elsie Eyakuze, a Tanzania Blogger and key informant, suggested that donors should
“stick around and actually spend the money on quality, longevity and dependability
rather than simply quantity and youth-centric stuff. Investing in media is investing in
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the intellectual trust of a country, that’s not something done lightly” (Eyakuze, 2015,
in interview).
The data relating to the professionalisation of the journalism sphere in these countries,
and presented in Chapter 5, shows that there is still much to be done and support
needed. There is always a need for impartial and reliable information. As Howard
argues “a reliable news media enables well-informed citizen decision making that,
when freely exercised, in turn contributes to democratization” (Howard, 2003:8). As
noted in the literature review a strong fourth estate can support accountability and
transparency.
Siema Patterson from UNDP also admitted quietly that, despite the exuberance in
Kenya with regards to ICTs and the sharp growth in mobile phones and citizen
journalism, “at election time, Kenyans still turn to the BBC” (Patterson, 2015, in
interview). This suggests that citizens still want a trusted, reliable source of news to
supplement their information requirements at these critical times.
The data illustrated how data journalism training has been a successful media
development intervention by Internews. As a result of Open Government partnerships,
governments around the world have committed to making more data available to the
public. This has created opportunities for data integration into investigations, as
journalists begin to bring data into their work. Data journalism has proved to be a
successful new media assistance method in which journalists will continue to need
skills training in accessing, interpreting and re-visualising this data for the general
public. It illustrates how the traditional training model has adapted to the new digital
environment.
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Theme 8: The changing information ecosystem makes media assistance
more relevant than ever
Digitisation and fragmentation of media means that independent and reliable news platforms
are more important than ever and these need donor support.

This research has focused on digital technology and media assistance in the SubSaharan region. Throughout the research other interesting trends were revealed, in
particular with regards to growth of traditional media outlets, which was noted by the
stakeholders. One of the by-products of a focus on new technologies and social media
is not to fully appreciate what has been happening with traditional media in the same
period.
Notable changes have also occurred with traditional media over the last 5 or 10 years,
which has grown in popularity in many parts of Africa, and elsewhere. In many
settings, the number of radio and television stations, satellite television channels,
commercial and community channels, and broadcast channels has multiplied. As
noted in Chapter 5, there are considerably more of them available to consumers now.
This has created a competitive media market, and in some media markets (such as
Kenya) these outlets are increasingly targeted at particular communities. These can be
linguistic or ethnic communities, factional or political communities.
As a result, there has been a fragmentation of media, and a lot more media associated
with particular entities and identities in society. This has some advantages because it
has created a voice for communities who have never previously had a voice and now
have a legitimate outlet for anger or grievance. They are now able to have a discussion
in their own language and in their own community.
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However, according to stakeholder James Deane, Policy Director from BBC Media
Action, this can also lead to much more divisive politics, much more polarised
political contexts, and it has spilled over into hate media. This was evident in Kenya
around the 2007/8 elections.
Deane argues that these more fragmented media systems are “increasing political
polarisation and driving greater extremism in society” (Deane, in interview, 2015). In
this thesis, the Case Study analysis revealed how in Kenya and Tanzania there has
been an increasing corruption of media - political actors are increasingly buying up,
taking over, and intimidating the media to advance their own interests. Co-option of
the media by narrow factional interests appears to be growing. It is referred to as
‘media capture’ (Schiffrin, 2017).
Deane argues that “most of the media ... actually now doesn't exist to inform a public
or enable a public debate or even hold power to account in the public interests. It
exists to advance an agenda” (Deane, 2015, in interview).
As a result, what has emerged is a much more crowded, complex and much more
polarised set of media environments, and much more disaggregated information
environments. And as people become increasingly exposed only to information and
opinion with which they already agree, the resulting “echo chamber” effect drives a
process of so called ‘group polarisation’ (Sunstein, 2009).
This is remarkably different to the media landscape of post-cold war Europe where
media development first gained traction. In the post-Cold War days when Media
Development thrived, there was very little trust in government media. This is still the
case and most state broadcasters are in trouble when it comes to trust. Bussiek claims
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a majority of citizens are dissatisfied with their national broadcasters and that “they
lack credibility – perhaps the most important quality for any successful media”
(Bussiek, 2016). But, increasingly, so are a lot of commercial media (Moehler and
Singh, 2011).
Thus, what is becoming more urgent in such a fractured, polarised and politicised
environment is a reliable source of information, a source that audiences can trust.
Deane claims audiences “want something that they can trust and rely upon to
triangulate all the other information they’re getting” (Deane, 2015, in interview).
The need for reliable news sources and a platform for a national debate is especially
valid in the context of countries in conflict or transition. In countries like Kenya and
Tanzania, which have many ethnic groups, often with tension “bubbling just below the
surface” (O Neill, 2015), it is becoming especially important that there is a trusted
platform for a national public conversation, which represents the views of the whole
of society and reflects a range of views and political opinions.
Putzel and Van der Zwan (2006) argue that in countries where there has been conflict,
such as the post-election Kenya, there is a need for a national public platform through
which people can argue out their differences, understand each other, and understand
people who are very different from themselves ethnically, politically or religiously
(Putzel and Van der Zwan, 2006). However, as noted, media in these countries are
often aligned with political and ethnic groups.
Deane argues that “currently it is very difficult to see where that national public
conversation would take place” (Deane, in interview, 2015). Whether such national
conversations can occur on social media or the virtual public sphere is questionable as
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these spaces have been shown to create ‘echo chambers’ (Sunstein, 2009) and Fenton
argues that social media “reinforces political fragmentation and inhibits solidarity
among the disenfranchised” (Curran et al., 2016).

Furthermore, Papacharissi maintains that the internet frequently fragmentises political
discourse and risks “spinning them in different directions” (Papacharissi, 2002) and
Gerhards & Schäfer suggest that internet technologies “might actually silence societal
debate" (Gerhards and Schäfer, 2010).
In a report from the Centre for International Media Assistance, Abbott argued
Contrary to the idea that digitization provides a panacea for all that’s wrong with
media systems, many experts believe that what is fundamentally still needed across
the world is better journalism, along with a means of ensuring that all people have
access to fair, balanced and quality news and information (Abbott, 2016:6).

As noted, interview participant Siema Patterson from UNDP revealed how most
Kenyans “still turn to the BBC World Service” when it comes to election time in that
country (Patterson, 2015, in interview). Despite an increase in news outlets now
available to them, new and old, they believe they can trust the information from this
source. This was reinforced in a survey on the value of the BBC's brand in Africa
where the BBC was found to be the most admired media brand in the region (Shishkin,
in email 2015).
The evidence from this research suggests that the need for donor supported assistance
for independent and impartial media, one which can reach the broad populace, provide
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a platform for balanced and ‘rationale debate’ and has not been subject to ‘media
capture’ (Schiffrin, 2017) is more urgent than ever. Abbott questioned “whether
commercial media systems alone can adequately provide for quality news and
information with sufficient democratic value” (Abbott, 2016:6).
As Nelson noted “although it is extremely important to stimulate innovative new
platforms, it is at least as important to help trusted sources” (Nelson, 2012:22).

Conclusion: The resilience of the traditional media assistance model
When assessing the contribution that digital technology can make to media
development goals, it is worthwhile to recap what the original motivations and aims of
the sector are. As covered in Chapter 1, media assistance programmes have
historically focused on strengthening the media sector, promoting better governance
through accountability and transparency and supporting a healthier public sphere.
Support for these programmes is based on the presumption that these goals would
create a healthier and stronger democracy (Kumar, 2006).
Projects and activities work to improve standards and quality of journalism, and also
assisting in the creation of regulatory and legal environments which provide an
“enabling environment” for a free press. The objectives of the media development
sector are varied but all focus on a more robust and plural media sector which can
hold those in power to account.
The primary focus of this thesis is whether media assistance is still relevant given
the digital transformation in the media and communications environment. In
particular, it investigates at the impact of digital technologies on the relevance of
media assistance in Kenya and Tanzania. Have ICTs impacted on the practice of
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media assistance in these countries? And if not, what is the rationale for a continuing
emphasis on traditional media methods?
Analysing the data from this research has shown that although use of digital
technologies is certainly growing in East Africa, and have provided alternative
platforms and avenues for news, media development organisations are not necessarily
changing their practice to achieve donor goals. Despite enthusiasm for the use of
ICTs in development, this research found that digital divides still persist in Kenya and
Tanzania and this impacts on the decision of what interventions are used in media
support initiatives.
This chapter analysed the reasons why digital technologies have not been effective in
achieving donor objectives, such as citizen engagement, participation and
accountability in Kenya and Tanzania. It found that
o For reaching young, urban based youth in the region with messaging for behaviour
change, yes, digital technologies certainly have a role. However, this group is not
a majority in Kenya and Tanzania and there is still a digital divide.
o For increasing citizen engagement for governance and accountability - long-time
aims of the media development sector – ICTs have not yet proven themselves as
effective tools to achieve these objectives. The ICT4Accountability model is
flawed.
o Traditional ‘media development’ and ‘media for development’ approaches
continue to be used to address donor objectives, including engaging citizens, and
key stakeholders explained the rationale why this is the best approach
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o For goals such as widening of the public sphere and providing platforms for broad
national discourse, these are better addressed by a medium that can be accessed by
all of the population: radio being the most prominent means of access.
o The internet is not an ideal public sphere, and online spaces have increasingly
become fragmented and fractured further limiting its role as a unifying platform
for national and cross-ethnic discussion.

The reasons for failures, or not using digital technologies, were discussed. Engaging
audiences and citizens using these ICTs is not straightforward. The findings suggest
that projects need to use traditional media or community outreach in conjunction with
ICTs for more success. This is supported by research by Nairobi’s iHub, who found
that using ICT tools for governance (or e-participation) is most effective in cases
where low-cost and non-internet based methods and tools (such as radio and feature
phones) are used, and in areas where forums exist for citizens to physically meet, then
follow up on issues raised using ICTs (Sika et al., 2014).
Citizens need to see the benefits of why they should use these technologies, and see
the results of doing so. In particular in Tanzania, citizens also need to feel empowered
or they have ‘agency’ enough to assert their rights.
As Rajani (2008) argues “citizen agency is not only the purpose – or the ends – of
development and democracy, it is also its most effective means” (Rajani, 2008).
The data from this research suggests that technology is not a ‘silver bullet’ for media
development. Colin Spurway from BBC Media Action in Tanzania suggests that
donors should be “sceptical about pressures to use new technology” to achieve these
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objectives “just because new technology is making such an impact on our rich western
lives” (Spurway, 2015, interview).
Spurway argues that when it comes to media development work, “it is important not
to be distracted by the latest gimmick. If people are suddenly excited about Snapchat
it doesn’t mean you got to go and do everything on Snapchat or WhatsApp. We need
to have a more stable perspective than to be that sort of reactive. And we have to be
grounded in the realities of our audiences’ experience and not just our own” (Spurway,
2014, in interview).
It is for these reasons that more often than not media development organisations are
continuing to use traditional approaches: training, capacity building, and production of
relevant content, in particular supporting local news and strengthening platforms for
national discussion.
What this research thesis suggests is that the broad societal, political and cultural
issues at play in citizen participation, accountability and good governance are not
easily addressed with new digital technologies. As noted by Nelson, “getting
constructive outcomes for and from media systems requires thinking about media
development more as a governance issue rather than a technical one” (Nelson, 2019)
The themes outlined in this chapter indicate that media development interventions
using traditional methods are certainly still relevant, and even perhaps underestimated,
in the new technological information ecosystems. This shall be discussed further in
the concluding chapter.
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Chapter 8

Conclusion

In the context of considerable enthusiasm from global donors with regards to the
potential of new technologies to answer development problems, this thesis has posed
the question as well as tested the proposition that Media Assistance is obsolete.
Examining the changes, if any, that have followed through to media development
projects in practice, the research has investigated whether the methods and approaches
of the Media Assistance sector are still relevant in an increasingly connected
technological global information system.
The thesis began with a discussion of the changing environment in which Media
Assistance now takes place. Donor priorities have changed since media assistance
emerged, as has the geo-political landscape in which it takes place. In post-Cold War
Europe, media assistance was seen as central to democracy building and establishing
free market societies. More recently, with the crisis in western journalism as a result
of the failing business model and pressure from online news, the model which media
assistance promotes as a template has been called into question. But in an
environment of ‘disordered information’ and fragmentation of media, this research
argues that media assistance can continue to play an important role.
Despite narratives of ‘Africa rising’, ‘Silicon Savannah’ and unchecked optimism
about ICTs and African development, this research finds there is currently limited
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application of digital technologies in media development work in the region. This is in
line with research by Kalathil (2017) who found that “overall, despite the advent of
digital media and the multitude of changes wrought within the global media
landscape, the priorities of broad media development assistance seem to have shifted
only marginally” (Kalathail, 2017).
This chapter, the Conclusion, will draw together the context, theoretical background
and significance of the research and conclude its assessment on whether media
assistance is still relevant in the current technological information ecosystem.

Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework for this study draws on theories concerning the role of
media in society and how media is related to development. The media development
sector is founded on a Theory of Change based on related theoretical positions
regarding the role of journalism and a free press in accountability and transparency,
participation in the public sphere and in democracy. The study also critically assessed
the theories of change related to ICT for Development and this was evaluated
throughout the research.
In Chapter One the media development theory of change was outlined and this model
draws on theories that were evaluated in the Literature review. The model, which is
based on Western liberal model of the press, suggests a fourth estate, which is free and
independent, will contribute positively to democracy.
This theoretical framework is based on the evidence of how an independent media,
which produces reliable and trustworthy information, can contribute positively to a
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democracy, through its role as watchdog, as agenda setter and as a platform for
discussion (Norris, 2008).
The media development theory of change is also based on theories of the public
sphere as advanced by Habermas, whereby, by means of the media, populations of a
country can fulfil their roles as citizens by participating in the public sphere, hold
leaders to account and influence how their country is governed. Much media
development work is based on this framework which reflects the importance of
political public dialogue and assumes that by strengthening the public sphere, it will
lead to greater debate, deliberation and discussion across society about important
issues. This is the rationale by which donors have used media assistance as a tool to
address participation, transparency and governance objectives.
Therefore, media assistance methods and activities, such as those outlined here
throughout the study, are presumed to contribute to a stronger media sector, a
strengthened fourth estate and an enhanced public sphere. These in turn contribute to
more reliable information being available for citizens, further educating them about
issues relevant to them and stimulating discussion which can empower citizens to hold
those in power to account. This process will, in theory, result in increased
participation in public life, improved accountability and thus better governance.
However, there are flaws in this theoretical framework, which have been discussed
throughout the study. One is whether the media in many settings today can be
considered truly independent. As noted in the country profile chapters, the media in
both Kenya and Tanzania are not considered independent, are owned and controlled in
the main by politicians and businessmen, and these are used to promote their owners’
agendas, whether business, political or electoral aspirations.
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In this thesis, Chapters 5, which presented a Case Study analysis, revealed how in
Kenya and Tanzania there has been an increasing corruption of media - political actors
are increasingly buying up, taking over, and intimidating the media to advance their
own interests. Co-option of the media by factional interests appears to be growing
and is referred to as “media capture” (Schiffrin, 2017; Powell, 2017). In these
countries, it was also noted how ethnic and tribal conflicts are played out through the
media.
Under these circumstances, where owners control and influence the agenda of the
media, it is difficult for journalists to carry out impartial and unbiased reporting, as it
is taught in media assistance programmes. Thus, regardless of how good these
capacity-strengthening programmes are, when journalists are working under challenge
of media control, self-censorship and sometimes intimidation, it is difficult to
implement and undertake the role of watchdog, and fulfil this democratic role.
Another problem with the theoretical framework for media development assistance is
that it is difficult to define what development is. As noted in the Chapter 3,
“developed” can mean different outcomes for different donors. For instance, the UN
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) focuses on 17 goals which include gender
balance, migrant issues and climate change.
And, how does one define when a country is finally “developed”? One criticism of
media development is that it remains closely allied to the “modernization” paradigm
of development, the idea that the underdeveloped could be ‘developed’ through the
transfer of particular technologies (Lerner 1958; Shcrammb1964; Rogers 1962). As
noted, Rogers proposed that media could be a ‘magic multiplier’ for development by
fostering transmission of messages between the developers and ‘developees’ (Berger,
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2005:3-4), irrespective of the impact that this would have on local cultures. ReidHenry called this “the replacement of traditional poverty by a more modern form of
misery” (Reid-Henry, 2012).
Furthermore, modernisation theory has been criticised for using western-style political
and social institutions as indicators of progress. For instance, according to this theory,
and the media development theory, “local media were expected to emulate Western
patterns of behaviour and contribute to the construction of democracy” (Miller,
2009:10).
The media development theory of change is based on western liberal ideas of the press
and this model promotes a privately-owned press. As Jacobson argues media
development theory of change “embodies a set of normative values concerning what
journalism has to offer Western-style political systems” (Jacobson, 2019:191).
The theory does not take into account local cultures and contexts nor how
understanding of concepts of impartiality or objectivity can change depending on the
“developee” (Berger, 2010:550). Nyamnjoh (2005) argued that western media
programmes, instead of acknowledging local conditions, required that ‘aspiring
journalists in Africa must, like containers, be dewatered of the mud and dirt of culture
as tradition and custom, and filled afresh with the tested sparkles of culture as
modernity and civilization’ (Nyamnjoh, 2005:3). Shaw outlined that that “the African
model of journalism lays emphasis on the community (civil society), or communities
(civil societies), the Western Liberal model emphasises the individual” (Shaw,
2009:20).
Furthermore, Skjerdal offers that “libertarian discourse assumes an exclusivist view of
the journalism profession where the media constitute a clear-cut fourth estate and
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journalists accordingly make up a fraternity distinct from other societal communities.
In contrast, African journalism models are strong in their belief that social and cultural
identity comes prior to professional identity” (Skjerdal, 2012:648).
As outlined by LaMay (2008), “exporting press freedom” is a complex endeavour and
has been a complicated and not altogether successful process for many media
assistance programmes in the past decades.
More recently, media development programmes have acknowledged the flaws within
the model and are more rooted in local communities and consultation with
“developees” (Berger, 2010:550).
Thus, the media development theory of change is not without its shortcomings. In fact
Noske-Turner argues that “few media assistance evaluations manage to provide sound
evidence of impacts on governance and social change” (Noske-Turner, 2014). And
Schiffrin and Zuckerman argue that “the multitude of variables that affect any process
of social change makes it hard to isolate—let alone measure—the impact of
journalistic efforts” (Schiffrin and Zuckerman, 2015).
Abbott offers that, when it comes to media development, there are many “unique
challenges” for “selecting a research framework or methodology to assess impact. One
reason for this is media development constitutes a vast range of activities, programs
and types of support” (Abbott, 2019:48). In fact, she questions “whether there is a
measurable theory of media development and one that is evaluable” (Abbott,
2019:42).
At the same time as critically reviewing the theoretical framework on which the media
assistance sector is founded, this thesis has also tested the ICT for development
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framework. This theoretical framework assumes that ICTs can contribute positively
to the same development goals as the media assistance sector. The narrative in
western media in past years has reflected a cyber-utopian approach to development
and democracy with regards to what mobile phones and the internet can do for the
continent of Africa. The objectives of the ICT4Development sector often overlap
with those of the media development sector – that is, citizen engagement,
transparency, accountability and governance.
Zanello and Maassen (2011) confirmed that since the late 1990s, the prospect of using
ICT to improve accountability, transparency and effectiveness of authorities has
attracted much optimism (Zanello and Maassen, 2011). The opening up of new online
public spaces, potentially accessible by all, has resulted in assumptions about
increasing participation and accountability in the democratic sphere of a country.
Techno-optimists such as Negroponte, Sachs and Diamond talk of “liberation
technologies” and proclaim a new democratic space has been created that can be
accessed by all which “will increase the political influence of ordinary citizens”
(Graham, 1999:79).
But this has not necessarily occurred.
The flaws with this model have been discussed: The internet may provide an
additional space for political deliberation, but its role in extending the public sphere is
limited because of its fragmented nature, inequalities in access, uncertainty regarding
validity of information and the phenomenon of echo chambers. For instance, Polat
(2005) argued that the internet does not offer much for extending the public sphere or
providing an alternative virtual public sphere because the internet is not universally
accessible by everyone. Dahlberg argues that online discourse is overall too
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fragmented and decentralised for a public sphere: “online deliberation appears to take
pace among like-minded people which results in a fragmentation of cyber-discourse
into mutually exclusive cyber-communities” (Dahlberg, 2001:618). Papacharissi
suggests that the electronic public sphere is “exclusive, elitist and far from ideal”
(Papacharissi, 2002:14).
This research illustrates that ICTs are not necessarily the best tools to achieve
development goals and engagement with them has been disappointing.
A complication with both these frameworks - the media development model and the
ICT for development model - which was highlighted in the study is the assumption
that end users of these programmes will act as expected. With some ICT projects end
users did not engage or use the technology as presumed.
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Figure 15. The ICT4Development Theory of Change and the Media Development Theory of Change
are often working towards the same development goals and this is the framework on which this
research is based.

This challenge was illustrated with the ICT4Accountability projects presented in this
study. The assumption with those projects is that “technological interventions are
almost sufficient unto themselves [and that they] set into motion social forces and
reactions that result in increased accountability and responsiveness” (Myers, 2013:25).
But the data shows how end-users, audiences and citizens do not necessarily behave in
the ways assumed in these theories of change. This can be as a result of a range or
reasons including apathy, or disillusionment with the political system, and lack of
belief that their actions will produce change.
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The same could be said with traditional media assistance programmes - even if
citizens have more information and better information available to them, they may not
use this in activities that progresses better transparency or governance or results in
‘development’.
Zuckerman and Schiffrin (2015) note that “just because journalists have exposed
people to information doesn’t mean that people will take action or demand policy
changes in response to that information” (Schiffrin and Zuckerman, 2015).
This research evaluated two interrelated theoretical frameworks which are based on
theories of media, public sphere, development and ICTs in Development. It finds that
despite techno-deterministic claims of the potential of ICTs in development, in fact
traditional media assistance methods (i.e. strengthening the institutions of traditional
mass media) are still more relevant in this sample of projects and can make a positive
contribution towards achieving development goals.
The theoretical framework and the theory of change on which media assistance is
founded, although not perfect, remain valid in the context of this research.

Empirical Findings
The main findings were presented and analysed within Chapters 6 and 7 and are
summarised below in response to the research question: Is Media Assistance obsolete?
Specifically, the research asks: have digital technologies impacted on the relevance
of media assistance in the chosen case study countries? (RQ2)

356

To answer this, the research investigated, through a process of practitioner-based
studies, a series of sub-questions, which will be dealt with in this section:

What are the characteristics of the current media and information environment
in the selected case studies of Kenya and Tanzania? (RQ 2a)
The research showed the extent of change in media in Kenya and Tanzania as a result
of use of mobile phones and new digital technologies, as this will impact the uptake of
these tools in media development work. Arguably, radical changes in the media
systems and audience habits in these countries will have an impact on the
interventions needed and the practice of media development in those countries. The
research illustrated, through primary and secondary data, how the media landscapes
and media sector have changed in the case study countries as a result of digitisation.
The data revealed that the information ecosystem in Kenya and Tanzania have
changed considerably in recent years, in particular with the introduction of mobile
phones and social media applications. There has been notable growth in citizen
journalism and a convergence of new and older media with radio and mobile phones.
The data illustrated how the growth and penetration of digital technologies has
provided important access to alternative news sources and online fora such as Twitter
and Facebook have widened the public space for discussion for the citizens of Kenya
and Tanzania.
This is particularly important for areas not served by traditional media outlets. Citizen
journalism platforms such as HiviSasa have provided essential new sources of news
for rural audiences, relevant to the populations who are not served by a Nairobicentred and Dar-centred news agenda.
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However, in the case study countries, issues related to the digital divide limit the
extent to which this has broadened the public sphere and access to trusted, quality
information. Problems such as cost, location, electricity, gender and education limit
uptake of newer digital media amongst the wider populations of Kenya and Tanzania.
Use of these platforms is often limited to urban populations and not rural populations.
There are also problems of a gender digital divide as well as the urban-rural split, or
“dual narrative”, when it comes to experiencing the benefits of newer technology.
Moreover, it was noted that digital technologies could even be widening the digital
divide in some countries. Alzouma found that newer forms of media can be
“intimidating technology which can contribute to widening the gap between those
who possess everything and those who do not” (Alzouma, 2005:352) .
Therefore, despite growth in these technologies, in particular the mobile phone, the
most popular medium remains the radio, which can be accessed by the broad
population.
The study then investigated what these aforementioned changes in the information
ecosystems of Kenya and Tanzania mean for the media development sector. Are
Media development NGOs using digital technologies in their projects along with, or in
place of, traditional media?

What are the characteristics of current media development practice in a modern
East African context? (RQ 2b)
To address this question, the thesis interviewed key stakeholders undertaking projects
in Kenya and Tanzania and through face to face interviews learnt whether they are
now employing digital technologies in their media development projects. This
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enabled the research to get the perspective of those working in practice as to whether
digital technologies are relevant for donor objectives.
Chapter Six documented the findings relating to projects being undertaken in Kenya
and Tanzania at the time of the fieldwork. The project data examined the objectives of
each of these projects is including the methods with which the project and
organisations address these objectives; the extent of their use of ICTs in these
projects; and the outcome in relation to their projects activities.
The data illustrated that Media Development Organisations are not using digital
technologies to a great extent in their programmes in this region. Media Capacity
projects attest to using them only peripherally. Media sector reform and capacity
building projects such as those undertaken by Tanzanian Media Fund, African Media
Initiative and Kenyan Media Programme attested to limited or no use for digital media
in their programmes.
The larger “hybrid” projects still use traditional media to reach wider target groups,
with digital technologies as “add-ons” or “future-proofing”. This was evidenced with
the BBC Media Action capacity building and content creation projects.
On the positive side, successes were discovered with regards to use of digital
technology in the area of Data Journalism, which is linked to recent Open Government
policies in the region and more data becoming available to the public. Internews have
shown success in this area.
The convergence of radio with mobile phones, enabling two-way communications,
chat shows and debates were successful activities in terms of achieving participation
in the public sphere using digital technologies. UNESCO and Farm Radio had
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success in this regard with their Participatory Radio initiatives. Thus, mobile phones
are offering new and exciting opportunities for audiences to participate in radio
broadcasting and on-air debates (Allen and Gagliardone, 2011).
Successes using digital technologies and apps were also found where the target
audiences of communication plans focused on youth and in urban areas (with Well
Told Story projects for instance). However, these were more in media for
development and behaviour change projects as opposed to media sector assistance
projects.
The data also revealed limited success using digital technologies in projects where
participation in the new public space was expected for objectives such as service
reporting and accountability. Twaweza’s Daraja project was presented as an example
of problematic use of digital technologies for citizen engagement and accountability.

Have ICTs impacted on the practice of media assistance in the chosen case
studies? (RQ 2c)
The results show that use of new digital technologies in media development projects is
(currently) limited. This implies that they are not necessarily the right tools for
achieving donor media development objectives. For the most part, use of traditional
media continues to be favoured to achieve media development objectives with this
sample of Media Development Organisations. Explanations for this are related to the
issues such as the digital divide and how technology use is for the most part limited to
urban centres, as noted above.
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What was noted in relation to use of digital technologies in media development projects
is the significance of project objectives. And as illustrated by data in the Chapter 5, the
present-day needs of the media systems of Kenya and Tanzania include the creation of
local news and content, professionalising the journalism sector, platforms that hold
government accountable and the safety of journalists.
The Media Development sector focuses on strengthening and improving the capacity
of the media sector, but additionally, according to one leading advocate and
practitioner, the objective is ‘reach’ (Deane, 2015, in interview) 89 . This means
reaching those audiences who cannot easily access reliable information or news that
might improve their lives.
These groups are often the poor, the marginalised, women, or ethnic minorities. The
reason they need access to donor supported media might be to get access to better
information relating to food security, humanitarian assistance, information relevant for
elections or to give them access to a public platform.
Thus, Media Development projects needs to engage with, or reach, these groups by
the means and medium that are most appropriate to them in their current setting. It is
for this reason that the media development projects in this study remain committed to
using traditional media to achieve their project objectives, according to key informants
working in practice.
Consequently, digital technologies are not considered core to media development
activity at this time. These technologies are certainly revolutionising the information
landscape and citizen journalism provides an important source of news for citizens of

89 James Deane in interview 2015
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Kenya and Tanzania. But digital technologies currently offer limited advantages over
traditional media for the principal goals for media development in Kenya and
Tanzania.
As Deane from BBC Media Action notes: “I haven't actually seen a tremendous
amount of compelling evidence of how those projects that have specifically privileged
the use of social media or new technologies to achieve objectives in and of
themselves, having some unique advantage” (Deane, in interview 2015).

What is the rationale for a continuing emphasis on traditional media methods?
(RQ 2d)
By examining the sample of media assistance projects, the research provides a counter
narrative to the techno-optimism in relation to use of digital technologies for
development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, the data shows relatively low utilisation
of ICTs in the sample of projects reviewed.
The process and mechanisms by which citizens engage and participate using digital
technologies were revealed. What was found is that dissemination and diffusion of
digital technologies, such as mobile phones and social media platforms, is widespread
(but not equal) in Kenya and Tanzania but this is not enough to guarantee increased
participation and engagement. Digital technologies and social media are not
necessarily used in the ways assumed. Thus, the potential for these technologies to
achieve goals such as participation, governance and a more equitable public sphere
has not necessarily been realised in the way the cyber-optimist narrative envisages.
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For engaging citizens, and for public discussion and debate, traditional media remains
an appealing and relevant platform and evidence from projects has demonstrated
effectiveness.
Media Development interventions are based on thorough research of media systems
and audiences and for the most part the organisations participating in this research
deemed traditional media a more appropriate route to achieve their donor objectives.
This study showed that those projects more focused on media sector reform attested to
limited use or uptake in new technologies in their programmes. Their focus continued
to be on traditional capacity building or production training, and creating spaces for
public discussion.
Additionally, the target audiences of media for development projects in Kenya and
Tanzania (often rural populations) are not using mobile phones in an advanced way
beyond calling and texting, and media development programmes need to take this into
account.
While projects are being “future-proofed”, the radical impact of newer forms of digital
media has yet to be felt for many populations of sub-Saharan Africa that media
development projects work with. The sample of media development organisations
surveyed in this study reflects this.
This research has found that despite theoretical frameworks relating to digital
technologies, such as the ICT4Accountability model, assuming increased participation
by citizens of these countries, these technologies have not been shown to be
necessarily more effective than traditional media for achieving goals such as
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transparency, accountability and engagement. In the data from this research, this
model was shown to be problematic.
Regardless of innovation and the growth of the tech-industry, the most popular mobile
service currently is the money transfer service, M-Pesa. M-Pesa is a branchless
banking service, designed to enable users to complete basic banking transactions
without the need to visit a bank branch. Its success has been attributed to the fact that
it is free, simple to use, and a practical means to address a critical, previously
unfulfilled need in Kenya – banking without having to go to a bank.
This illustrates how the most successful application of technology in the region is one
that can be used by the broad populace, is easy to use, does not require high standards
of literacy and is accessible in both urban and rural areas. As key informant Kees De
Graaf from Twaweza noted: “there's very little technology that, with all its promises,
has made a real big difference in ... on top of just being able to talk to each other on
the phone (Graaf, 2015, in interview).
Therefore, in spite of what is often reported about the proliferation of technology use
in this region of Africa - and the possible advantages that it can offer for governance
and development - in practice, digital technologies have limited success in achieving
media development goals, according to the sample in this research.
Undoubtedly, mobile phones and the internet have had huge social and economic
impact for the citizens of Kenya and Tanzania (and elsewhere) but the political impact
has not been as significant. Tettey confirms that even though “a lot more people are
getting a lot more information”, this does not translate into a “significant expansion in
the numbers and categories of those who engage in, and hence influence, the direction
of politics on the continent” (Tettey, 2001:153).
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These findings need to be considered when approaching donor policy and
development goals relating to good governance and accountability in this region.

Contribution to knowledge
This current work offers a new perspective and understanding of the field of media
assistance. Geertsema-Singh (2019) notes that to date there has been little scholarly
research in the area of media assistance and that there is “almost no research on NGOs
and media assistance” (Geertsema-Singh, 2019:2440). This research thesis provides a
critical review of media assistance’ evolution to date and contextualises it in the
current ‘new’ media environment. The study presents evidence for the positive
contribution that traditional media can continue make to development when digital
tools are being viewed as an alternative. It provides a fresh appreciation for
traditional media assistance methods in an environment where digital technologies are
assumed to provide solutions to a range of development problems.
The significance of the findings in this research is that they counter the dominant
techno-deterministic narrative with regards to ICTs in development. This will
hopefully counteract some of the hype for technology and support an evidence-based
approach that is grounded in the realities of how people use and assimilate
technologies into their lives.
Whilst there are academic works which assess the impact of digital technologies on
journalism, on media, on society and on development, this research reveals the impact
of these technologies of media development in practice. It is a practitioner focused
study with real world informants providing an industry perspective on the issues of
media development assistance.

This thesis adds to the body of literature in that it
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reveals the crossover of Media Development Assistance and ICTs in its current,
applied working environment.
The research builds on previous academic work in the fields of journalism, media,
development and democracy, and brings a practical perspective to the role of media
assistance in the current technological era. Despite the techno-optimistic view of
development, this research has revealed the continuing importance of traditional
methods of support for media interventions in development.
The events around the Arab Spring created excitement and optimism about social
media and what it could do for political change but the subsequent events in the region
show how complex this link is. The results of this research imply that theoretical
frameworks such as the ICT for Accountability model are simplistic and the
relationship is not linear.
Media Assistance operates in a complex ecosystem. As highlighted in the Media
Development Theory of Change (Figure 2), media development operates on several
levels of influence: populations and citizens; journalists and producers; media and
academic organisations and the ultimate aim is to create change on a societal level and
a political level. As Stremlau notes “media assistance is highly political and is, in
itself, a form of political engineering” (Stremlau, 2019:69).
It has been difficult to agree a successful working model for media assistance for
precisely this reason.
In Media Assistance the process of change is not linear, in particular when trying to
create positive change on several levels. There are many challenges to creating
independent, free and unfettered press for development ends. But there are also
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complexities for using technologies to these ends. This thesis provides an evidencebased account that reflects this.

What was also noted in the research, and supported by the data, was the growth in the
“hybrid model” of media assistance. This is the merging of ‘media sector support’ and
‘media for development’ approaches.
This is a noteworthy contribution to the story of media assistance, how it has evolved
to take account of the local needs of media projects. The data from this research
supports the case for Scotts’ “hybrid model” (Scott, 2014) and underscores how the
model for media assistance changes to take account of local media needs, local
audience habits, donor project objectives – what is known by practitioners as a ‘needs
analysis’.
The data illustrated that in an East African context, media development practice often
takes this hybrid form. Within the sample of NGOs which participated in this
research, very few were focused solely on media sector support or reform. Within the
sample, there were several projects which had media for development activities but
which also contained elements of capacity building or training as captured in the
notion of the ‘media development hybrid’ (Scott, 2014).
Kumar (2009) noted in his book One Size does not fit all that the international
community should tailor media assistance to meet the unique needs of the societies
being helped. He notes:
If one looks at the history of media assistance during the past two decades, one finds that
policymakers and media practitioners have fashioned media interventions that take into
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consideration the distinctive social and political structures of a country and its level of
economic development, which affect the nature of political openings (Kumar, 2009).

This research study emphasises how the media assistance model is a responsive
model, and the project data from this research reflects that model. Media Assistance
continues to evolve in this complex technological infosystem. Perhaps that is why is
has been difficult for the media assistance sector to agree on a final working model
that fits all interventions.

Policy Implications
The outcomes of this investigation help frame the relevance of media assistance in the
current information system. With the swift penetration of digital technologies such as
mobile phones and social media as information sources, and with global citizens
getting access to news and information at any time, the possibility that media
assistance could be become obsolete is a real one.
Public Service Media
The previous chapter discussed the problem of increasingly polarised and political
media environments. The effect that these fractured and fragmented media
environments have on politics is topical. This subject has risen up the agenda with the
rise of populist governments, including the election to the presidency of Donald
Trump in the USA. There is a growing awareness amongst global audiences of terms
such as “fake news” (or “information disorder”) (Wardle and Derakhshan, 2017), of

368

online hate speech, internet trolls and even the negative effect social media can have
on mental health of users (Shakya and Christakis, 2017).
One media development practitioner notes “the tech optimism offered by the US West
Coast digital giants and the democratic energy of the Arab Uprisings so quickly
turn[ed] to information-powered factionalism, confusion and hate” (Deane, 2019).
As discussed throughout the study, there has been an expansion of the public sphere in
developing countries in recent years. Most of this has been seen as positive for
democracy. But due to media’s increasing fragmentation and polarisation and cooption of media in particular interests, there is now a need for more trusted, balanced
sources of information.
A possible solution to these fragmented media environments and a possible response
from the media development sector in Sub Saharan Africa is to focus on strengthening
national broadcasters or Public Service Broadcasting. In a report called Rethinking
Public Service Broadcasting, Abbott urged “international donors who support the
development of free and independent media around the world would be well-served to
pay attention to the role – and the potential – of public service broadcasting” (Abbott,
2016:1). She suggests that “PSB has a huge effect on social cohesion, democratic
understanding and social development” (Abbott, 2016).

The lack of trusted sources of information that people consider to be credible and
reliable, and the lack of platforms for public debate means the importance of national,
as well as local, public service broadcasting has become important again.
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Support for public service broadcasting has long been part of the range of Media
Development interventions that donors can support. The review of literature noted
that early examples of such support were led by Allied forces in Germany during the
Marshall plan in the aftermath of the Second World War. Foreign aid was used to
create what are now “arguably … most successful examples of PSB in the world –
Germany’s ARD and ZDF” (Abbott, 2016:10).
Lublinski argues that that media development should focus on transformation of state
departments of information as well as state broadcasters into public broadcasters
(Lublinski et al., 2014). However as noted by Harding (2015) “most state
broadcasters are little more than government propaganda machines owned and
controlled by the government. They are widely distrusted by large sections of the
population” (Harding, 2015:8).
Nevertheless, Bussiek notes that in particular in Africa:
As things stand, only national, state-controlled broadcasters have the potential to
provide news, education and entertainment to the broad majority of the population in
most countries in Africa. They dominate radio and TV services in all aspects: with
regard to technical reach, diversity of languages and popularity in terms of audience
ratings (Bussiek, 2016)

And Simon Derry, Regional Director for Africa and the Middle East at BBC Media
Action notes that the “behemoth state broadcaster… is becoming increasingly
irrelevant, and unless they are reformed they are going to die” (Harding, 2015:8)
The implication is that donor support for public service broadcasting or public interest
media could take a place higher up the agenda again. Deane refers to “public interest
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institutions capable of generating journalism and other media content capable of
underpinning informed public debate” (Deane, 2018).
Certainly, the need for reliable information and a public sphere where ‘rational
debate’ can occur seems more important than ever. As Papacharissi argued, just
because a virtual space has been created, this does not mean it is a democratic one “a virtual space enhances discussion; a virtual sphere enhances democracy”
(Papacharissi, 2002:11).
It may seem ironic that when public service broadcasting is on the retreat in western
societies it is the subject of donor support. In some countries, governments have in
fact cut funding for public broadcasters saying licence fees are too high and that they
represent too great an interference in the operations of the free market. In 2018, the
UK government insisted the BBC take over the funding of free licence fees for those
over 75 years of age and the BBC has faced considerable unpopularity from making
pensioners pay the licence fee. In the case of DK, the Danish public service
broadcaster, a 20 per cent budget cut imposed by the Danish government led to the
closure of three of the organisation’s six television stations plus three radio stations.
The Irish broadcaster, RTE, has been forced to sell off land and cut some
programming in an effort to remain viable.
However, the research suggests that in this current political environment, where
information spaces are vulnerable to manipulation and distortion, and public debate is
subject to polarisation and echo chamber effects, that this could be an important
avenue of support for media assistance. Canadian academic, Mark Starowicz, argues
“public broadcasting institutions are even more crucial today as we see the
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disappearance of public space and the atomization of audiences into special interest
constituencies” (Starowicz, 2000).
Harding (2015) argues that public service media have special characteristics relevant
in particular to divided societies. These media can contribute to social cohesion and
political stability where much of the rest of the media (both traditional and social) may
be fragmented along factional, religious, ethnic or other lines. He maintains that
public service media “can help people in divided societies to find common cause with
each other, enabling them to transcend the politics of identity to rebuild their often
fractured nations” (Harding, 2015).
For citizens of Kenya and Tanzania, access to information that people can trust, that
supports informed democratic debate, and can hold power to account would be a
valuable addition to the media landscape. But the survival of public interest media will
need donor support. As Abbot argues “capture of the private media means that simple
privatization is not a cure-all for creating a diverse media sector that promotes a
variety of views and opinions” (Abbott, 2016:1).
This does not have to be done exclusive of newer technologies however. For
example, some of the social media platforms that BBC Media Action have supported
are playing the same role as a public service broadcaster: The long running Al Mirbad
radio station in Iraq (which it helped to establish in 2005) now has almost 1.4 million
followers on Facebook and 1.8 million subscribers on YouTube.
The process of reforming state broadcasters is not easy however, and requires the buyin of the political class. There have been efforts in the past to transform the Tanzanian
State broadcaster, TBC, but this programme was stopped after the 2010 elections,
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when the government there interfered in the reform project. However, reforming state
broadcasters is still seen as a worthwhile endeavour and in recent years there have
been extensive reform projects launched in more than 25 countries (Harding, 2015).
Values
The research also has implications for the UN Sustainable Development Goals 90. The
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) suggest ways in which independent,
professional, diverse and pluralist media can contribute to development. Key SDG
targets that are relevant for media include:


16.6: Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels



16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representation decisionmaking at all levels



16.8 Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms

Goal 16 centres on peace, justice and strong institutions and the UN states that
“without peace, stability, human rights, and effective governance based on the rule of
law we cannot hope for sustainable development”. The UN suggests that independent
and professional media sectors have the potential to be actors for peace and
development through:


avoiding and reducing the spread of hate speech and disinformation leading to
violence;



providing conflict-sensitive reporting, informing on root-causes of conflicts
and peaceful solutions;

90 The Sustainable Development Goals are a collection of 17 global goals set by the United Nations
General Assembly in 2015 for the year 2030.
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offering a platform for dialogue and, as a trusted infomediary, supporting
broad-based social cohesion, rather than being a vehicle for reinforcing
identity politics.

These are themes that were noted throughout the thesis and this research suggests that
traditional media assistance approaches have a role in contributing to these
development goals. The implications for media development practice are that donor
interventions should focus on strengthening communities against these threats.
This research noted the technological and financial forces that are creating difficult
challenges to journalism’s traditional values, and this impacts on media assistance.
However, perhaps it is more important than ever to return to these values. Richard
Sambrook, Professor of Journalism and Director of the Centre for Journalism at
Cardiff School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies, maintains:
Over the past few years, traditional broadcasting and traditional newspapers looked
rather old fashioned and tired compared to the energy, vibrancy and enthusiasm of
social media. But after a few years, we have now reached the stage where people are
actually saying that some of the ethics, the processes, the traditions and values of
traditional journalism still do matter. (Sambrook, 2012)

The literature revealed the challenges with exporting a Western journalism model in
Media Assistance programmes and how there may not be a universal model that can
be imposed by western journalism trainers - this should be inculcated naturally and
emerge organically.
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But there are values, as opposed to practices, that are universal for journalism that
could contribute to social-cohesion and reducing conflict that are core to the
Sustainable Development Goals.
For instance, Kovach and Rosential argue in The Elements of Journalism that the
purpose of journalism is “to provide people with the information they need to be free
and self-governing” (Kovach and Rosenstiel, 2014:12). They maintain that the
essential elements of journalism are as follows: its first obligation is to tell the truth;
its first loyalty is to citizens; its essence is a discipline of verification; its practitioners
must maintain an independence from those they cover; it must serve as an independent
monitor of power; and it must provide a forum for public criticism and compromise
(Kovach and Rosenstiel, 2014).
The authors of course represent a western perspective of journalism, but media
assistance was founded on these principles of the press as a trusted source information
and a check on those in power. These core values must still be taught but could be
done to reflect African or other cultures where it is carried out. In addition, media
trainers could transfer an understanding of what media can do for communities and to
strengthen communities.
This thesis investigates the uptake and relevance of digital technologies to media
assistance. However, what is notable with regards to the environment in which media
assistance currently takes place is not just the technological changes but political
changes and especially polarisation of politics. Media has been fragmented and
fractured but so have communities.
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In his reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism, Benedict Anderson referred
to “imagined communities” in the sense of nations as a socially constructed
community, imagined by the people who perceive themselves as part of that group.
The media can perpetuate stereotypes through certain images and vernacular. He
defined a nation as "an imagined political community" (Anderson, 2006). So, whereas
media has had a role in the polarisation of communities (in the West and elsewhere),
can it now serve a role as a unifying force? Journalism and media trainers could train
in community, ethics, trustworthiness but on any platform, these values are platform
neutral.
So, perhaps in this highly networked and connected and fragmented information
ecosystem, media assistance and media development programmes need to revert to
core values, irrespective of which medium, to serve as a unifying force. Colonial
Africa created divided communities; indigenous tribes split by the drawing of borders
by the empires. But, given direction and support and focus, media might serve as a
facilitator in communities, as outlined in the SDGs: “offering a platform for dialogue
and, as a trusted infomediary, supporting broad-based social cohesion, rather than
being a vehicle for reinforcing identity politics” (UNDP Oslo Governance Centre,
2019). Effective, balanced journalism could help calm public discourse.
As noted in Chapter 6 and as illustrated by the research data, traditional media
assistance methods provide positive results for engagement and participation by
citizens. Chapter 6 discussed the particular need for reliable news sources and a
platform for a national debate in countries that are in conflict or transition.

There are

many African countries like Kenya and Tanzania (and elsewhere) that are home to a
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number of ethnic groups, often with tension “bubbling just below the surface” (O
Neill, 2015), and in which identity politics plays a large role.
As was noted therefore, it is becoming especially important that there are trusted
platforms for a national public conversation, which represents the views of the whole
of society and reflects a range of views and political opinions. This was discussed in
reference to some of the projects in this research data. The need for rational
discussion and debate was noted, to assist peaceful resolution and combat conflict and
violence. But this must be done in a balanced and measured manner, with skillful
mediating. This is another core value that could be transferred in media development
programmes – the capacity for journalists to preside and arbitrate debate and
discussion without being inflammatory and incendiary.
Consequently, media has the potential to serve as a unifying, rather than fracturing,
force in communities, but this would have to be done independent of the market and
for that reason will need continued donor support.

Hate Speech
A further implication for policy and practice is in the area of hate speech and how to
counter it. This issue was raised in the research, as during the post-election violence in
Kenya in 2007 reports alleged that ethnically-based radio stations in Kenya were
partly responsible for inflaming ethnic hatred (Allen and Gagliordone, 2011). But this
is a growing problem globally both online and offline, and exacerbated by the rapid
growth in mobile technologies and social media platforms.
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The media assistance sector is starting to address this issue in Africa and other
regions. In Myanmar, for instance, there are a number of organisations undertaking
programmes to counter hate speech. There has been a sharp rise in hate speech in
Myanmar, aggravating the ethnic and religious tensions in that country. In particular,
anti-Muslim statements are widespread on social media, which has contributed to the
escalation of violence across the country.
Myanmar is an interesting case study as it has seen massive growth in internet
penetration, mobile phone adoption and social media usage in the past few years,
spurred by the lifting of censorship and rapid opening up of its telecoms and media
market. Experts have expressed concern that this sudden access to the internet is not
being accompanied by discussions about how to critically read content. Myanmar has
a “low media and information literacy rate”, according to the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Myanmar office.
Clare Lyons of BBC Media Action in Myanmar concurs that “media literacy is not
high here. You have a country that for decades has been fed the news … they haven't
been exposed to that much in the way of real, critical news” (Lyons, in interview,
2017).91 Htaike Htaike Aung, Executive Director of Myanmar ICT for Development
Organization (MIDO) confirms “many Burmese with little education easily fall prey
to fake news and propaganda. Some users believe whatever they see on Facebook and
share it without first finding out if the post is true or false”3. There are also too few
trained journalists and insufficient media infrastructure to facilitate quality coverage
of the country’s most pressing issues (Foster, 2018).

91 This interview took place as part of a separate project
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This is a problem that has been created by the rapid growth in digitisation but one that
could be ameliorated by the media assistance sector. For instance, to counter hate
speech in Myanmar, BBC Media Action are running a project called the Tea Cup
Diaries (La Pe’ Ye Ta Kwe Ye Diari), a radio drama that hopes to increase
understanding and tolerance between different ethnic and religious communities. This
is a format that could be replicated in other countries.
The Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) has also worked on hate speech in
Myanmar, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, all countries emerging from autocratic
rule or war which saw similar trends of hate speech. IWPR started the ‘No Hate
Speech Project’ in Myanmar in 2016 to promote greater tolerance of ethnic, religious
and marginalised groups. Alan Davis from IWPR insists “not all hate speech is
deliberate and a lot of hate speech comes from a lack of understanding or awareness”.
Davis argues: “The way to beat hate speech is not through silencing people, but via
education, information, debate and getting all points of views, listened to and engaged
upon”.
Social media can be criticised for being a medium for hateful speech, but is in reality a
mirror of much deeper divides that exists in ethnically diverse countries. The rise in
digitisation, mobile phones and internet access have created new and exciting ways
for people to connect globally but there are also downsides as noted throughout this
research. These are familiar trends and hate speech is a global phenomenon.
For instance, Internews Kenya reported that since 2016, observers have noted a
resurgence of hate speech in community and local language media in Kenya. They
argue that this is mainly due to lack of capacity of journalists, and political
interference or ownership. This is particularly true for media houses based at the
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county level, where media is under resourced and susceptible to control of local
political interests (Internews, 2017). The area of most concern is the rise of hate
speech on radio talk shows on local-language stations, a primary source of news and
information for many citizens.
These are issues on which future media assistance projects might focus, returning to
and reiterating the values, ethics and “elements of journalism” (Kovach and
Rosenstiel, 2014). Aidan White, founder of the Ethical Journalism Network, argues
that to combat hate speech journalists need “to tell the truth, to respect the facts, to be
independent, to be responsible and, above all, to show humanity – oblige us to avoid
becoming propagandists and foot soldiers in political campaigns that nourish hatred
by feeding on the insecurities of people” (White, 2014).
This research suggests that media assistance should be confident in its core values
which are still necessary throughout the developing world as elsewhere. As Nelson
argues, “quality content is the ultimate goal of media assistance” (Nelson, 2009:22).
Thus, in summary, this research suggests that media assistance policy and
programmes could:


Serve as a unifying force for communities and be a facilitator in communities,
by providing a trusted platform for communities, and journalists who can
arbitrate over debates (in particular on-air radio discussion) in a balanced and
impartial manner.



Focus on its core values and ethics of journalism that can contribute to social
cohesion and reducing conflict, in line with the SDGs
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Work to counter hate speech and disinformation through media and
information literacy interventions, in addition to supporting the training of core
values and balance in journalism



Focus on reforming state broadcasters and strengthening public interest media,
to provide independent spaces for national and cross-ethnic debate

Limitations of the research
The results reported here should be considered in the light of some limitations. The
first is with regards to the long-term validity of the findings. With the speed of
technological change, and uptake and affordability of technologies in the region and
the wider world, what the current research found may not be applicable in five years’
time. However, this research offers a picture of the practice of media development at
a most interesting time.
Interview participants spoke of how Kenya and Tanzania may be at a “tipping point”
of the potential of mobile phones and internet with regards to access to information for
the broader population. Kharas and Rogerson reported that “by 2025 there could be
near-universal mobile phone coverage” (Kharas and Rogerson, 2012:11). Smartphone
penetration and access to the internet will certainly increase for Kenya and Tanzania
in the next years and media development interventions may change.
However, this is still not a guarantee that audiences and citizens will engage more in
politics. One reason offered for this is lack of agency. Another is the lack of belief in
their governments to act on information that citizens have communicated.
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Donor policies should support media development initiatives based on the realities of
media use by audiences and citizens in this region. Donors should consider how
citizens really engage and interact with these digital technologies and for what ends
they use them. Therefore, the potential benefits for media development goals should to
be continually assessed.
A second limitation is with regards to access to data. The researcher approached a
selection of organisations, and representatives of those organisations, that were
operating in the region and for the most part they were available and consented to
participate. The research findings presented in Chapter 6 were based on interview
data with stakeholders from 10 media organisations that were available to contribute
to the study. However, not all interviewees who were approached were responsive and
it is possible that data from other organisation may have produced different results.
The data from this research study provides a snapshot of media development activity
taking place in Kenya and Tanzania, and as such represents the variety of media
assistance in the region. Using a different sample of organisations may have produced
different results. Additionally, a sample of projects from other regions, whether in
Africa or elsewhere on the globe, might produce different outcomes with regards to
assessing the relevance of digital technologies for achieving media development
goals.
But as noted, media development is not linear, has many objectives and outcomes, and
the Case Studies and projects examined here provide a view of the sector at a most
fascinating time.
A third limitation could be in the data collection methodology. In this case face-toface semi-structured interviews were chosen for the method of collecting details of the
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stakeholder’s media development projects and also their perspectives on the media
landscape and the impact of digitisation in Kenya and Tanzania. Qualitative, semistructured interviews could be considered a less scientific and less precise method of
data collection, for instance, the researcher could have simply emailed the interview
schedule to the participants. However, the researcher believes the rate of response
was much higher, and faster, from the face to face interviews than would have been
from an email or survey methodology. Research has shown that in-person methods
get higher responses that other survey methods. Additionally, and as noted in Chapter
4, the semi-structured interview can lead to more open, honest and detailed responses
that more structured or written surveys.
Lastly, a limitation might be in the timing of the primary data collection. The face to
face interviews took place in Kenya and Tanzania in 2014 and 2015. Undoubtedly,
diffusion of digital technologies and social media have changed since those
participating projects were initiated, new projects have started and others have been
completed. However, in a sense this timeframe has made the study more relevant. In
the years since the explosion of mobile technologies and social media in the region
there has been a shift in the narrative relating to these technologies, and this study
reflects those changes. From initial exuberance about technologies and the potential
for development, to more recent balance about what ICTs can do for social and
political change, the time-frame means that the study has tracked the cycle of
emerging technologies, excitement about their potential and then the move to a more
evidence-based assessment of what technology can do for global citizens. As noted
by O’ Maley, initial cyber-optimism has “quickly given way to growing pessimism as
the internet has also been used for mass surveillance and the political mobilization of
non-democratic actors” (O’ Maley, 2019).
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In fact, the more harmful and disruptive aspects of social media and the internet, for
journalism, news, information and democracy, have only become apparent in recent
years which gives even more significance to the research.

Future Research Directions
This research investigates the impact of digital technologies on media development
practice in East Africa. It examines whether the methods and approaches of this
sector are still relevant in an increasingly connected technological global information
system. As part of the investigation the research looked at changing information
systems in Africa and the impact of new ICTs on the region. It was found that digital
technologies have not impacted on media development practice to a great extent.
However, other interesting aspects of the current media assistance landscape were
noted which could provide opportunities for further research.
This focus of this thesis was the relevance of media development assistance in a
changing media landscape. This is a question that the sector itself reflects on. There
are many conferences, round-tables and blog posts on whether media assistance has
the impact it intends to have and the difficulty of measuring its impact. Susman-Pena
calls it “the existential crisis” of media development (Susman-Peña, 2019).
Furthermore, as media assistance is such a politically sensitive development
intervention, it is susceptible to many external factors that can impact on programme
success. As remarked by Stremlau (2019), “media assistance is highly political and
is, in itself, a form of political engineering” (O’ Maley, 2019).
This research analysed a sample of programmes being undertaken in East Africa and
the extent to which ICTs were in use in project activities. The research did not
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evaluate whether these programmes were successful in their long-term objectives nor
whether they were deemed successful on completion. This is a possible avenue for
further research. More analysis of media development programmes which do use
ICTs (possibly in other regions with higher mobile and internet diffusion) might
produce interesting further research.
This research took a practice-based perspective to whether digital technologies are
impacting on the media assistance sector and its work. The reason for this is that the
researcher wanted the study to be grounded in the realities of working on the ground.
This could be a research approach for other research into media assistance going
forward. Often academic literature is theorised and written many miles away from
whether the work actually takes place. Presenting practitioners’ perspective on the
tools they use, the approaches that work, and sometimes more importantly those do
not work, gives a grounded view of work in the media development sector. Providing
Case Studies brings the data alive and gives more context to the underlying data. This
mixed methods approach could be replicated for research in other regions.
Another possible avenue for further research could be around the issue of fake news
and hate speech. The fragmentation and polarisation of media and the growth in socalled fake news and disinformation was noted. This is one area of potential focus for
media development practice to combat misperceptions, prejudices and hate speech.
Media literacy programmes are being implemented to help develop a critical approach
to news coverage by media consumers and to promote media awareness.
However, Bulger and Davison (2018) note that there is a lack of comprehensive
evaluation data of media literacy efforts.
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Media literacy has become a center of gravity for countering “fake news,” and a diverse array
of stakeholders–from educators to legislators, philanthropists to technologists–have pushed
significant resources toward media literacy programs. Media literacy, however, cannot be
treated as a panacea”(Bulger and Davison, 2018:1)

This is one area that is a current focus for media assistance efforts and donor funds but
it might be worthwhile to focus resources on researching evidence for its effectiveness
and what actually works to counter hate speech. For instance, media literacy efforts
are being focused on young people and school curricula, but recent research by Guess
et al. (2019) shows that people aged over 65 are much more likely than younger
people to share fake news on Facebook. That research found that just over 11% of
people aged 65 or over shared links to fake stories. By contrast, only 3% of those aged
18-29 actively passed on similar links (Guess et al., 2019).
As diffusion of mobile technologies, internet access and smartphones become greater
in these countries it is likely that these problems will become more widespread. What
can Media Assistance do to address these problems? And have any interventions to
date been successful? As hate speech and fake news are such topical and important
subjects there is certainly value in further research on these issues in the context of
media development assistance.

A final recommendation for future research relates to the political economy of the
funding for development and ICT4D. As was noted throughout the research, media
development activity is naturally tied to and shaped by the funding streams from
which it originates. As a result, media development and its focus over the decades has
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reflected the foreign policies of government donors and the ideological leanings of
non-government donors. Miller (2009) noted that media development during the Cold
War was “unavoidably influenced by the political self-interests of North America and
Western Europe, which were then engaged in a ‘war of ideas’ with the USSR” (Miller,
2009:12).
Chapter One outlined how not all the donors have the same priorities and do not
follow the same strategies. Europeans have a more rights-based reasons for supporting
media development, the US follows a more liberal, free market-model. Both are
different to the motivation behind Chinese media development activity in Africa,
which has been called “soft-power” (Mano et al., 2016). The motivation and ideology
of these donors, and the subsequent activities and programmes they fund, take
different forms and produce different outcomes. Freedman and Obar refer to “donorled initiatives” (Freedman et al., 2016).
As recorded, a trend in the media development sphere in recent years has been the
emergence of donors emerging from technology firms from Silicon Valley, who often
emphasise technological solutions for development. As Deane confirmed “if a
proposal didn’t include some form of digital app it was unlikely to be supported”
(Deane, 2018).
But as Manji (2008) asks regarding this widespread technological determinism: “Why
are we not holding conferences about the role of the pencil in development? Or the
role of paper? There is more evidence of social progress made by these humble
instruments than all the information and communication technologies (ICTs) over the
last 20 years” (Manji, 2008).
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Just as McChesney (2008) suggested a decade ago that a process of global media
mergers had concentrated control in the hands of a few multinational corporations
(McChesney, 2008), the same process is happening today with the technology
companies with regards to the grab for developing markets. Whether in Africa, Latin
America or the Middle East, technology companies are funding development projects
with an emphasis on digital solutions, to expand their “digital media empires” (Boyd
Barrett, 2014).
This research questioned the focus on digital technologies for media development.
Where did this techno-determinism originate? It was suggested that providing access
to new technologies in the Third World as part of development Aid could be a
mechanism of allowing corporations to establish new channels of market entry into
these developing commercial markets. Susman-Pena (2019) calls these “technical
solutions in search of problems” (Susman-Peña, 2019:252).
What is beginning to become apparent therefore is that these are not necessarily the
correct solutions. As an avenue for further research, it could be worthwhile to
undertake a more forensic analysis of ICT4 development activities and funding in
developing countries, using a political economy lens. As Gumucio-Dagron (2008)
claimed “in the name of the ‘digital divide’, great business is being made” (GumucioDagron, 2008:77).

These themes are touched upon in this current research but could be interesting
avenues for further research. These would be worthwhile and interesting studies in the
area of media assistance donor support.
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Conclusion
This research set out to ascertain the relevance of media assistance in today’s
increasingly connected and technological information environment. It explored the
changes that digital technologies have brought to the field of Media Development
Assistance in sub-Saharan Africa. Due to rapid changes in the amount and type of
information available to citizens, and the fractured and fragmented media environment
resulting from digital technologies and social media platforms, reliable and
trustworthy journalism and news is more important than ever, especially for local
populations. Media that provide this type of information, and supports “rational”
dialogue across broad populations are more crucial than ever.
This research concludes that within the current ‘post-truth’ information ecosystem,
Media Assistance is important and relevant. In a global environment of growing
divisiveness, populism and extremism in politics, donor-funded media assistance
could work to support the creation of reliable and trustworthy content and provide a
space where cross-societal debate, discussion and deliberation can occur. It can
contribute to the Sustainable Development Goals of maintaining peace and reducing
conflict and violence.
Hence, Media Assistance remains a significant and relevant part of the support that
donors can give for enhancing transparency, accountability, and good governance.
This is because of its potential role in helping journalists produce reliable and
trustworthy information, by providing platforms for citizens to discuss and debate
important issues, for them to hold those in power to account, engage and participate
and contribute to how they are governed.
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What citizens of Kenya and Tanzania, and elsewhere, need is a trusted news source to
turn to, to rely upon and with which to make sense of all the other sources of
information available to them in the new fractured information ecosystem. A source of
news that is balance, unbiased, fact based and independent of the editorial influence of
owners, or the market, would appear to be increasingly necessary.
As noted by Tim Berners Lee, the inventor of the World Wide Web, “even though we
have a new technology where information comes to us instantly over the wires… the
art and science of journalism is still really important” (Parkinson, 2015:5).
Despite the speed of technological change, and perhaps because of it, media assistance
remains a relevant tool for donors to use for democratic objectives. The research
concludes that media assistance is not obsolete, and in fact, may be more important
than ever.
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